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The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
network of client states and allies represented a period of turmoil and of hope. The 
hope that “democracy has won” and that its ascendancy was now almost inevitable, 
found its most famous intellectual manifestation in Francis Fukuyama’s End of 
History (1992) as well as a ready audience among the public and political class all 
over the Western World. 
 But the euphoria was short-lived. Collapsing economies in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, and a collapsing social order in a number of countries all 
over the world led to the realisation that unless the United States and its allies got 
involved, many of the post-communist countries were in grave danger of internal 
collapse.  
 The answer to these challenges was a resurgence of so-called nation-building 
across the globe. As well as a reactive measure for dealing with failed or new states, it 
has evolved since the attacks of September 11, 2001 into also dealing with territories 
“won” in offensive warfare.  
 In the public debate, the policy of nation-building, usually meaning the 
building up of stable democratic institutions and a wealth-increasing market economy, 
has been closely associated with the rebuilding of Germany and Japan after the 
Second World War. US president George W. Bush made this comparison in a speech 
proposing a massive program of reconstruction in Iraq after the invasion: 
 … America has done this kind of work before. Following World War II, we 
 lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany, and stood with them as 
 they built representative governments. We committed years and resources to 
 this cause. And that effort has been repaid many times over in three 
 generations of friendship and peace. America today accepts the challenge of 
 helping Iraq in the same spirit -- for their sake, and our own. (Bush 2003) 
Most other US nation-building exercises have not led to stable democratic, market-
liberal regimes. One widely-quoted comparative study shows success in four of 16 
cases, Germany, Japan and tiny Grenada and Panama in the 1980’s (Pei and Kasper 
2003)  
 It is therefore natural that American policy planners have turned to the 
successful cases of Germany and Japan in advocating and planning for nation-
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building interventions. But is this explicit linking of the post-war occupations with the 
current challenges of US interventions really fruitful? In this thesis I concentrate on 
the American occupation of Germany and pose the following question: 
 Was the creation of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) a representative 
case of US nation-building? 
 In order to answer this question, three sub-questions need to be answered. First 
of all, what is nation-building? Secondly, how does the occupation of Germany fit 
into the nation-building paradigm? And finally, how does the German experience 
compare to other nation-building exercises? 
 The first question will be discussed shortly in this introduction. The second 
and third questions are interconnected, and in order to be able to approach them we 
need two things: an adequate understanding of the American occupation of Germany, 
and the most relevant factors for comparing the German occupation to the idea of 
nation-building as well as to the population of US nation-building attempts.  
 An adequate understanding of the US occupation of Germany as a case of 
nation-building, will, as I argue later, have to involve not just comparing the situation 
at the end of the occupation with a list of nation-building objectives. (As the 
speechwriters of George W. Bush might be accused of above.) Neither is it sufficient 
to concentrate on US policy initiatives and to just look at success or failure rates. An 
occupation is an interaction between both occupier and the occupied. And in Germany 
the occupation was further complicated by the mutually exclusive goals of the 
different occupiers. A great part of my thesis therefore consists of unravelling the at 
times massively interconnected weave of power structures, strategic goals and policy 
issues that formed the US occupation in Germany. 
 But since we are only discussing the occupation as a case of nation-building, it 
has been necessary to cut down on the size of this tapestry to factors connected to 
nation-building. The connection between the general and the specific, between nation-
building as an idea and as a group of instances versus the specific nation-building case 
of Germany, has been challenging to draw up. My initial plan was to do a 
comparative examination of the US occupation in Germany versus other nation-
building attempts, on different core areas pertaining to nation-building. What I found 
relatively fast was that the distinct “tone” of the German example, its unique interplay 
of groups and historical developments, was more or less lost when pushed into a 
comparison of factors with other US occupations. 
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 What I finally settled on, the thesis you are now reading, is more of a 
hermeneutical approach: First a discussion of the general idea of nation-building, then 
looking at the occupation of Germany along the lines of this general idea, and finally 
an attempt at synthesis, where I tackle the overall question of this thesis, was the US 
occupation of Germany a representative case of nation-building? 
 
1.a Terminology 
What is nation-building? The term started as a descriptive one, meaning more or less 
the process of how modern Western countries have developed into nations and then 
nation-states. (eg. Lipset 1963) Especially outside of academia the term is now 
usually used in a normative sense, as a policy tool or strategy to develop failed, weak 
or “rogue” states.  
 First used to address the decolonisation process, especially in Africa in the 
1950’s and 1960’s, its use spread to include the Vietnam War. As a consequence of 
America’s failure in Southeast Asia, as well as the less than perfect results in the 
former colonies in Africa, nation-building lost its appeal academically as well as 
politically in the 1970’s. (Hippler 2005:3-14) 
 With the end of the Cold War, the concept re-emerged, because of the 
international debate on how to deal with a number of collapsing states. The term 
“nation-building” itself took a bit longer to reconstitute, but was firmly back as an 
accepted part of academic as well as political debate in the late 1990’s.  
 But what does nation-building actually mean? In the first “golden age” of 
nation-building, the term normally referred to a formula of different reforms 
considered vital for modernisation. 
 The contemporary usage of the term nation-building is generally much vaguer 
than the formulaic modernisation programmes of the post-colonial era. This might be 
because of the post-modernists’ shredding of many of the un-stated assumptions about 
historical progress of nation-states inherent in the classic nation-building model. That 
does not mean that there is not still a strong tendency among academics and the 
international policy community involved with nation-building to see nation-building 
as a process towards western market-liberal democracy, and with a series of explicit 
steps to move towards it.  
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 In the United States, this effort has come to be known as nation-building. This 
 terminology perhaps reflects the national experience, in which cultural and 
 historical identity was shaped by political institutions like constitutionalism 
 and democracy. Europeans tend to be more aware of the distinction between 
 state and nation and point out that nation-building in the sense of the creation 
 of a community bound together by shared history and culture is well beyond 
 the ability of any foreign power to achieve.(Fukuyama 2004:134-135)  
 
1.b American nationalism 
The US Constitution and the political and social institutions that grew out of the 
American war of independence have defined what it is to be American.  
 It is an open, inclusive nationalism, which paradoxically is remarkably self-
centred. You can be accepted as an American as long as you embrace American 
national symbols and values. A measure of the inclusiveness of American culture is 
the fact that the US population in general does not look at immigration as a threat 
towards the American “national character,” but as an affirmation of the superiority of 
it. That is, people do not come to the United States to steal the jobs of Americans, but 
to take part in the greatest country in the world. 
 In some ways, there is only a small step from ”Give us your poor, your tired, 
your huddled masses longing to be free...” to actively going out into the world to 
export American “freedom and democracy” to assorted conflict areas around the 
world. If Mohammed cannot come to Mount Freedom, Mount Freedom has to come 
to Mohammed. 
 It is tempting to draw parallels to French nationalism, which shares some of 
the same kind of inclusiveness. The French are the other Western country that has 
most clearly tried to mould foreign territories under their military control into cultural 
and political copies of themselves, instead of just installing a colonial bureaucracy on 
top of the local system. The results have been relatively unsuccessful for the French 
too, as the loss of Algeria shows. 
 German nationalism, on the other hand, has traditionally centred on mythic 
German racial bonds, on the Vaterland, on common blood and traditions. It is a 
nationalism in many ways formed as an opposition to the French universalism which 
American nationalism resembles. With such a fundamental difference in perception, 
how was it possible for the United States not only to control their part of Germany, 
but also to get active cooperation and to a certain degree respect and gratitude from 
the Germans for their occupation? 
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 It is not only George W. Bush who has pointed to the German reconstruction 
as a result of American influence, with almost no focus on the immense changes the 
Nazis and their defeat had wreaked on the structure of German society. This focus is 
even present in some of the academic literature on the subject. An influential RAND 
study on American nation-building concluded that: 
 
 ... What principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia and Kosovo from 
 Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan are not their levels of Western culture, 
 economic development, or cultural homogeneity. Rather it is the level of effort 
 the United States and the international community put into their democratic 
 transformations. (Dobbins et al. 2003:xix) 
 
American policy makers are seen as the active creators of the new, democratic 
Germany and Japan, while the conquered peoples are almost static abstractions, 
mouldable by the right input and by sufficient effort. 
 An alternative view might be that the US occupation was successful, not 
because of adequate resources and good policy, but because of the unique situation of 
(in this example) German society. A move from occupier to occupied is also a move 
from the general to the particular as an explanatory model. 
 This thesis does not claim to prove that American policy makers did not have 
anything to do with the shaping of what would become the Bundesrepublik and the 
speed of the reconstruction. Rather, it is an attempt at drawing the boundaries between 
occupiers and the occupied, between factors that can be applied to other attempts at 
democratisation and factors that were particular to the time and place of post-war 
Germany. This is in itself a rather ambitious undertaking. But the task is further 
complicated by the changing American policies in Germany during the occupation 
period. 
 There are three main parts to this thesis, which I have attempted to construct 
as a chronological, thematical and structural flow, in order to capture the 
aforementioned dynamic: Chronologically I move from early to late occupation, and 
then to the wider historical picture. Thematically I go from planning to the 
implementation to results of the occupation. Structurally I travel from personal and 
group dynamics in US planning, to local, regional and then country level discussions. 
I have endeavoured to not make this slightly ambitious structure interfere with the 
narrative flow.  
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 1.c Outline 
The first part describes American policy planning on the German occupation and what 
came out of it, the JCS 1067 directive. The narrative is in its main outline eerily 
similar to the post-war planning in Iraq, where several years of planning where 
thrown out of the window in the last minute to be replaced with unworkable policies 
created by politicians with little area expertise. (To read the sorry tale of Iraqi 
planning, Larry Diamond’s “What Went Wrong in Iraq” (2004) is a fascinating 
insider’s look.) Towards the end of the Roosevelt administration, the United States 
was advocating a Carthaginian peace in Germany, which it took years for the 
Americans to move away from. This part of the thesis ends with an attempt at 
explaining how the United States went from having the most punitive policies against 
Germany to having the most accommodative policies at the end. In short, I point to 
the strong moral elements in US foreign policy.  
 The second part lays out how this slide from punitive to accommodative 
policies happened. It lays out how the multifaceted interaction between different US 
factions, between Americans and Germans and among the allies shaped US policy. 
While the main driver for change undoubtedly was the worsening relationship with 
the Soviet Union, other factors were important for the eventual shape of post-war 
Germany, such as the troubled relationship with the French, the interaction between 
Americans and Germans, the horrible economic situation and US domestic pressure. 
 The third part ties the German occupation into the wider history of US military 
occupations, extending the question of the applicability of the nation-building term to 
the whole body of American foreign interventions. Then I discuss how the post-World 
War Two occupations in Europe and Japan differed from these other cases in three 
core areas, economy, political history and social structure. I end by arguing that there 
is a fourth factor that distinguishes Germany and Japan from other American nation-
building cases, namely the fact that the stated American goal in these two cases was to 
lower state capacity instead of raising it. State capacity is a vital part of nation-
building, making this divergence an important one. 
 
1.d Nation-building: what is it? 
Attempts at spreading the “American way” through exporting American institutions 
and political apparatus actually predates the term nation-building by at least half a 
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century. The first “Golden Age” was the era of Wilsonian idealism following the 
outburst of the Fist World War. It has been a constant, but inconsistently applied, 
factor in US Latin-American policies ever since. (Whitehead 1991:234-235) 
 Nation-building can in the widest sense be seen as the increase of internal 
cohesion and central control within a territory, imposed by internal or external actors. 
This term is a bit broad for our purposes, but already at this abstract level we can 
identify a set of factors that are needed for a process of nation-building. First of all, 
any imposer of change needs to have legitimacy to do so, be it based on national 
myths, religion, culture or political utopianism. To sustain this legitimacy a monopoly 
on the use of violence has to be imposed. Secondly, there needs to be a process of 
integration of all the different groupings within society and the creation of a national 
identity. In other words, not only do the leaders need legitimacy, the geographical 
area they control also needs legitimacy as a natural entity, separated from others. 
Lastly, state institutions need to be strengthened and increased as this process 
develops. 
 Of course this does not say anything about how these results are achieved, or 
what the ultimate goal of the process is. The process sketched above fits to a certain 
degree all countries with a central administration. It also fits colonisation efforts, 
successful conquests and the creation of client states. Whether or not the Soviet client 
states in the former East Block were held in check primarily by the threat of force or 
whether other sources of legitimacy also existed, there is no doubt that the Soviet 
Union was able to keep Eastern European developments within the ideological mould 
of Soviet communism. 
 If we see the Soviet client state system as a communist version of foreign-led 
nation-building, it is natural to assume that the United States, with its democratic 
traditions as an integral part of the national raison d’etre, has been seeking to impose 
its political values on the areas under US control. On the other hand, the United States 
has frequently been unwilling to intervene when its efforts were threatened by 
undemocratic forces.   
 This might be evidence of a more pragmatic, less hegemonial approach to 
nation-building by the United States compared to the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly 
traditional American isolationism has lowered the appetite for American foreign 
adventures. Along with left-wing pacifism, lingering isolationism can be seen as one 
of the reasons for the end to foreign military adventures in both the 1930’s and the 
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1970’s. Another explanation might be the dismal failure of virtually all attempts at 
imposing American-style democracy by military force outside of Europe. (Pei and 
Kasper 2003) If anything, this depressing list seems to point to a lack of pragmatism 
when it comes to handling foreign societies rather than an overabundance of it. 
 The Soviet Union was able to keep a relatively firm grip on its satellite states 
through the propping up of ideological allies in the target countries. To a remarkable 
degree Russia was thus able to neutralise competing power structures within Eastern 
European societies. The Soviet Union’s effectiveness at this probably had some of its 
cause in the administrative know-how created by the October revolution and 
consequent reforms, a process that involved a high degree of ruthless pragmatism. 
Likewise the British Empire had institutional know-how of how to control and shape 
foreign territories through divide-and-rule tactics, generous use of force and an 
ideology of a class structured world (Famously epitomised in the British writer 
Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden”).  
 Now, if we see externally-led nation-building as a purely imperial project, the 
obvious solution for the United States would be to repeat the Philippines experience 
after the war of 1898, pouring enough military force with wide enough powers to 
keep the natives docile. This is an approach to “nation-building” supported by a few 
Republican “imperialists”, such as Max Boot in his The Savage Wars of Peace: Small 
Wars and the Rise of American Power (2002). But if a goal of foreign intervention is 
to create stable and friendly democratic regimes, there are obvious problems with 
putting a bullet through the head of anyone that disagrees with you. 
   
1.e Imposing democracy 
Despite the fact that the United States has generally been following overall strategic 
objectives outside of what would be considered democratisation when intervening 
militarily in other countries, it is not really fruitful to define American-led nation-
building as mainly empire-building.  
 Based on the US approach to nation-building, it makes more sense to see it as 
the end result of a convergence of strategic foreign policy considerations and political 
idealism. But because of American ideals, the US foreign policy and military 
apparatus has been locked into following a nation-building strategy that, like general 
nation-building theory in the 1950’s and 60’s, has been trying to cut the shortest 
possible path towards a modern democratic state apparatus and market economy. 
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Little thought seems to have been given to the process of legitimising the new regime, 
and on integrating different societies and power structures within the borders into a 
national setting. As we will come back to later, the legitimising of new ways and new 
power structures is a complicated and slow process. The benefits of a democratic 
system imposed from above might not be as readily apparent to the people it is being 
imposed on as it is for the imposers. 
 Modernisation and democratisation have often been seen as a legitimisation in 
itself of continued Great Power presence after the successful acquisition of territorial 
control. But even a passive occupation will lead to disruptions in the power structure 
of a society. In most cases this is of course why there is an occupation to begin with, 
to transform a failing system. But “regardless of whether their intentions are of a 
humanitarian or imperial nature, in the target country nation-building has to bring 
about passive and active resistance and a shift in power.” (Hippler 2005:13)  
 The way this resistance and shift of power manifests itself among the occupied 
and how it is handled by the occupiers are of course vital to the success of any nation-
building exercise. One could claim that because the US approach to nation-building 
has included such a strong element of modernist idealism, there has been little 
pressure or need to stay for the long haul. Either US troops have been withdrawn 
when initial reforms have led to a freely elected government, no matter how shakily 
its foundation, or the troops have been withdrawn in haste as local power groupings 
have turned on the occupier. 
 Since thorough processes of nation-building have at least historically been 
long-drawn and involved an interaction of state apparatus and the governed, built on 
the strength  and legitimacy of the regime, there is no wonder that the number of 
successful American nation-building efforts has been limited. 
 When one examines the academic literature on American nation-building, one 
can often see the same kind of perceptional blindness to the multifaceted nature of so-
called nation-building. In defence of at least some of the writers though, the single-
minded focus on the action of the occupiers is often intentional, an attempt at limiting 
the scope of inquiry to just the constant variable, the occupier. 
 
1.f Nation-building as concept and process 
When defining foreign-led nation-building, it is therefore important to be able to 
separate efforts of democratisation and reform from attempts at foreign hegemony. 
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The delineation is a question of degrees though, as even the most humanitarian of 
interventions will have an inherent element of soft-power hegemonism.  
 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, in an influential comparative article on US 
nation-building (2003), sees nation-building as (to summarise) a considerable 
deployment of military force, which makes way for American military and civilian 
control of the target country, with the stated goal or practical effect being regime 
change or the survival of a regime that would otherwise collapse.  
 As we can see, this is a very broad and descriptive (as opposed to normative) 
definition of nation-building. While this is a good definition for most US military 
occupations since the Spanish-American war, it does not separate democratisation 
missions from colonial capers. It does not even separate goals of an occupation from 
the end result of it. If we removed the word American from the definition, it could be 
used on any number of empires through the ages, among others the Soviet Union and 
its client states. 
 Quite clearly we need a narrower, more teleological definition, more in line 
with President Bush’s rhetoric of “lifting up” defeated nations, quoted upstream. As 
we sharpen the definition, the number of cases of nation-building starts to sink. For 
instance, only the most broad and descriptive definition can include the US colonial 
control of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico.  
 On the other hand, with the problem being posed in this thesis, I have to be 
careful not to define myself into an answer to my question. That is, it would be very 
dubious to use a definition of nation-building that excludes the German and Japanese 
occupations from the outset. 
 To avoid being accused of this, and also because of its simple elegance I have 
chosen the definition of probably the best known and thorough academic work to 
actually use the occupation of Germany as a representative case of nation-building. 
The American think-tank RAND’s study America’s Role In Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq (Dobbins et al. 2003) is a set of case studies of US-led military 
interventions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq) that are presented  and compared in an attempt at finding best practises and 
common problems.  
 The report defines these aforementioned military interventions as nation-
building exercises where “… the intent was to use military force to underpin a 
process of democratization.” (Dobbins et al. 2003:1) As a clear and succinct 
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definition of foreign-led nation-building that has a robust line separating it from 
purely imperial and colonial projects, as well as against communist state-building, this 
is a good starting point. 
 Since this thesis is looking at nation-building as a normative process, we also 
have to look at criteria for the success of such a process.  In the same study, this 
definition is equally straight-forward in the RAND study. “Success is defined as the 
ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions.” (Dobbins, et al. 
2003:2) 
 It might be interesting to discuss what is meant by transfer here, and to look at 
how democratic institutions in the two success cases in that regard, Germany and 
Japan, developed. But there is little else to build a discussion of Germany as a nation-
building exercise on in this definition.  
 As mentioned earlier, nation-building is no longer considered a set process of 
steps that can be taken by any non-functioning state or its occupiers to transform it 
into an economically strong democracy. But the process can still be divided into 
individual steps and processes that are important for the overall rate of success.  
 This is the approach taken by Christoph Zuercher in a comparative view of 22 
post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions. He proposes that the success of nation-
building (or state-building as he calls it) should be “… disaggregated and measured 
along five dimensions: the absence of war, the reestablishment of a full monopoly 
over the means for violence, economic development, democracy, and institutional 
capacities.” (Zuercher 2006:2)  
 Building up a rigid theoretical structure of a contentious idea, and then 
applying this construction on a chaotic and complex endeavour like a military 
occupation is very much a quixotic task. There is no agreement on the specific 
meaning of the term nation-building, nor is objective knowledge about history 
possible. Therefore I only offer these definitions as measuring sticks: As fairly 
representative samples of definitions of nation-building, the overall goal and factors 
for success.  
 
1.g Scope 
In this thesis, Germany and Japan are often used as roughly comparable cases of 
American military occupation. Nevertheless I have chosen to concentrate on the 
occupation of Germany. The cultural proximity, as well as the amount of sources and 
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literature available, makes the German case more accessible to me than the Japanese 
one. Also, unlike Japanese, I can actually read German relatively well. 
 Time-wise, the general focus has been on the period between Germany’s 
unconditional surrender in May 1945, up to the election of the Adenauer government 
in 1949. Technically, the Bundesrepublik did not become fully independent until the 
reunification with East Germany in 1990, but in practical terms, direct control over 
West German affairs by the Western allies quickly diminished from 1949 onward. 
From May 5, 1955, BRD was granted the full powers of a sovereign state, excluding 
West Berlin, and Soviet-controlled East Germany. (Steininger 1987:467-475) Even 
before 1955, the French, British and American High Commissioners had more or less 
retreated to their comfortable castle on the outskirts of Bonn. Further, this work 
concentrates on the American military government and its challenges versus the 
Germans and the occupation allies.  
 I sincerely hope my use of the Harvard system of referencing has not led to 
heightened blood pressure and mental anguish for my readers. As for why I would 
choose to use it in this thesis, I can only blame habits formed during my years of 
wallowing in the world of political science, as well as my belief that it enhances 
readability as well as keeping me, the writer, from veering completely off course in 
the footnotes, and that the relative low number of primary sources makes the Harvard 
system an appropriate choice for this thesis. In my defence, its use is specifically 
allowed in the guidelines of the master program for which this thesis was written. 
(Jølstad 2006:20-21) 
 
1.h Sources and literature  
This thesis represents an attempt at combining two relatively large fields of research: 
On the one side, the booming literature on foreign-led nation-building, and on the 
other, the vast amount of information and literature on the occupation and rebuilding 
of Germany after the Second World War.  
 Originally my aim when looking at Germany as a case of nation-building was 
to narrow the scope of the inquiry down to a few of the factors I felt were among the 
most important ones in differentiating the German occupation from other nation-
building exercises. There are two interconnected reasons for why this approach was 
modified. Firstly, there seemed to be a pretty broad academic consensus already that 
Germany differed in the areas I planned to delve into. (This can very generally be 
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described as the strength of state institutions, the economy and national cohesion.) 
Spending a year kicking in open doors did not seem especially interesting. What 
struck me thought was that there was no academic literature looking at the whole of 
the occupation in the perspective of nation- or state-building. The one exception was 
the case study in the aforementioned RAND report (Dobbins, et al. 2003), which did 
not delve very far into either the planning of the occupation, the way it was shaped by 
US allies, or how the Germans themselves were part of the process.  
 To be fair to Dobbins et al., this was a conscious choice by them, built on the 
assumption that they were looking for factors that could be transferred to other cases 
of nation-building. But describing the success and failure of an occupation mostly 
through the action of the occupiers is in a way like describing a game of chess by only 
showing the movements of one of the sides. You can see where it is heading, but you 
can never be sure why. It was therefore natural to make relations between occupiers 
and the occupied, between the allies and between parts of the US policy and 
administrative apparatus a central point of my analysis. 
 One particular problem for this study has been the overabundance of primary 
sources relating to the occupation of Germany. There is enough material out there for 
several lifetimes of research. Although I have chosen a specific narrative arch in my 
outline of the occupation of Germany, my intention was never to radically alter the 
understanding of the American occupation of Germany. Therefore I have felt 
perfectly justified in relying on secondary literature on most issues. 
 The analysis of Joint Chiefs of Staff document 1067 (JCS 1067) is the one big 
exception. This document is analysed at some length to try to discern how important 
traditional nation-building goals were in the early occupation policy. The text is 
analysed on especially three levels: The process of how it came to be, how much 
influence the document had on the American military government (MG), and how the 
document compares to a historical narrative of the US occupation as a nation-building 
exercise.  
The role of Americans in the democratisation and “reshaping” of Western Germany is 
still hotly debated. In the historiography of the US occupation of Germany, there are 
three general schools of thought, which to a certain degree mirror the divisions within 
Cold War historiography.  
The orthodox view dominated in the immediate post-war years and during the 
height of the Cold war. It saw a decisive and positive role played by the United States 
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in “exporting” democracy to the BRD. Initially the occupation years were seen almost 
as a period of limbo, where the Germans were ruled by outside forces, only regaining 
self-determination with the return of self-rule in 1949. The famous German historian 
of the 1950’s Ernst Deuerlein explained 1945 to 1949 as a period where “Germany 
stopped being a subject of world politics; it was nothing but an object anymore.” 
(Deuerlein 1971:51)  
Revisionists, both in the US and in Germany have, since the end of the 60’s, 
argued against a positive reading of US influence in Germany. According to them the 
American MG, in an effort to expand American capitalism, either consciously or 
unconsciously, destroyed Genuine German grassroots initiatives, like the Antifa-
movement. This destruction, along with MG appointment of Weimar politicians to 
administrative positions led to the re-emergence of the old Weimar and even Third 
Reich elite. (Ruhl 1982) Members of the American New Left and its German Neue 
Links counterpart at the end of the 1960’s and early 1970’s went the furthest, placing 
the responsibility for the “restoration” of l’ancien regime squarely in the hands of the 
Western allies and especially the United States. (Fichter and Schmidt 1971) 
On the other side we have an American tradition questioning how much the 
United States actually accomplished. With John Gimbel (1961;1968) and Edward N. 
Peterson (1978) in the forefront, they, like the revisionists question whether the new 
Federal Republic really was such a big break with the past. But they see this as a 
result of Military Government powerlessness instead of as a conscious choice. They 
wanted to do what the orthodox laud them for and to a degree what the revisionists 
blame them for, but they failed due to their powerlessness. (Prowe, 1993:307-8; 
Prowe 1977:312-319)  
But as Dietlheim Prowe puts it: ”The greatest weakness of all three 
interpretations is that they have underestimated the role of traditional German 
political-social forces in shaping West German democracy.” (1993:308) Especially 
after the reunification the focus among German historians have moved more and more 
towards focusing on the creation of the Bundesrepublik as a negotiated process 
between German and Western Allied interests and the influence of indigenous power-
centres as well as the general German populations on shaping the events of the 
occupation era. 
 Why was this focus lacking during the Cold War? While I do not presume to 
know the thoughts or feelings of neither the German people nor the historians 
 20
documenting their lives, there seems to have been a certain unwillingness, especially 
among Germans, to discuss the Bundesrepublik and its inhabitants as free actors. 
Whether you were critical of the US influence over West Germany or supportive of it, 
claiming it was the work of an outside force in many ways shielded Germany from 
introspection. For the people adhering to the orthodox view, seeing Germans as 
objects a la Deuerlein, as a wayward people saved from themselves, had an almost 
messianic determinism to it: First a period of judgement and then redemption, with 
the acceptance into the society of nations again. Such a narrative was bound to beat 
one where the Germans more or less freely chose to turn their backs to their 
countrymen in the east and to tie themselves to a superpower. 
 Likewise, there was a need to absolve Germany in the narrative of German 
revisionists, and to tear down the US messianic “claim” among American revisionists. 
Criticising the Hegemon made sense, both because of the claims of the preceding 
historical paradigm, but also, in Germany, to rally national support for a 
reconsideration of both the past and the present. Especially the Neue Links school had 
strong links to the youth movement of the time, which was in the forefront of finally 
taking a definite break with the Nazi past. 
 It is tempting to claim that the third school, detailing the relative failure of the 
US occupation in instituting change as an answer to the revisionists, saying in essence 
“well, we couldn’t have been responsible.” But it is time to escape this heavy-handed 
theorising to get at my main point, namely that historical narratives change with time. 
Our understanding of the past naturally is coloured by our understanding of the 
present. 
 What is so eye-catching with seeing the creation of the Bundesrepublik as built 
under US tutelage in a process of nation-building is that it is a return back to the 
orthodox school, overlooking 40 years of research on the occupation of Germany in 
the process. 
 There are several works that have been important for me in examining the US 
occupation of Germany. The biographies of Kurt Schumacher (Edinger 1965) and 
Kurt Adenauer (Schwarz 1986) have given me a valuable look into German politics 
and how they shaped the creation of BRD during the occupation period. Rolf 
Steiningers Deutsche Geschichte (1987;1988) has helped me with understanding both 
the German as well as the Allied (especially British) views during the occupation. 
Steininger also offered a wealth of primary sources that I have been far too lax in 
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taking advantage of in this thesis. Other primary resources that I have spent too much 
time reading and too little time incorporating in this thesis is the Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS 1945-1949) series and a collection of Lucius D. Clay’s 
letters (Smith 1974) For an overview of American economic policy in Germany, John 
Killick’s The United States and European Reconstruction 1945-1960 (1997) has been 
priceless. 
 On the scope and limitations of the US occupation I have drawn heavily from 
the aforementioned Gimbel (1961;1968) and Peterson (1978), as well as from the 
newer generation of German historians that have built on these works to show internal 
German power groupings and processes and their influence on the occupation. One of 
the main inspirations from this historical school was a compilation of articles entitled 
American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955 (Diefendorf et 
al., 1993)  
 When it comes to the field of nation-building research, I have already outlined 
the main developments in this field over the last half century. I will therefore jump 
directly to briefly presenting the main theoretical works I have used in examining the 
nation-building term. Francis Fukuyama has been an outspoken proponent of the 
spreading of “liberal democracy”. He is a previous member of the neoconservative 
think thank Project for a New American Century (PNAC) as well as a former 
supporter of the invasion of Iraq. With the obvious intent of establishing himself as a 
leading authority on nation-building (or state-building as he prefers to refer to it), 
Fukuyama has written a series of influential books and articles on the subject. His 
latest offering, as editor of Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (2006) 
unfortunately came too late to influence this thesis. Extra so because the volume 
includes works from other nation-building scholars who have had influence on this 
thesis; names such as Minxin Pei, James Dobbins and Larry Diamond.  
Fukuyama’s State Building (2004) has been used extensively however, 
especially to cover the aspect of strength of state institutions and its vital importance 
in any nation-building attempt, as well as the immense difficulties an outside force 
will have to overcome to build them. (As a personal note I am struck with disbelief at 
how Fukuyama can support nation-building if he really sees the process as being as 
difficult as he portrays.) 
Professor Jochen Hippler has a series of articles in German and English 
available online, at http://www.jochen-hippler.de/index.html examining among other 
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things the meaning and evolution of the term nation-building, which has been of great 
help. Likewise Cristoph Zuerchers article on external-led nation-building (2006) has 
been helpful, by synthesising the views of a number of writers into a concise and 
relevant division of nation-building into commonly-referenced factors.  
 Finally, and most importantly, we have the RAND study America’s Role In 
Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Dobbins et al. 2003), a collection of case 
studies of American nation-building attempts along with a comparative analysis, with 
the goal of extrapolating “best practises.”  
 As noted earlier, I have taken my definition of nation-building from this 
widely-cited work, as well as the definition of success. The structure of the German 
part of this thesis was also to a certain degree inspired by the succinct and rather 
thorough look at the US occupation in the RAND study. Unfortunately, the 
conclusions drawn from this summary of the German occupation are at times rather 
tendentious.  
To quote some of the more egregious examples: After acknowledging that the 
denazification effort had to be scaled back and shut down, because of overly 
ambitious goals and a lack of resources, the study concludes “In the long run, this 
more-practical policy helped lead to a more-thorough repudiation of Nazi policies by 
the German populace and eliminated remaining support for the return of such an 
autocratic regime.” (Dobbins et al. 2003:14) There is no source for this rather 
remarkable assertion, and indeed, extensive polling done by the US Military 
Government in its zone seems to contradict this view. (Merritt and Merritt 1970: 30-
33) Likewise the study claims that the US administration successfully broke up 
German cartels and was instrumental in creating a free-market economy in Germany 
after the harsh winter of 1946. As I will show later, decartelisation was never truly 
attempted, and the German economy was essentially planned on the macro level and 
almost entirely non-existent on the local level. The case study of Germany concludes 
with, among other things “The economic policies General Clay and the U.S. Army 
personnel under his command pursued were key to the economic recovery of West 
Germany.” (Dobbins et al. 2003:22) While strictly true on a semiotic level, the 
historical record points to US policies and lack of Allied consensus as one of the main 




 2. American planning and occupation 
 
This chapter will focus on several aspects: The extent of occupation planning and 
policy making, how interdepartmental squabbles and lack of communication 
influenced the planning phase, and the extent to which these differences in opinion 
turned the planned occupation into a project of collective punishment instead of 
nation-building. In the next chapter, we will look at how the compromise hammered 
out in Washington on post-war policy, influenced the occupation., and how the focus 
on "punishing" the Germans did not go away until the Cold War was in full bloom.  
American planning of the occupation started before the United States joined 
the Second World War. Despite this, military rank and file was still not sure of 
American policy in occupied Germany when the first American troops entered 
Germany towards the end of 1944.  
The goals were high, as one would expect from the administration responsible 
for The New Deal. But planning of the occupation was marred by interdepartmental 
strife between the Department of War (DoW), Department of State (SD) and 
Treasury. This chapter is an overview of the different camps, and their struggle to put 
their stamp on post-war policy in Germany. 
 
2.a The Department of War 
Since the Mexican War (1846-1848) American military occupations had been 
administered by the Department of War. Naturally, Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson expected this to also be the case in Germany.  With the start of hostilities in 
Europe in the autumn of 1939, army planners started to worry about the lack of plans 
for military government of occupied territories. The only Army plans existing at the 
time was a subsection in the newly released military field manual FM 27-10, The 
Rules of Land Warfare. 
Together with the  recommendations from the so-called Hunt Report regarding 
the lessons from the American occupation of the Ruhr after World War 1, FM 27-10 
would become the foundation for FM 27-5; Military Government. It was the first 
blueprint for military government of occupied territories. These field manuals would 
be the basis for army planning on the occupation of Germany, along with all the 
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liberated territories. “The Old and New Testaments of American military 
government,” as Ziemke (1975:4) puts it. 
FM 27-5 called for the training of military personnel in the art of military 
government in occupied territories. With the widening of military responsibilities over 
civilians, brought on by the imposition of martial law in Hawaii and the forced 
internment of Japanese-Americans and other “enemy combatants,” need for a training 
programme increased. (Ziemke 1975:6) In the summer of 1942, the School of Military 
Government opened on the campus of the University of Virgina, in Charlottenville 
Virginia.  
Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion, who had administered the writing 
of FM 27-5, was also the main driving force behind the School of Military 
Government. Gullion worked tirelessly on centring responsibility for occupation 
planning in his office. He was helped in this by Under Secretary of War Robert B. 
Patterson. Patterson was worried about other departments “encroachment” on the 
military command. One example of this was a meeting with DoW officials and 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau on September 4 1942. This meeting 
was ostensibly about currency issues on the North African front, but was marred by 
attempts by Morgenthau to put the whole issue of occupation policy on the agenda. 
Morgenthau was well informed on the work done so far, and informed the DoW 
representatives that his own department was also looking into occupation policy. 
Morgenthau was a close friend of Roosevelt, and anxious to put a stamp on post-war 
planning. This was a worrying development for the DoW officials present at the 
meeting. 
Under Secretary of War Patterson’s moved to head off the DoW rivals. On 
august 16 1942, Gullion was handed the authority of setting up a Military 
Government Division in the Provost Marshal General's Office “to engage in broad 
planning." This group authored “Synopsis of the War Department Pro-ram [sic] for 
Military Government."  The synopsis aimed "to assert and maintain War Department 
leadership in military government and at the same time invite and employ a wide 
cooperation with other departments and agencies of the government…" according to a 
later Military Government Division memo.  (Ziemke 1975:11) 
Criticism was strong when the synopsis was presented in a cabinet meeting on 
October 29. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes objected to what he saw as a 
 25
germ of imperialism in the plans for military government. Others objected to being 
sidelined by the DoW on this issue.  
The army’s early foray into policy planning did not sit well with President 
Roosevelt either. He saw it as encroaching on territory he had staked out for himself 
(Merritt 1995:50). After the meeting he drafted a memo to Secretary of War Stimson, 
asking for a full account on the work at the School of Military Government. Roosevelt 
was especially critical of the School of Military Government, and felt that the matter 
should have been taken to him in the first place. He concluded by pronouncing that 
governing civilian territory was to be a civilian task. (Coles and Weinberg 1965:22) 
In November 1942 he handed “full authority for economic, political and fiscal 
questions in liberated territories” to Cordell Hull’s Department of State. (Merritt 
1995:50) Through its Office of Foreign Territories, the Department of State tried to 
use it’s newly given powers to control the recently conquered territories in Northern 
Africa. However, their job was fraught with difficulties. The Army was unwilling to 
share command and decision-making in areas under their control, while the Board of 
Economic Warfare and the Lend-Lease Administration were also trying to become 
leading voices in occupation policy. 
The impasse was solved when General Eisenhower got a dispensation for 
overall Army control of the administration of civilians in Northern Africa, effectively 
giving back control of occupation to the Army “on sufferance”. Eisenhower argued 
that the Army was instructed to hand over control of occupied areas to civilian 
agencies as soon as the military conditions allowed. But as long as the enemy was 
holding Tunisia, the military could not safely return any area in North Africa to 
civilians. This policy was followed with the invasion of Sicily and Italy proper. 
(Ziemke 1975:15-17) 
In February 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opened its Civil Affairs Division, 
which was responsible for the administration and planning of civil affairs in occupied 
territories. This, along with infighting and indecision in the civilian agencies involved 
in occupation policy, lead to the State departments Office of Foreign Territories 
getting marginalised, and its eventual shutdown not long after, along with the White 
House’s last endeavour into the “nitty-gritty” of occupation planning, the Foreign 
Economic Administration. (FEA) (Merrit 1995:51, Coles and Weinberg 1992:93)  
The FEA was instituted in September 1943, but already two months later, 
Roosevelt handed the responsibility for coordinating and implementing policy on 
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post-war Germany back to the Department of War. (Coles and Weinberg 1992:108-
109) 
Pacified areas were still to be turned over to civilian control at the earliest 
possible time. But Roosevelt’s decision was an admission that the Army had, through 
its planning and the experience gained in the North African campaign, assumed de 
facto leadership in administration of occupied territories.  In the end, the Army ended 
up getting what they had asked for in their much-criticised Synopsis.  
This proved to be a problem for post war planning, since the military had 
specific orders to hand over control to civilian agencies as soon as the situation 
allowed. And the Army was busy enough just handling the logistical challenges of 
feeding and controlling freed areas. They did not want to worry about the structure of 
a post-war occupation of Germany. (Ziemke 1975:21) 
 
2.b Department of State 
Although the Department of State was forced into a subordinate role in occupation 
planning, Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s department was working actively on the 
German question. Early in 1942 the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy 
was instituted to coordinate State Department planning.  
Their work, however, was marred by policy disagreements within the 
department. Hull was strongly in favour of a united Germany after the war, while the 
President was strongly in favour of breaking it up. Roosevelt's view was shared by 
important members of Hull’s staff, the most prominent one being Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles, who would resign later as a result of the disagreement. (Merritt 
1995:54) 
Welles assigned the question of partitioning Germany to the committee, and 
the committee worked on detailed plans for turning it into three to seven different 
states. In the end however, the committee agreed with Hull’s view that Germany 
should not be dismembered. (Hammond 1963:317) The controversy slowed and 
hindered the State Departments policy making capacity for the first half of 1943 
however, and in the end, moved it into a position of disagreement with the President. 
In July Hull, after finally getting the committee to support his view on 
partition, suspended the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy and its 
subcommittees indefinitely, and instituted a new structure of policy planning 
committees. 
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The leading committee on the German question was the Interdivisional 
Country Committee on Germany, composed of former staff members of the Advisory 
Committee as well as State Department experts on Germany. They would prepare 
Hull for the upcoming tripartite meeting between the allied foreign ministers in 
Moscow, and would extrapolate on Hull’s views, now that the storm within the 
department had subsided. 
At the Moscow Conference in October 1943, Hull got a chance to put his 
stamp on post-war policy. The conference was a meeting between Hull and the 
foreign ministers of Britain (Anthony Eden) and the USSR (Vyacheslav Molotov). 
The primary focus of the conference was the German question. Hull presented two 
proposals on German occupation policy, drawn up by the State department. These 
proposals began by elaborating on the meaning of the demand for unconditional 
surrender and by detailing the rights of the victors. Germany was to be returned to its 
pre-1937 borders, and controlled by an inter-allied control commission, not by the 
allies individually. This commission would have the final word on occupation policy 
in the separate occupation zones that would be given to each of the allies.  
There was agreement on a policy of punishment of Nazi leaders and 
destruction of the Nazi party structure, and that Germany should be thoroughly 
demilitarised. On reparations, economic issues and political reorganisation, the 
foreign ministers had more problems finding a common policy. While Molotov 
initially agreed to the State Departments call for a somewhat lenient peace, he would 
later say that he regarded the American proposal as constituting a minimum rather 
than a maximum proposal. (Meaning that the level of reparations offered by the 
Americans was the lower limit, not the upper.) To work further on these questions, 
they decided to establish a European Advisory Committee (EAC) to handle this and 
other problems that might arise pertaining to issues of occupation policy. (Hammond 
1963:316)  
The EAC, which had a somewhat unclear mandate, turned to the two most 
important problems on allied occupation of Germany: The issue of dividing Germany 
into occupation zones, and the hammering out of a tri-partite control apparatus for the 
occupation. The British were interested in getting as many of these issues as possible 
on the table and preferably settled before the end of the war. The Russians were 
sceptical, but were willing to work through the committee. The Americans, under 
Ambassador John G. Winant, on the other hand, could not effectively work through 
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the EAC, for the simple reason that Winant was unable to get adequate instructions 
from Washington. Roosevelt was intent on settling important policy issues regarding 
the occupation himself, and Hull was unable to get the presidents approval for the 
work done in the EAC. Since all decisions had to be unanimous, Winant could do 
nothing but stall British and Russian initiatives, while not having any authority to put 
forth proposals himself.  
One of Winants main problems was that he was being briefed by the 
Interdivisional Country Committee on Germany, which mirrored Hull’s views, but not 
necessarily those of Roosevelt. The State Department “opposed dismemberment, 
wished to encourage democracy in Germany through a moderate peace, and 
advocated de-centralisation of the government of Germany.” (Hammond 1963:318), 
this was in opposition to Roosevelt, who wanted a hard peace and a partitioning of 
Germany. 
The toothlessness of the State Department in German occupation planning was 
apparent during the Teheran conference, November to December 1943. Here 
Roosevelt ignored the work done at the Moscow conference (which was supposed to 
be a preliminary meeting for the Teheran conference), and argued strongly in favour 
of partitioning Germany into several smaller states, but could not agree with Churchill 
and Stalin on the details. Stalin argued for strict peace terms; a division of Germany, 
hand-over of Prussian territory east of the Oder river to Poland, summary execution of 
Nazis and de-industrialisation. Churchill strongly disagreed, while Roosevelt joked 
with Stalin about a “compromise” on how many German military officers that should 
be summarily shot, and discussed how Germany would be divided. (Beschloss 
2002:26-27) This was of course completely counter to the plans being worked on in 
Hull’s Department of State. 
 
2.c The lenient peace: CCS 551 
When General Eisenhower assumed command of Operation Overlord in December 
1943, he asked for a concise plan for post-war Germany. As noted earlier, the EAC, 
which was formally responsible for policy issues pertaining to the occupation of 
Germany, could not help. In anticipation of agreement on post-war policies, the 
Anglo-American Combined Civil Affairs Committee, a committee under the Anglo-
American Combined Chiefs of Staff drew up a directive for pre-surrender policies in 
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Germany. The document was drafted with the aid of, on the American side, the State, 
Treasury and Navy Departments. 
This was the first authoritative document on military occupation strategy in 
Germany for the Western allies.  It was surprisingly mild compared to Roosevelt’s 
tough stance during the Teheran conference. The document started by stating that “… 
It should be made clear to the military occupation is intended (1) to aid military 
operations; (2) to destroy Nazism-Fascism and the Nazi Hierarchy; (3) to maintain 
and preserve law and order; and (4) to restore normal conditions among the civilian 
population as soon as possible…” (CCS 551, cited by Hammond 1963:328) 
German industry and infrastructure would be left intact, to feed and support 
the German people, and pay for the occupation. The occupation authorities would 
allow freedom of speech and press, and of religion. The establishment of local 
government, making use of both Germans and Allied officers, would be encouraged. 
There would be no absolute ban on the employment of Nazis, and while political 
activity would be discouraged, the Allied Command would “permit the formation of a 
democratic trade union movement and other forms of free economic association.” 
(CCS 551, cited by Hammond 1963:328; Pogue 1954:347-348) 
From this directive, handbooks and papers on how to practically approach the 
occupation were produced for distribution to Army commanders and civilian 
agencies. The directive was the first serious and full-scale handling of the questions 
pertaining to occupation policies, and mirrored State Department and British views on 
policy. It stayed clear of political questions regarding the occupation however, except 
for the goal of destroying the Nazi party apparatus.  
Meanwhile the State Department tried to clear up the logjam in the EAC, by 
establishing the Working Security Committee (WSC), which was to bring together all 
government agencies that would have a hand in German occupation policy. The goal 
was to hammer out an agreement on guidelines for Ambassador Winant in the EAC. 
The two main parties in the WSC would of course be the Department of War and the 
Department of State. The committee was at a stand-still up until August 1944 
however, due to DoW foot-dragging. “The War Department had shown only 
indifference to cooperation with the State Department for the purpose of clearing 
American policy in order to expedite Anglo-American negotiations on the treatment of 
Germany. It seemed to be confident that what policies had to be settled [could be 
handled] through military channels to the President...” (Hammond 1963:346) The 
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belief was not altogether unfounded, as Roosevelt’s habit of roundly ignoring State 
Department policy initiatives suggests.  Roosevelt’s disregard for much of Hull’s 
work at the Moscow conference, described above, was just part of a pattern, according 
to Beschloss. (2002) 
 
2.d The Morgenthau Plan 
Henry Morgenthau was, as Secretary of the Treasury, deeply involved in the 
economic aspects of the War and the post-war planning. And, as noted earlier, he was 
anxious to expand his influence on post-war policy. 
As news of the Holocaust trickled out of German territory and across the 
Atlantic, Morgenthau tells in his memoirs about how he became radicalised. As the 
most influential Jew in the US Administration, he tried to pressure Roosevelt and the 
War Department into bombing the Nazi death camps, and became the main proponent 
of a hard peace for Germany. His calls for air raids went unheeded, but soon the 
Treasury would catch the ear of everyone in Washington. 
On a trip to Europe in August 1944, Assistant Secretary of Treasury Harry 
Dexter White handed Morgenthau a paper on reparations, restitution and property 
rights in occupied Germany, authored by the Dean Acheson in the State Department, 
which upset him greatly. Morgenthau saw great danger in what he perceived was a 
“soft peace” that ignored the most important part of post-war policies towards 
Germany, namely how to stop the Germans from threatening the world with war 
again. (Ziemke 1975:86) 
In Britain, Morgenthau met Colonel Bernhard Bernstein, economic advisor in 
Eisenhowers staff. Bernstein was an old Treasury man, who had been commissioned 
into the Army through the Civilian Affairs Division and the School of Military 
Government program. He shocked Morgenthau even more, by handing him a draft of 
the Handbook for Military Government in Germany, produced by the German 
Country Unit in Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF). (Beschloss 2002:71) 
The book was supposed to be a practical guide to help commanders on the 
ground deal with the daily routine of military administration of occupied areas, during 
the push into Germany. But it was likely to influence post-war planning, by being 
standard policy by the time of an eventual surrender. To Morgenthau it seemed to 
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treat Germany in the same way as the countries that were being liberated from the 
Germans.  
Other aspects of the post-war planning were also worrying for Morgenthau. 
He talked to Ambassador Winant, who again voiced his frustration on the lack of 
input from Washington on the work being done in the EAC. Later, in a private 
conversation with British Foreign Minister Eden, he was shown transcripts from the 
conference in Teheran, which showed, surprisingly, that Roosevelt had agreed to 
policies that neither the Department of War or Department of State seemed to know 
about. One example was the decision to partition Germany. (Beschloss 2002:77-78) 
Deeply concerned, but at the same time conscious of the gap between the State 
Department policy makers on Germany and the president, Morgenthau went into 
action setting forth his views, which he believed to be closer to the Presidents. He 
instructed Treasury staffers to write a draft paper detailing Treasury policy on the 
German question, and used the issue of the unknown Teheran transcripts to drive a 
wedge between the President and Secretary of State Hull. 
First he went to Hull and told him what he knew of the Teheran conference. In 
his diaries Morgenthau wrote that on receiving this news, Hull gasped “Henry, this is 
the first time I have ever heard of this! I have never been permitted to see the minutes 
of the Teheran conference. I have asked [the President] and I have not been allowed.” 
After being consoled by Morgenthau, Hull reportedly continued lamenting “I am not 
told what is going on. That’s on a higher level… When they talk about the state of 
Germany, I am not consulted.” Hull was “exhausted fighting the different people 
around town”… “The president could stop it in a minute – if he wanted to do it.” 
(Beschloss 2002:81) 
After this meeting Morgenthau met with Roosevelt, telling him that the post-
war planning on Germany was in disarray, and that the departments of State and War 
were working towards an occupation framework in direct opposition to what had been 
agreed upon in Teheran. Later he handed the Handbook over to Roosevelt, along with 
his comments on what he considered especially gregarious parts. The President, upon 
reading the handbook and memo, acted swiftly.  
The errant handbook arrived in Stimson's office on the 26th accompanied by a 
presidential memorandum which began, "This so-called Handbook is pretty 
bad. I should like to know how it came to be written and who approved it 
down the line. If it has not been sent out as approved, all copies should be 
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withdrawn and held until you get a chance to go over it." There followed 
passages from the handbook pertaining to economic rehabilitation that 
Morgenthau had singled out as particularly objectionable. "It gives the 
impression," the memorandum continued, "that Germany is to be restored as 
much as the Netherlands or Belgium, and the people of Germany brought back 
as quickly to their prewar estate." The President said he had no such intention. 
It was of "the utmost importance" that every person in Germany should 
recognize that "this time" Germany was a defeated nation. He did not want 
them to starve. If they needed food "to keep body and soul together," they 
could be fed "a bowl of soup" three times a day from Army soup kitchens. 
(The first version reportedly read, "a bowl of soup per day.") He saw no 
reason, however, for starting "a WPA, PWA, or CCC for Germany. “The 
German people had to have it driven home to them that "the whole nation has 
been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern 
civilization. (Ziemke 1975:86) 
Paris was liberated in late August, and the allies were speculating about an end of 
hostilities in 1944. When Stimson ordered that the handbook was to be thrown out, 
General Hildring of the Civilian Affairs Division told him that allied troops might be 
in Germany within days, and it was too late to withdraw the handbooks. He was also 
informed that the British had already approved the Handbook, and it would take 
considerable time to work out a new one that was closer to the Presidents views. The 
Civil Affairs Division had no option but to distribute the Handbook, but with a 
warning affixed to the front, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the dangers of 
being too lenient towards the Germans. There were also some revisions done to the 
text, more in an attempt to rectify specific criticisms by the President and Morgenthau 
than to change the general gist of the Handbook. (Ziemke 1975:88-89) 
To clear up the mess that resulted from the apparent disagreement on 
fundamental issues between Roosevelt and his policy planners on Germany, the 
President instituted (on a suggestion from Stimson) a cabinet committee to hammer 
out a compromise. This committee consisted of the Secretaries of State, War and 
Treasury. (Hammond 1963:355)  
To present their views in this committee, the three departments’ planners set to 
work on papers presenting their differing views. The Treasury department had been 
working on a paper since Morgenthau’s return from Europe, while State planners 
produced a memo of State positions on the occupation, based on State papers and 
what had been accomplished in the EAC so far.  
The memo repeated the State Department’s opposition to a dismemberment of 
Germany, dissolution of the military forces and destruction of all military equipment, 
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liquidation of the Nazi party and the exclusion of party members from civilian 
administration, the end of discriminatory laws, and the imprisonment of war 
criminals. The memo did not mention economic measures, the area where the biggest 
differences existed within the government. (Hammond 1963:361)  
The Department of War, which so far had tried to stay out of policy planning 
not directly pertaining to the military obligations during occupation, had to hastily 
prepare their own opinion. On most issues, Army planners agreed with State’s views, 
which they already knew well. The army was mostly interested of issues of the 
Command chain, and they wanted to keep German weapons for the war against Japan. 
Otherwise they had few objections to the State Departments views. 
Treasury’s view was presented in a memo that can be seen as the first draft of 
what would later be called the Morgenthau Plan. It called for the complete disarming 
of the German army and people, the total destruction of the armament industry, as 
well as supporting industries. Regarding the partition of Germany, large part were to 
be given to neighbouring countries, the rest divided into two states, each made into 
decentralised federal states.  
The Ruhr, Kiel Canal and the Rhineland would become an internationalized 
free trade area. Reparations for the war would be extracted from existing German 
resources and territories. Members of Nazi organisations, along with military officers 
and members of the Junker class, would be put in labour battalions used for the 
reconstruction of countries damaged by German warfare. Attempts by occupying 
forces to help in reconstruction of the German economy would be strictly forbidden in 
any way or form, and once Germany was completely disarmed, the occupation would 
be turned over to neighbouring countries (including Russia, but excluding Britain.) 
(Hammond 1963:362)  
This draft was rejected by Morgenthau, because it did not go far enough. 
Morgenthau wanted a complete dismantling of all industry in the Ruhr area as well as 
the destruction and flooding of all coal mines. On Roosevelt’s suggestion, he also 
added a total ban on all aircraft, and on military uniforms and parades of any sort. The 
main area of disagreement was on the issue of economic policies, with Morgenthau 
advocating a “pastoralisation” of Germany, while Hull and Stimson insisted on 
leaving German industrial power somewhat intact. Stimson also argued against 
Morgenthau’s suggestion of summary execution of a pre-approved list of Nazi 
criminals. 
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The cabinet committee came to no common ground in its first few meetings. 
But the extent which Roosevelt shared Morgenthau’s views became even more 
obvious when he brought Morgenthau with him to a conference in Quebec with 
Churchill. Neither Stimson nor Hull was present at the meeting, where Roosevelt 
pressured an initially shocked Churchill into signing a document calling for turning 
Germany into a country “primarily agricultural and pastoral in character.” With 
Churchill’s initials on paper, Morgenthau and Roosevelt turned to the issues of 
continued Lend-Lease aid, something Churchill considered of vital importance to the 
British post-war economy, and an agreement was signed conforming to British 
views… (Beschloss 2002:125-130) 
With the Quebec agreement, the impression among his opponents in the 
departments of War and State was that Morgenthau had won a decisive policy victory 
in Quebec. Not only was his punitive policies towards Germany approved by 
Roosevelt, Churchill had also (more or less voluntarily) been “converted” into a 
supporter. (Hammond 1963:377) 
 
2.e No fraternisation, no economic help: JCS 1067 
The focus among policy makers in the Departments of War and State was on damage 
control after the Quebec conference. A new interim directive on Germany was in the 
process of being drawn up while the controversy was raging. With Treasury having 
captured the President’s ear, CCS 551 had to be modified. But State and War planners 
were hoping to soften or bypass the harsher parts of the Morgenthau Plan, during the 
drafting of this directive. Hull and Stimson attempted to limit Treasury influence on 
drawing up this paper, in committee and outside, including through alleged leaks of 
information to the media. 
The Morgenthau Plan and the Quebec agreement were leaked to the press (the 
most likely suspects being State deparment officials according to Beschloss,) leading 
to a scandal. The plans for a hard peace was eagerly taken up by the German 
propaganda machine as a “Jewish Murder Plan” (Beschloss 2002:144), and Thomas 
Dewey, the Republican challenger in an increasingly heated presidential election 
campaign, used the uproar for all it was worth, stating that “Almost overnight the 
morale of the German people seemed wholly changed. Now they are fighting with the 
frenzy of despair. We are paying in blood for our failure to have ready an intelligent 
program for dealing with invaded Germany.”  (From speech published in New York 
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Times, October 19 1944 cited in Hammond 1963:383) The American press was 
divided on whether a hard peace was desirable or not, but it was clear for everyone 
that there was a serious policy split within the Cabinet in regards to Germany.  
Roosevelt did not want to get involved in this mess during the election season, 
and tried to back-pedal from the Quebec agreement. When Stimson showed the 
president the agreement he and Churchill had signed in Quebec, Roosevelt reply was 
that he had no idea how he could have signed such a document. (Beschloss 2002:149) 
Despite feigning ignorance and keeping as distant as possible from the scandal, 
Roosevelt did not really show any willingness to go back on his support for a hard 
peace for Germany. 
The Morgenthau Plan was therefore bound to colour the directive being drawn 
up for the American occupation. The document, which after being approved by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was assigned the name JCS 1067, was in some ways a watered 
down version of the Morgenthau plan. Eisenhower was instructed to exert control 
over German economy only as much as necessary to stop war production, hunger and 
sabotage.  
So far I have discussed the chaotic process of planning the occupation as a 
conflict between distinct structures in the US administration. Along with Roosevelt’s 
aloofness, the differing goals, institutional memories and structural differences 
between the departments of War, Treasury and State were undoubtedly part of the 















3. Crime and Punishment: A look at JCS 1067 
 
The American goals with in the occupation of Germany were neither primarily 
territorial nor economic. Roosevelt had originally favoured dismembering Germany, 
with the Western parts falling under a British sphere of interest, and the eastern parts 
under the Soviet umbrella, as a part of his “grand designs for the peace,” a vision of 
the post-war geopolitical landscape, consisting of the so-called “4 policemen”. 
Through the apparatus of the United Nations, collective security would be enforced 
by 4 great powers in their regions: The United States, Britain, USSR and China. 
Germany was to be neutralised as a threat to British and Soviet dominance in Europe, 
and American troops returned home as soon as possible. 
With Roosevelt’s death the drive towards creating his post-war vision slowly 
lost force. James F. Byrnes, who took over as Secretary of State after Stettinus in the 
new Truman administration, tried to keep the cooperation with the war-time Allies 
going, but was increasingly frustrated in his goals by resistance from Soviet 
negotiators, the French and growing anticommunist sentiments at home. (Peterson 
1978:20-21) 
America’s goals, expressed through an aggressive and punitive policy to 
“crush Nazism,” were prominent in the main policy document on the early 
occupation, usually referred to as JCS 1067 (Joint Chiefs of Staff document 
1067).The development of this directive and the compromises hammered out were 
presented in chapter 2. Despite the gradual death of the vision of post-war cooperation 
between the allies, the Occupation Directive for Germany worked out during the last 
days of the Roosevelt administration would continue to be the basis for the Military 
Government (MG) up until mid 1947. 
 
3.a JCS 1067 
According to one of its critics JCS 1067 was: “Harsher in tone than either its British 
or Soviet counterparts, as well as ill-considered, narrow, and generally unenforcible 
[sic], JCS 1067 turned policy-making in Germany into an American political 
football.” (Gillingham 1993:113.) . Or as Walter Dorn put it “What is so striking 
about J.C.S. 1067 is not that it was a punitive document – it could not have been 
otherwise – but that it was an exclusively punitive document.” (Dorn 1957:498) 
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The Americans were in Germany not only as Conquerors, but as the deliverers 
of Justice. The ambiguity of policy came from the fact that there was no consensus on 
what kind of justice was needed. Roosevelt and Morgenthau had been proponents of a 
harsh peace with Germany, including summary execution of much of the officer 
corps, deindustrialisation and fragmentation of Germany. This extreme position lost 
ground with the death of Roosevelt, but it still had considerable resonance among the 
American public and in political circles for years. 
Robert Wolfe, who was an officer in the American Military Government in 
Germany, thinks lenient policies in the first postwar years were nearly impossible due 
to public opinion at the end of a:  
… war more unquestionably instigated by the losers than any major war in 
history, and ending with disclosures of mass murder of innocents on a scale 
and intensity unmatched in human experience . […] 
The initial policies of U.S. Military Government were not originated by ‘that 
vengeful Jew,’ Henry Morgenthau, as the persisting misconception would 
have it. The hard policy embodied in JCS 1067 and expressed so trenchantly 
in General Eisenhower’s proclamation ‘We come as conquerors, but not as 
oppressors,’ represented an attitude common to most Americans at that stage.  
(Wolfe 1993:196) 
 
Historians have been harsh towards Morgenthau and his “meddling in foreign policy”, 
something Wolfe dismisses: 
This attitude included the Military men at the top of the Military Government. The 
official instructions to the American Commander in Germany reflected these views. 
While JCS 1067 was not as punitive as the Morgenthau Plan favoured by Roosevelt, it 
was still very much a plan for the punishment and containment of Germany and its 
supposed totalitarian tendencies. 
 
3.b Germany locked down 
 
“3.e […] no civilians shall be permitted to leave or enter your zone without 
your authority, and no Germans within your zone shall be permitted to leave 
Germany except for specific purposes approved by you.” (FRUS 1945 III:486) 
 
As clearly stated in JCS 1067, the primary goal of the American occupation in its 
infancy, was to prevent another German threat to World Peace. The whole American 
zone was more or less put under house arrest, while the US and its allies, the judges in 
the “Court of World Opinion,” decided what Germany’s punishment would be. The 
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cities were put under strict curfew; violators were to be shot on sight. Germans 
needed travel visas for even the smallest trip. All political activity was banned, and 
the population, including the police forces, were disarmed. (Peterson 1978:272-3) 
Much has been made out of the “guilt clause” in the Treaty of Versailles, 
blaming Germany for the First World War. But its supposed harshness is nothing 
compared to the indictment levelled on the German people in JCS 1067. (All excerpts 
from JCS 1067 are from the revision usually referred to as JCS 1067/6, signed by 
President Truman on the of May 16 1945) 
 
 “It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare 
and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and 
made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape 
responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.” (FRUS 1945 
III:487) 
 
The Military Commander was instructed that “Germany will not be occupied for the 
purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but 
to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives.”  
(FRUS 1945 III:487) 
 The Germans were going to be put on trial, and the American commander and 
troops were the Judge and Jury.  The Commander of the American zone was 
instructed to be “just but firm and aloof.”  This aloofness was extended to all 
Americans under his command. “You will strongly discourage fraternization with the 
German officials and population.” (FRUS 1945 III:487) 
As we shall see later, the discouragement of contact between American 
Military Government personnel and the Germans served to alienated the Germans and 
make the administration of the American zone and the accomplishment of American 
goals more difficult. 
These were far from abstract phrases in the directive, not meant to be 
enforced. Some of the biggest scandals of the early occupation, like the 
Administration of Aachen and Patton’s removal from his position as Military 
Governor of Bavaria, happened at least partly because of “fraternisation” between 
American Officers and Germans. (Gimbel 1968:3) 
So what were the “important Allied objectives” that the zone Commander was 
tasked with accomplishing? 
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 “4.c The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again 
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the 
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism 
in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for 
punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with 
continuing control over Germany’s capacity to make war, and the preparation 
for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.” 
(FRUS 1945 III:487)  
 
Apart from the ban on political activity and organisations, the last half sentence of this 
paragraph is the only mention of democratisation in the whole document. In 
comparison, JCS 1067 included six pages instructing the MG Commander on various 
aspects of denazification and eight pages on Economic and Financial control of the 
American zone.  
Tasking the zone Commander with starting preparations for “an eventual 
reconstruction of German political life” was hardly putting pressure on the Military 
Commander to act fast and forcefully in democratising the American zone. 
In the discussion on the concept of nation-building in the introduction of this 
thesis I have mused that the RAND study definition probably is the closest thing to an 
American consensus view on what the concept entails.  My view is that in the face of 
the rather specific objectives drawn up in JCS 1067, it is difficult to claim that“… the 
intent was to use military force to underpin a process of democratization.”(Dobbins, 
et al. 2002:1). Military force was clearly used as an instrument to destroy the German 
ability to fight another World War. The eventual democratisation of Germany was 
only a small part of this objective. 
 
3.c Clay and JCS 1067 
JCS 1067 was, with some amendments (the most important one being the post-
Potsdam changes), the guideline the American Occupation until mid 1947, when it 
was superseded by the more accommodative JCS 1779. 
 The first American Military Government Commander in Germany was 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (of World War Two fame), who distinguished himself by his 
harsh attitude towards the Germans, purportedly intensified by visits to German 
concentration camps. He emphasised cooperation with the Russians to keep the 
defeated Germans in check, and was generally hostile towards all Germans. One story 
has him refusing to shake hands with a defeated German General, saying “I won’t 
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shake hands with a Nazi.” (Peterson 1978:55) From November 26, 1945 General 
Joseph McNarney took over, but was kept busy trying to quell GI discontent on 
Occupation duty. One rather interesting way of motivating his troops for the 
Occupation was by instituting “hate training” to warn GI’s of the lurking Nazi menace 
in the sleepy German Burgs of the American zone. 
  These two men left most of the policy decisions of the MG administration to 
their deputy Commander, Lucius D. Clay however. He would finally take over as MG 
Commander when McNarney left in March 1947.  
Military Government officials, with Lucius D. Clay and his top advisors 
Robert Murphy and William Draper in the lead, have made much of their early 
resistance to the punitive aspects of JCS 1067.  (Clay, 1950:16-18; Murphy, 
1964:251) These accounts of early resistance have been an important part of the 
common narrative of the Occupation. This narrative sees the first post-war years as a 
battle between unworkable, harsh and vague directives from Washington and a MG 
apparatus interested in rebuilding and democratising the American zone.  
 Examples of recent additions to this view, Morgan (2002: 69-71), and 
Beschloss (2002) goes even further. Beschloss theorises that Clay was suggested as a 
candidate for his job by Deputy Secretary of War John J. McCloy, because Clay could 
be counted on to be lenient towards his German subjects. 
Gimbel and others point out however that the only contemporary criticism by 
Clay and his men towards the policy directives (mainly JCS 1067) centered on the 
economic aspects. Basically he and his closest advisors feared that closing down 
German industry would hinder European reconstruction and lead to higher costs for 
the United States in the occupation, because the US would have to feed German 
refugees and fund German reparation payments to its neighbours. Clay did not 
support two high-profile American reports in the autumn of 1945 (The Calvin Hoover 
Report in August 1945 and the Byron Price Report in November 1945) criticising the 
harshness of the policies decided on regarding Germany. (Gimbel 1968:2-16)  
Clay himself found that most of his early disagreements with JCS 1067 melted 
away after the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 added provisions calling 
for a Centralised German control apparatus over the Economy. In a wire to the Civil 
Affairs Division of the War Department on December 2 1945, Clay stated that he “… 
do[es] not understand what Byron Price had in mind” with the criticism levelled 
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against American policy in his report. “On the whole, JCS 1067 as modified by 
Potsdam has proved workable.” (Gimbel 1968:22)  
 It would be tendentious to claim that Clay’s attitudes on JCS 1067 were 
constant over the period it was in force. But, at the same time, JCS 1067 went through 
several revisions, mostly to reflect the gradually softening views of the top 
administrator in the American zone. Clay was also granted wide-reaching powers to 
implement the policies of the directive as he saw fit. From early 1946, suspiciousness 
towards Russia started to rise, and with the bungled denazification offensive of the 
latter part of 1946, Clay starts to advocate softer treatment of Germans and economic 
rebuilding. In my view Clay’s opinion on the administration of the American zone 
only differed markedly from JCS 1067 from the winter of 1946-47 and up to the 
implementation of JCS 1779 on July 15 1947.  
Indeed, in an interview Clay stated himself that he came to his duties 
“determined to punish Germans, and therefore determined to get along with the 
Russians”. His gradual slide towards an anti-Soviet attitude seems to have 
corresponded with the movement of American foreign policy in general. Clay claimed 
to have softened to German suffering, and to mistrust Russian intransigence before 
Washington caught up with his views, which might be true. (Peterson 1978:58-59) 
Others argue however that Clay was even slower at hardening his stance towards the 
Russians than Byrnes. (Hans Peter Schwarz in Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik 
(1966:122) claimed that Clay did not change his opinion of Germans until the Berlin 
air lift of 1948.)  
To a relative outsider in this debate, it seems, at least, that Clay’s opinions on 
German policies versus the directive he was to follow was ambiguous enough for 
historians to disagree. And since the US relationship with Germany had changed a 
great deal by the time Clay wrote Decision in Germany in 1950, he might consciously 
or unconsciously have chosen to present himself as relatively more pro-German then 
was the case in the early occupation.  
 
3.d The Moral Occupation 
It is my contention that it matters little, and that the rise of the Cold War, and the 
subsequent removal of punitive policies towards Germany (leading to reconstruction 
and independence) can be found in the national characters and strategic positions of 
the three main sides in the occupation, the United States, the Soviet Union and 
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Occupied Germany, while the two other occupying powers, France and Britain, 
































 This very simplified Graph is a way to illustrate an important point to this thesis, the 
two phases the occupation of Germany went through. The United States went into 
Germany with the stated goal of crushing Nazism and German militarism and making 
sure Germany would never be a threat to World Peace again.  
The principal way of doing that would be the destruction of the German 
Military-Industrial Complex and the economic system that made it possible, along 
with the weakening of the centralised elite-controlled administrative apparatus. To do 
this, America needed the cooperation of its allies, primarily the Soviet Union. 
At the end of the Second World War Germany was a country in which one 
third was Nazi party members and supporters that believed in a strongly hierarchal 
ideology based on the showing of strength, while the remaining two thirds of the 
population were more or less forced into compliance or at least passivity. It is easy to 
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claim afterwards that the allies should have seen that the Germans would be passive in 
the face of an occupation army. The American expectance of conflict and resistance 
among the German population is consistent with an American view of Germany as 
“evil”, and their failure to act in an “evil ways” undoubtedly changed the perception 
about Germany at home. The Germans had been saved, while the Soviet Union turned 
evil by placing itself in opposition to the US. “Clay, who came to Germany prepared 
to let the Germans suffer, had by 1946 or 1947 decided he had no choice but to limit 
their suffering or lose them to communism.” (Peterson 1978:350) 
And with this shift in perspective, the Occupation went from being a fight 
against Nazism to being a fight against Communism. As we shall see later, this 
involved letting the MG control be pushed back by the resurgent German political 
class. Whether this can be characterised as nation-building will be discussed in later 
chapters. Here we will take a look at how it was cognitively possible for American 
decision-makers and the American public to switch so easily from being friendly to 
the Russians and virulently Anti-Nazi, to being friendly to the Germans and virulently  
anti-communist. 
 
3.e Utopian moralism 
The American tradition of following an absolutist, moralistic foreign policy is long 
and persistent. Whether this moralism is used as a propaganda tool to sell a war to the 
masses, or whether it is the logical outcome of the American self-image can be 
debated. But most American foreign adventures have been framed by their supporters 
as “moralistic crusades”, from The War of 1812 (a fight to eliminate monarchical 
rule) and the Civil War (a fight to end slavery), up to the present, almost caricatures of 
these moral sentiments, with the rhetoric of the “Axis of Evil” and “democratising the 
Middle East.”   
Seymor Martin Lipset sees such justifications for conflict as a sign that 
Americans are what he calls utopian moralists, “... who press hard to institutionalize 
virtue, to destroy evil people, and to eliminate wicked institutions and practices. They 
tend to view social and political dramas as morality plays, as battles between God 
and the devil, so that compromise is virtually unthinkable.” (Lipset 1991:22) 
This unwillingness to compromise sometimes makes the American perception 
of the rest of the world prone to violent changes, depending on whether foreign 
powers choose to cooperate with the US or not. When Germany invaded the Soviet 
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Union in June 1941, Churchill greeted the emergence of his new ally by dryly noting 
that he was prepared to make a treaty with Satan if necessary to beat Nazi Germany.  
Not so across the Atlantic. “The United States does not ally itself with Satan. 
If circumstances oblige it to co-operate with evil regimes, they are converted into 
agents of virtue.” (Lipset 1991:24) In the American media, Stalin was instead 
depicted as a friendly, delightfully brusque pipe-smoking “Uncle Joe.” What is maybe 
most fascinating is that these attitudes seem not only to be “propaganda for the 
masses,” but that they were also shared by American leaders. Roosevelt has been 
rightly criticised for his mistaken optimism and trust in his relationship with Stalin.  
Not only Roosevelt, but a large percentage of the American public had a very 
positive attitude towards the Russians at the end of the War. Truman is said to have 
been suspicious of the Russians, but left the running of American foreign policy more 
or less in the hands of his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who consistently 
sought a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union well into 1946. 
This same utopian moralist attitude, however, made it relatively easy for the 
Americans to move from a strong anti-Nazi attitude with the Communist Soviet 
Union as a valued ally, to a position of violent anticommunism with the Germans as 
good Western European democrats as soon as it became clear that the defeated 
Germans were accepting their fate as an occupied nation without too much struggle, 
while the Soviet Union consistently sought to extend its sphere of influence.  
It has to be mentioned here that Lipset is a representative of one tradition on 
American self-consciousness (or what you might call exceptionalism or nationalism 
or any other of the terms with roughly the same meaning.) Marxists historians, in the 
ilk of Howard Zinn, see the American exceptionalism as the ideology of the strong, a 
moral carte blanche to spread American power and implicitly the internal American 
power structure.(Zinn 2005) While it is certainly true that national leaders and elites 
will often exploit nationalism for their own gain, the limited application of Lipsets 
theories in this chapter does not in itself contradict a Marxist reading, as I see it. My 
argument is that American nationalism, whatever kind of a product of US history it is, 
shapes the way Americans view themselves and others, and that reviewing in relation 
to for instance the occupation of Germany, therefore gives valuable insights into the 
thought patterns of Americans at the time. To summarise, while I agree with Lipsets 
view that morality plays an important part in American nationalism, I do not 
necessarily agree that Americans are correct in mixing morality with nationalism. 
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 3.f American anticommunism 
When Germans failed to show themselves as unruly, unrepentant Nazi sympathisers, 
in other words as the evil caricatures of the war, the moral justification for punishing 
them lost its force. At the same time the Soviet Union actively resisted cooperation 
with the United States and sought to expand its influence. The American public was 
already used to anticommunist rhetoric. There had been a major “red scare” in the 
United States after the Bolshevik revolution and the end of the First World War. And 
the House Un-American Activities Committee, made (in)famous by Joseph 
McCarthy’s chairmanship over a decade later, was actually started in May 1938. As 
soon as the war started, however, it moved from chasing communists and socialists 
and started going after fascist groups. As the relationship with the Soviet Union fell 
apart after the war, the Committee went back to its old (communist-chasing) ways 
with renewed gusto. (Heale 1990:60-78, 119) 
It is easy to dismiss this kind of rhetoric as propaganda for the masses, 
designed to give support to foreign involvements among a generally isolationist 
people. What is fascinating though is how the moralistic painting of a fight against 
“evil” (in these two cases totalitarian) forces, is not only used as a propaganda tool, 
but also seems to mirror the public statements and behaviour of MG officials and the 
Truman Administration. It is also evident in internal communications. To a certain 
degree, the administrative apparatus believed that they were fighting “the good fight”. 
Lipset sees this thinking as an integral part of “being American.”  
 
The United States is unique in that it started from a revolutionary event and 
defined its raison d’etre ideologically. Other countries’ sense of themselves is 
derided from a common history, not an ideology. […] Winston Churchill once 
gave vivid evidence of the difference between a nation rooted in history and 
one defined by ideology in objecting to a proposal in 1940 to outlaw the 
Communist Party, when it was anti-war. […] Churchill said that as far as he 
knew the Communist Party was composed of Englishmen and he did not fear 
an Englishman. In Europe nationality is related to community, one cannot 
become un-English, or un-Swedish. Being American, however, is an 
ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American 
values are un-American. (Lipset, 1991:6) 
 
One way of looking at the American occupation in Germany could in this context be 
to see it as an ideological crusade. When the Germans were shown to not be virulently 
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anti-American Nazis, there was bound to be a reaction against America’s difficult and 
expansionistic Allies the Russians. 
 My intention with this chapter is to first of all explain the importance of JCS 
1067 and the ideas behind it for the first years of the occupation. Secondly, I try to 
draw a connection between the punitive phase of the occupation of Germany and the 
restorative phase, by pointing out that both periods had a strong element of American 





























4. Local Military Government 
 
This chapter focuses on how the American occupation was preoccupied with 
destroying Nazism and punishing Germans in the first few years of the occupation, 
and then the gradual turn towards anti-communism, as the American policies of 
punishment met with little resistance and little progress among Germans. 
At the end of the War the United States had 61 divisions consisting 1.6 million 
men in Germany, one soldier for every ten civilian in the American zone of 
occupation. The number of soldiers fell rapidly thought, especially after the end of 
hostilities in Japan. Originally American planners had a goal of keeping a total of 
around 400.000 soldiers in the American zone to maintain security.  
To deal with the German population, the US Army deployed a Constabulary 
force, planned to consist of 38.000 men, (calculated to be one per 450 German in the 
American zone.) which would work closely with the German population. It was 
instituted in January 1946. Meanwhile American troop levels kept dropping far below 
previous targets, and the Army was under strong pressure from G.I.’s and the 
American public and opposition to bring them home. At the end of 1946, 200.000 
troops remained, including the Constabulary corps, peaking around 30.000 men. 
(Ziemke, 1975: 335, 339-341) 
The disgruntled remaining troops, mostly confined to American military 
camps, was frequently more of a challenge for the Military Government (MG) than 
was maintaining security among the relatively passive German society. 
The MG was also hampered by the constant rotation of troops and Civilian 
Affairs officers. The constant changes of personnel, along with the wide leeway MG 
local officers had in policy matters, often created a sense of confusion both in the 
Occupation Apparatus and among their German subordinates.  
US troops were supposed to instil the German population with a sense of the 
superiority of the American society and system. But they had only limited influence 
on the German population. Although using troops as cultural ambassadors could 
probably be considered a quixotic task at the best of times, in Germany the US Army 
was further hampered by a mix of issues: Constant shift of personnel, rapid drop in 
the number of troops, as well as American non-fraternisation rules and other policies 
designed to “instil a sense of defeat” among Germans. In this chapter I will try to shed 
some light on the consequences of these differing trends and policies, and try to 
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The American planning of the post-war occupation had assumed that the Germans 
would be Nazi-infested and hostile to the American occupation, and that a functioning 
German bureaucracy could be taken over and used by the MG. Both assumptions 
proved to be wrong. The Germans were docile and peaceful, while the civil 
administration had to be rebuilt, almost from scratch. (Although all the allies relied 
heavily on bureaucrats and local party people from the Weimar era.)  
The docility of the German population in general only led to a very gradual 
loosening of the grip on them by the Military Government. And this loosening must 
be seen in the context of the geopolitical situation, with the growing divide between 
the Soviet Union and the West.  
And incidents like the one in Aachen, where an MG investigation found the 
American-appointed German city administration “infested” with Nazis and 
conservative business and church-interests, made the Americans suspicious and wary 
of the civilians ready to help them administer the areas under occupation. It was not 
only the question of clearing out Nazis that created a headache for the Military 
Government, as one high ranking member of the SHAEF noted about the Aachen 
controversy: 
 
The clarification of de-Nazification instructions does not solve the problem. 
...We are going to be criticized for the way the political situation develops [in 
Germany] even when the question of Naziism is not involved... If we allow 
right-wing figures to dominate a civil administration we will be criticized by 
the left wing and vice versa. (Schwabe, 2000) 
 
The American response was to treat the German civilian administration with 
suspicion and reserve. The result, according to Edward N. Peterson in Retreat to 
Victory (1978), was that the local military government withdrew from the German 
civilian administration apparatus, and only intervened to do (somewhat random) 
firings of Nazis and hiring of non-Nazis, and to give orders to German bureaucrats. 
The OMGUS leadership was active in regulating the contact American 
soldiers and administrators had with Germans in general. The goal was, on one hand, 
to keep discipline and order in the ranks of the Occupying Army, and on the other, to 
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instil a sense of defeat into the German populace. What the regulations seems to 
primarily have done was to minimize legalised contact between troops and the 
German population. They seem to have done little to curb the thriving black market 
growing up between enterprising American soldiers and German civilians however. 
In an effort to curb “fraternisation” and undoubtedly also to try to instil the 
troops with a sense of “the importance” of garrison duty in the Southern part of 
Germany, the MG leadership instructed their troops about the dangers facing them in 
their mission.  
According to Stars and Stripes correspondents Andy Rooney and Brad Hutton 
in their book Conquerors Peace (Hutton and Rooney 1947:88), General McNarney 
(leader of the Military Occupation after Eisenhower’s departure) ordered “hate 
training” to be given to all newly arrived troops under his command. In an interesting 
mix of the vicious and the banal, American soldiers were told:  
 
“You are a soldier fighting a war. The shooting is over, but there is a lot to be 
done. Sudden raids have been developed as the best way to make sure, that the 
Germans aren’t concealing weapons, Nazi literature or Army property. […] 
Towns look clean and bright, however, look out, the people are still a 
formidable enemy. […] The ragged German trudging along the street with a 
load of firewood may not look vicious, but he has a lot in common with a 
trapped rat.” (Quoted in Hutton and Rooney 1947:88) 
 
Clearly this kind of “sensitivity training” was not designed to win the “hearts and 
minds” of the Germans. The American military tended to see the occupation primarily 
as a security operation, where the objective was to control the German population. 
This top down relationship made it easy for elements of the Occupation forces to 
exploit the Germans. At the same time public and official pressure made it very 
difficult to cooperate with friendly minded Germans. 
The problem on the local level, with non-fraternisation-laws and 
indoctrination of occupation troops about the dangers posed by the German 
population, was a growing disconnect between the occupiers and the occupied. By not 
actively communicating with the Germans, most American troops had no other 
opinions about the German people than the one that their superiors and their training 
gave them. And confined to their barracks, morale among the troops soon started to 
falter. 
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In the winter of 1945 to 1946, thousands of troops demonstrated outside Army 
Headquarters all over the American zone, The unrest culminated in January 1946 with 
a demonstration outside of OMGUS Military Governor, General McNarney’s 
Headquarter, with 3.000 G.I.s, chanting “I want to go home!” The army brass, in a 
telling anecdote on the changing political climate, blamed Communist agitation for 
the demonstrations. ()  
The growing unrest did not go unnoticed in the American press. The New York 
Times, reporting on the incident, described the Army of Occupation as “…an 
aggregation of homesick Americans, who shirk their jobs in order to find time and 
ways to make illegally money, counting up points for their departure from Germany.”  
(New York Times, December 16 1945 as quoted in Gulgowski 1983:249-50) 
 
4.b Black marketeering 
 
Initially the black market was the only area of major contact between the 
American army and the Germans. Because most goods were rationed, and the Allies 
had banned the exchange of the Old Reichsmark into other currencies, the principal 
way for Germans to acquire goods was the Black Market. And on the market there 
was only two valid currencies, the Allied Military Mark (The only official way of 
monetary exchange between Americans and Germans), and American cigarettes, 
which was wildly popular as a payment method up until the currency reform of 1948.  
  
The American Military’s logistical operations oversupplied the American 
Troops, and sold at low cost cigarettes, candy, coffee and other minor luxury 
products, and paid even the lowliest GI 75 dollars a month, a fortune in the 
shattered German economy. All these supplies could be exchanged on the 
black market, along with Gasoline from military transports and other military 
products, in exchange for German high tech or luxury products (Leica 
Cameras, Bausch and Lomb binoculars, Dresden China, porcelain artwork, 
crystal, paintings, antiques, etc, etc.) (Davis, 1967: 148-9) 
 
The line between racketeering and outright looting seems to have been frequently 
broken. Especially cars, precious watches and cameras were popular targets for long-
fingered American soldiers.  
Only in the most blatant of cases were the Army forced to intervene, as in the 
theft of 3 million dollars worth of jewels and heirlooms belonging to the Grand Ducal 
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house of Hesse. The valuables were stolen from Kronberg Castle, which had been 
requisitioned to serve as an Army Officers Club, by a Colonel, a Major and a 
Women’s Corps Captain. In Bremen, the complete traditional silver service of the 
city, valued before the war at 10.000 Gold Marks, was stolen by the Military 
Government Commander of the City and his executive officer. In both cases the guilty 
were sentenced in a military court, but this was the exception more than the rule. Most 
thefts went unreported and unpunished. 
Konrad Adenauer, the future leader of the CDU and the Federal Republic, was 
dismayed at the behaviour of the American troops on their arrival:  
 
“Die amerikanischen Truppen haben sich seit ihrer Ankunf durch Plündern, 
Diebstähle [stealing] und durch ihr arrogantes, menschenunwürdiges 
Auftretren derart unbeliebt gemacht, daß ihre Haltung, wenn sie sich nicht 
ändern sollte, die Züchtung [the breeding of] eines neuen Nationalsozialismus, 
wenn nicht Bolschewismus, zur Folge haben werden...” (Schwarz 1986:439) 
 
Adenauer’s views on their administrative abilities were not much better, and he had 
scathing criticisms for the Americans during the first months of the Occupation. 
(Adenauer’s home state of Rhineland would later fall under the British zone of 
control.) “Die Amerikaner haben nicht die geringste Ahnung von der deutschen 
Mentalität und sind in Verwaltungsdingen die reinsten Kinder. Nicht nur in Köln, 
sondern überall herrscht ein Durcheinander [chaos], das einfach nicht zu 
beschreiben ist...” (Schwarz 1986:443) 
There were however at least “a few good men”. Adenauer had good relations 
with several American officers, including MG Governor Colonel Patterson, and noted 
dryly that the personal qualities of these men far outweighted the bureaucracy of 
which they were part. (Schwarz 1986:443-444) Among American officers there were 
also dismayed at the rampant looting and racketeering of the Occupation troops: 
 
Each time I had come away with a sense of sheer horror at the spectacle of this 
horde of my compatriots and their dependents, camping in luxury amid the 
ruins of a shattered national community, ignorant of the past, oblivious to the 
abundant evidences of present tragedy all around them, inhabiting the same 
sequested villas, that the Gestapo and SS had just abandoned, and enjoying the 
same privileges, flaunting their silly supermarket luxuries in the face of 
veritable ocean of deprivation, hunger and wretchedness, setting an example of 
empty materialism and cultural poverty, before a people desperately in need of 
spiritual and intellectual guidance, taking for granted – as thought it were their 
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natural due – a disparity of privilege and comfort between themselves and 
their German neighbours, no smaller than those that had once divided lord and 
peasant in that feudal Germany which it had been our declared purpose in two 
world wars to destroy. (Kennan, 1967:452, as quoted in Gulgowski 1983: 243-
244) 
 
4.c Peaceful and detached 
These horror stories are, however, only part of the picture. For the most part, the 
American occupation was peaceful and tranquil, with few breaks in the routine of 
barracks life and administrative duties. According to one widely quoted account of the 
occupation, it seems to have been so peaceful and uneventful that historians have had 
some problems documenting what actually happened (Peterson 1978:7-9), both 
because of the lack of written documentation from the local Military Commands, and 
lack of recollection in interviews with ex-military and German civilians decades later. 
The mountain of documents from the Occupation, stored at the Washington 
National Record Center and at the National Archives in the United States;  
 
… evidenced the conflicts at the top, but gave disturbingly few insights into 
 local policy implementation. The fragmentary reports of local units were  
 composed of bland (usually statistical) reports of progress made, occasional 
 bitter accounts of German resistance to the occupation, and even more 
 occasionally a candid inspection report stating that the local units were not 
 implementing  policy for reasons of sloth or confusion.” (Peterson 1978:8) 
 
In Retreat from Victory (1978) Edward N. Peterson did case studies of three 
local German communities under American Military rule, and tried to get hold of 
military officers that had served in these areas. The few he could track down were 
according to him all very critical of local policy implementation and of their superior 
officers. Some saw themselves as incompetent at the tasks.  
 
But it was a greater shock to discover that the [recollection of Germans in 
these areas] was much less filled with details about the military government 
than it had been about Hitler’s less recent government. The closer to the 
people I came, the less evidence of an American military government I found. 
There were individual memories, sometimes very fond, of individual 
Americans, but those Germans I interviewed at length remembered very little 
of substance that military government had done: a bicycle burned for 
trespassing on an off limits street, a house requisitioned, coffee and cigarettes 
acquired. The hunger of those years [… and] in a vaguely grateful way, the 
Marshal Plan. Clay’s resistance to the Russians, formally begun with the 1948 
Berlin blockade, was more clearly recalled, but very little else. (Peterson 
1978:8-9) 
 53
 4.d Opinion polls 
These anecdotes support the picture found in opinion polls conducted by OMGUS 
during the occupation. A survey done in Mannheim in September 1946 revealed that 
only 28 percent of the city’s inhabitants had been in communication with white 
American G.I.s or officers, and 16 percent with blacks. (OMGUS surveys during the 
occupation routinely separated questions according to skin colour.) In the whole of 
the American zone, only one in five of Germans had had the opportunity to talk to 
American soldiers. 
The questionnaires paint the picture of a German population that seemed to 
have a moderately positive attitude towards the American troops. In November 1947 
around 30 percent of those polled felt that the Americans enriched themselves through 
barter. 36 percent had heard of US Army troops wasting or destroying food, 21 
percent had heard of cases where the troops had destroyed German properties, and 13 
percent had had unpleasant experiences with American troops. Somewhat 
surprisingly, among the people that claimed to know Americans, the complaints 
against the troops were in general 13 percent higher than among the ones that did not 
know any troops in person. (Merritt and Merritt 1970:8-12) While the OMGUS did 
not specifically ask why this was so, it seems there can only be a limited amount of 
explanations for this difference. Either the Germans that knew American soldiers 
were in some way predisposed to dislike the Americans more than the average 
German in the American zone, or the American behaviour led to reactions from some 
the Germans they were in contact with.  
Another caveat is the extent to which those responding were answering in 
accordance with what they thought the pollster wanted. Since these surveys were done 
by members of the Military Government, even the OSS (Opinion Survey Section), the 
OMGUS agency responsible for surveying, operated with a generous “sponsorship 
difference” on top of the margin of error. The leader of the OSS at the time, Leo P. 
Crespi, put it at about 10 percent. That is to say that the OSS itself thought the results 
of the surveys were on average around 10 percent more positive than the real opinions 
of the populace, excluding the margin of error. (Crespi 1950:168-169) 
In other words, the German population only had infrequent meetings with the 
American occupation force, and their opinion of them was ambivalent. If we add 
these numbers up, we find that among the ones that had contact with American troops, 
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around half felt that the American troops were enriching themselves on the black 
market and wasting food, while a bit under one third had had unpleasant experiences 
with American troops. Four fifths of the Germans in the American zone had no 
contact with American troops, however, something that, with opinion poll numbers 
being the way they were, might have worked to the benefit of the American MG. 
The interaction between the occupiers and the occupied, and the ability to 
influence Germans on the local level were limited, as I have shown in this chapter. 
And US forces were, due to several factors, hardly in a perfect position to “win the 
hearts and minds” of the occupied, as modern parlance goes. Although since US 
troops often made a rather bad impression on the Germans they interacted with, 
maybe the strict non-fraternisation rules the MG enforced had a positive influence 


























During the war, and in the immediate aftermath, there were strong doubts among the 
American populace, press and policymakers if Germany could ever be a truly 
democratic nation. Others saw it as a daunting task that would require a massive 
American effort at teaching and coercing “backwards and authoritarian” Germans into 
accepting democratic institutions. 
JCS 1067 called for the allies to “[prepare] for an eventual reconstruction of 
German political life on a democratic basis.” Not exactly a sterling cry for immediate 
action on democratising Germany, but fairly optimistic by the prevailing notions in 
the United States about Germany at the time. And for the first months of the 
occupation, democratisation was put on hold as the MG concentrated on restoring 
public order and reviving municipal administration. Indeed, democratisation only 
started in the autumn of 1945 because of Soviet pressure. 
The result, as several scholars have pointed out, was that real grassroots 
movements of change, like the Antifa-movement, were suppressed, while the old 
political elite from the Weimar republic days were able to get into position and 
organise in the political vacuum created by the blanket ban on political activity. 
(Boehling 1993:281-283; Berger 1991:26-29) 
This chapter is a relatively simplistic look at the struggle of different power 
groupings within German society, pointing towards how the old moderate Weimar 
parties were more or less destined to take centre stage, due to Allied policies and the 
limits of German grassroots movements. 
 
5.a The suppression of Antifa 
The blanket ban on political organisations after the end of the war, imposed in all 
allied areas of occupation, was supposed to make it more difficult for Nazi 
sympathisers to regroup.  But there is no evidence of any serious attempt at Nazi 
regrouping. In the end, the major victim of the blanket ban was the burgeoning Antifa- 
(Anti-fascist) movement. The suppression of the Antifas is seen by the so-called 
revisionist school as the main reason for the re-emergence of the Old Guard in 
German politics after the war, and the death of the hope for a genuine grassroots-
based democracy. 
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Local Antifa-groups appeared in most major German cities in the days before 
and after the end of hostilities. These groups were loosely built around the Communist 
and to a lesser degree the social-democrat underground movement during the Nazi 
era, so were able to prepare for the eventual end of hostilities. The groups did not, 
however, see themselves as primarily communist or even socialist, and tried to recruit 
members from all anti-fascist political groupings in Germany, although the majority 
of the members were clearly on the left side of the political spectrum. 
Committed to a total purge of the Nazi apparatus and its replacement with a 
democratic order, Antifa gathered information on local Nazis, and their crimes, which 
they handed over to the MG. They were training a new “elite” to take the place of the 
old Weimar and Nazi governing apparatus, and engaging in more practical tasks. 
These included gathering firewood, clearing rubble, and reallocating housing to take 
care of the influx of refugees and homeless, based on the house owners association 
with the former Nazi apparatus. They also tried to apply political pressure to get into 
local government positions. (Boehling 1993:282-286) 
Political activity was banned across all Occupation zones in the months after 
the end of the war, and there is no doubt that the Antifa movement was engaged in 
political activity. On the other hand, Antifa was, at least on the surface, trying to 
accomplish the same as the American MG was tasked with doing: the purging and 
punishment of members of the Nazi party, and thorough societal and political change 
in Germany, with the goal of creating a democracy “for the people, by the people.”  
At the onset of the Occupation, American MG officers seemed to have a 
largely positive attitude to the Communist resistance who were the main driving force 
behind the Antifa movement. The communists were seen as the German political 
group that fought longest and most stubbornly against the Nazi dictatorship. 
(Boehling 1993:300-301)  
This respect did not stop the MG from clamping down on the Communist- and 
Socialist-dominated Antifa-movement. Some of the more extreme revisionists, 
especially among the Neue Links-movement in West Germany in the late sixties and 
seventies has seen the suppression of the Antifa movement as a deliberate policy to 
suppress the German left and lay the groundwork for an American-style Market 
Liberal, “sham democratic” society. (Schmidt and Fichter 1971) As I see it, there is 
little evidence of such an overall strategy in the rather chaotic and fluctuating policies 
of the MG. 
 57
There seems to have been a general distrust in the MG apparatus of all overt 
signs of political organising by the Germans. But this was limited by what the MG 
considered to be part of the political sphere. With the American view on the 
separation of the political sphere, business and religion, the MG allowed Chambers of 
Commerce, business associations and the religious hierarchies to act freely in their 
zone, and also used these power structures (which had been highly political in 
German society, especially during the Weimar era) for advice and administrative 
positions. Coupled with the American military bureaucracy’s general hostility to 
initiatives that threatened their chain of command, the decision to suppress the Antifa 
movement is more understandable.  
The Antifa movement’s obvious parallels to the Communist workers councils 
of the aborted revolution of 1918, as well as the Soviet Revolution itself, seem not to 
have been the MG’s main concern. As earlier mentioned, the MG officers trained 
during the war generally had a positive attitude to the German communists in the 
immediate post-war era, and the historical parallels were probably not as clear to the 
Americans as it was to their German subjects. To both the Antifa organisers and the 
old business and church elite, the connection must have been abundantly clear; this 
might be one of the reasons why the business and church elites generally fought the 
Antifa movement tooth and nail. 
The Roman-Catholic Vicar-General of Stuttgart and his MG liaison called the 
local Antifa organisation “Camouflaged bodies for the propagation of Communism,” 
and claimed that many Nazis were joining them, with a delightful penchant for 
hyperbole. The Roman Catholic leadership of Wurttemberg was another church group 
determined in their opposition to the Antifa Kampfkomitee[s], according to a U.S. Field 
Intelligence Study from July 1945. (Boehling 1993: 300-301) 
Despite the suppression efforts, the Antifa movement survived until the 
blanket ban on political activity was lifted, when it was eclipsed by the old Weimar 
political elites, elevated to positions of power by the MG. The determined resistance 
by Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the new Social Democrat Party to any cooperation 
with the Communists, would end up being the final nail in the coffin of the Antifa 
movement, since its main strength was derived from the union of local Social-




5.b Church and business 
Although the American MG might have had somewhat of a blind spot for the political 
potential and ambitions of church and business interests, their ability to entrench 
themselves in the new MG-approved administration was also to a certain degree 
curtailed. But in contrast to the blanket ban on the Antifa movement, the church and 
business interests’ powers were regulated primarily by the views of the local MG 
commanders, their superiors and pressure from the American press and public. 
The first big scandal of the occupation was a result of what was considered to 
be improper ties between American MG officers and the local church and business 
elites in Aachen. The city was the first major German city to be under American 
military government. Captured in October 1944, it was almost empty when the 
Americans arrived. But around 6000 out of a population of about 175.000 was still in 
the city. Intent on setting up civil government as soon as possible, the Americans, 
with the help of the Bishop of Aachen, searched for a suitable Mayor among the 
business-community, and settled on the 42 year old Franz Oppenhoff.  
The relationship between the occupiers and the German administration and 
population of the city was good for almost half a year, but then started to deteriorate. 
The Americans were given stronger and stronger anti-fraternisation rules. There were 
no more handshakes between American soldiers and German officials, and the 
Americans started to fire former members of the Nazi party in the City administration. 
(Schwabe 2000) 
This was connected to the struggle over German policy in Washington. The 
old Army handbook, leaked by Colonel Bernstein was being modified to emphasise 
that the troops were not liberators in Germany, but conquerors. And JCS 1067 was 
slowly coming into being under pressure from the Treasury Department. The press 
were also critical of the chummy relationship between the victors and the defeated 
Germans. “The Stars and Stripes came out with an editorial that sharply criticized the 
friendly attitude some American soldiers displayed to people in occupied 
Germany.”Don't get chummy with Jerry ", it advised these overly gullible American 
G.I.’ s.“ (Schwabe 2000) 
The American troops were handed black lists, listing members of the Nazi 
party that were to be fired or interned, and white lists, listing anti-Nazi Germans who 
should be given leading roles, for use in reinstituting Civil Government in the 
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occupied areas. These lists were compiled by the Intelligence Services, but were not 
ready when the Americans entered Aachen.  
Scandal hit when members of the Psychological Warfare Division came to 
study the situation in Aachen, the way the city was run, and the attitudes of the 
Germans. Led by a civilian historian named Saul Padover, they discovered that while 
the great majority of the Aachen population trended strongly to the left in political 
views, the city administration included hardly any representatives of trade unions, 
communists or social democrats. Padover included this in a report to his superiors, 
which was subsequently leaked to the press. 
 
Padover reported to his superiors that the Aachen city administration consisted 
of technicians, lawyers, engineers, businessmen, manufacturers, and 
churchmen."This elite", he continued," is shrewd, strongwilled, and 
aggressive..Its leader is Oberbürgermeister Oppenhoff...behind Oppenhoff is 
the bishop of Aachen, a powerful figure with a subtlety of his own... All of 
these men managed to stay out of the Nazi party, most of them were directly 
connected with the town's leading war industries, [Veltrup and Talbot ]..These 
men are not democratically minded... They are planning the future in terms of 
an authoritarian highly bureaucratic state...Politically it is conceived as small-
state Clericalism...". To make matters worse this clerical-semi fascist clique 
had displayed a telling leniency in accepting ex-Nazis for jobs in the city 
administration. Was this to be a model for Germany as a whole ? Were not the 
Germans in the first German city conquered by American troops totally 
deprived of the chances of the democratic revival that Roosevelt and Churchill 
had promised them? (Schwabe, 2000) 
 
The result of this scandal was mass firings in the Aachen city government. Oppenhoff 
however, was killed by Nazi Werwolf commandos before the Americans got round to 
sacking him. (Schwabe, 2000) 
Another result of this debacle was an increased suspicion of not only 
conservative church and business interests, but of the German political and 
administrative elite in general.  Although MG tried to avoid filling administrative 
positions with people of the old business elite, this does not mean that they were 
marginalised like the grass root movements on the left. Business elites were involved 
in the administrative apparatus through local Chambers of commerce, which were 
tasked with keeping the economic wheels rolling. They also had extensive contacts 
not only with party elites on the moderate right and left, but also among the leaders of 
the labour unions. These were people they knew and had worked with before the Nazi 
period. 
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Konrad Adenauer’s return as Mayor of Cologne is one of the most well known 
examples of the re-emergence of the old elites in West German politics. Not only did 
he rely heavily on his old friends from the Centre party, but also on his contacts 
within the Cologne business-community, catholic organisations and labour unions, 
and some old members of the Social Democrats. Adenauer defended the restoration of 
the Weimar political elite in a letter to a friend by pointing out that there were few 
alternatives: “There are very few capable people. The two wars have torn great gaps, 
and the young talent is not there owing to the disastrous influence of the NSDAP.” 
(Schwarz 1986:437) 
He was probably correct in this. The Nazi bureaucracy had collapsed with the 
end of hostilities. The allies needed men with the institutional know-how and clean 
hands to rebuild (initially local) German administration along acceptable lines. 
 
5.c Weimar parties return 
The “white lists” compiled by Army intelligence units for the local MG contingents 
tried to include a mix of communists, social-democrats and right-of-centre opponents 
of the Nazi party. Because these lists were built on what Military Intelligence could 
stitch together from Weimar politics and Nazi archives, they were drawn heavily from 
the party elites of the Weimar era, especially the Social Democrats, the Centre and 
Democratic parties.  
The MG needed experienced administrators to rebuild the devastated German 
civil administration. The German administrative apparatus suffered a complete 
collapse with the end of hostilities. Since using the old Nazi party bureaucracy was 
politically impossible, prominent Weimar politicians sidetracked or repressed during 
the Nazi era were the most obvious choices. In practice this meant giving power back 
to the old party structures of the Weimar era. 
When political activity in the American zone was reluctantly allowed, on the 
local level, in August 1945, old party hands from the Weimar era centre and left 
parties were already in control of most municipal positions of power. After pressure 
from the social-democrats and communists, the MG instituted advisory councils at 
about the same time. With the goal of including all political stripes in the decision 
making process, the advisory councils suffered under the flaw that they were chosen 
by the mayor himself, and only had advisory power. Instead of including the left 
wing, who had often been sidestepped for more “safe” centre or rightwing candidates, 
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these councils were often used to further reduce the power of the left, and especially 
the communists. (Boehler 1993:296) 
The mayors usually chose members of the local political elite that they had 
worked with before the Nazi era. With the end of the ban on political activity, the old 
Weimar party structures were therefore the only major political force to be in 
positions of power. 
Not only did this lead to a de facto restoration of the political landscape of the 
Weimar republic. Because of the way the coalescence of power happened, the parties 
were shaped very much from the top down. This coalescence started already during 
the ban on political activity, and gained speed after the end of the ban. The first ones 
to form were the parties that had been most active in their resistance during the Nazi 
era, the Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FPD) were later to form, because 
of their dormancy before and during the war, and the time spent swallowing up 
splinter parties. 
Other parties were allowed to form, but faced formidable obstacles to gain a 
strong position in the emerging political system. With no mayoral positions or 
advisory council seats, and with a heavily regulated press licensed out by the MG to 
the established parties, new parties had few ways of making their voice heard before 
the first elections in the spring of 1946. 
And even if they did manage to get the attention of the voters, they were also 
faced with percentage clauses of up to 15 percent of the vote, to get council seats. 
Parties needed a license from the MG to run for elections, but MG political officers 
often actively discouraged small parties from registering. “Splinter group” parties 
were asked to find common ground with one of the big four parties instead, by MG 
officers wary of recreating the political chaos of the Weimar era. (Boehler 1993:297-
299) 
The re-emergence of the Weimar political elite, and the lack of new blood in 
the re-democratisation of Germany has been hotly debated especially in German 
historiography. Very basically the traditionalists have seen the gradual restoration of 
Democracy as a “job well done” by the Western Allies, while the revisionists within 
the Neue Links movement, especially prominent in the end of the 60’s, have pointed 
out the obvious ties to the old political system, and the effect of the squelching of 
Grass Roots initiatives like the Antifa movement. 
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One can question whether, as the German New Left believed, the Antifa 
movement would have been able to create a bottom-up grass roots democracy, and a 
clean break with the Nazi past. But the fact that a movement that corresponded with 
what was supposed to be two of the main goals of the occupation, grass-roots 
democracy and thorough de-Nazification, seems to indicate that these goals were not 
the most important ones for the MG at the start of the occupation. This is in itself not 
that surprising. As we have seen in the main policy paper of the early occupation, JCS 
1067, the American MG stressed that the Army was there as Conquerors, to impose 
order and eradicate Nazism on the terms of the Victors.  
In practice this massive program of reorientation was in itself never really put 
into practice, because the MG had to turn most of their resources in the first few years 
of the occupation into feeding a starving mass of West Germans, and handling 
millions of internal and external German refugees, military prisoners and former Nazi 
party members.  
 In Germany, as well as in Japan, the US chose to use existing power structures 
and old political and administrative elites as the basis for establishing a new regime. 
The lesson from other interventions, where such options were either not available or 
were not used, seems to point to this being the only prudent course of action.  
 
5.d Soviet pressure 
The Soviet authorities pretty much forced the other Allied powers’ hands, when they 
unilaterally ended the ban on political activity in the Soviet Occupation zone on the 
10th of June 1945, a month before the Potsdam conference. In what was no doubt a 
coordinated move, the Communist party (KPD) was the first to form a day later, with 
a declaration calling for an all-German democratisation. The Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Party (LDP, later 
FDP) quickly followed. (Berger 1991:29-30) 
A more thorough look at how this changed the strategic landscape during the 
Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2 1945) and after will be done later in this 
thesis. But with active political parties in the Soviet zone, including a communist 
party calling for a united democratic Germany, the Western Allies, and especially 
American hands, were in many ways tied. The British already wanted a united, 
democratic Germany. The Americans, faced with being the sole opposition against 
German geographical and democratic restoration, and with dwindling support for a 
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harsh peace within the Administration, joined in the call for a future reunification of 
Germany, and for the creation of political parties. 
Political activity was officially allowed again in the American zone from 
August 13 1945, but only at the local level. This was a development that seems to 
have come as a surprise to OMGUS officials, including Clay himself. In his August 
18 briefing to Washington on “Conditions in Germany” Clay mentions only that 
OMGUS has heard of the legalisation of parties in the Soviet zone. First in his next 
briefing September 3, is there a mention of democratisation and the rushed schedule 
to make local elections possible. (Smith 1974:59-60, 67-68) On November 23 parties 
were allowed on the State level, and party organisations on the zonal level were given 
the go-ahead only in February 1946,. The British waited until September 15 1945 
before allowing political activity, but then allowed it for the entire zone, something 
that might explain why the leaders of both major West German parties, Schumacher 
of the SPD and Adenauer of CDU grew into power in the British zone. The French, 
incensed at being excluded from the Potsdam conference, and in disagreement with 
several key portions of the Potsdam Declaration, waited until December 1945 before 
allowing political activity, and then only on the local level. (Berger 1991:30-32; 
Gimbel 1968:17-18) 
To mirror the criticism of the suppression of the Antifa movement, one could 
also claim that the early resumption of political activity in the Soviet zone forced the 
Americans to abandon any plans of thoroughly building up a genuine grassroots based 
democracy based on American ideals, and instead opt for the “easy way out” by 
handing over the reins of political power to resurrected Weimar party entities. 
There were some attempts by the American MG to encourage “grass roots 
discussions” on democratisation, as part of the American re-education programme. 
However, these attempts were generally built around American political traditions and 
ideas, and failed to garner any support in the alien political climate of Post-War 
Germany. One example was the institution of Burgerversammlung (town hall 
meetings) where political leaders were supposed to interact with the populace. These 
gatherings met with determined resistance from the municipal administrations, and 
only lukewarm interest from the general public, and were eventually abandoned. 
(Prowe 1993:320-321)  
American initiatives stressed informal links between the people in power and 
the governed. German initiatives at involving the grass roots in policy making tended 
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to create more formal links. An example was the Citizen Councils on the Länder 
level, which sprang up in the German zone.  These councils were linked to and 
controlled by the administrative apparatus, but went virtually unnoticed by the 
American occupiers. (Prowe 1993:321) 
Another formal link to the grassroots wanted by the Germans, business-labour 
chambers of industry to organise the economy on the local level, was, however, met 
with determined opposition by the Americans, who tended to look at corporatism with 
the greatest unease and suspicion. I will return to the discussion of American hostility 
to Corporatist initiatives in the chapter on the Economic reconstruction of Germany.  
 
5.e End of democratic “reorientation” 
Despite US efforts, a thorough Democratisation along American lines, failed in 
Germany. The most important US contribution to what would be the political system 
of the Federal Republic might be said to have been deciding who was and who wasn’t 
given administrative positions at the end of hostilities, and subsequently, the speed at 
which they handed over the reins of power to the emerging German political class. 
Clay mirrored this view in his answer to his CAD (Civil Affairs Division) 
chief Edward H. Lichfeld’s complaints that CAD felt German democratisation was 
lagging because of their reliance on formal organisations and parties: 
 
Somehow we have to find out what is the true essence of democracy rather 
than what is the true essence of what Americans would like. We have a 
tendency to criticize everything in Germany that doesn’t follow the American 
pattern. Yet I think the [sic] most of us will agree that France, over a great 
many years, has basically been as democratic and probably a more democratic 
country than we have… I think that your own people in studying this thing 
have got to distinguish between reforms that we would like to have because 
we say we do them at home or the Continental practice… (OMGUS Staff 
Conference, March 27, 1948, as quoted in Peterson 1978) 
 
What emerged had much more in common with the old Weimar republic than it did 
the American system of Government, even thought many historians have found 
American influence in the relatively decentralised nature of the Federal Republic as 
opposed to earlier German states.  
One could even argue that American efforts actually held back restoration of 
democracy in the American zone, effectively turning the American zone, as well as 
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the smaller French zone, into a political backwater, subordinates to the growing power 
of the national parties in the British and Soviet zone of occupation.  
One reason for this might be, as mentioned earlier, that the American 
occupiers were forced to respond to the opening of political life in the other zones of 
occupation. One can however also argue that military government as instituted by the 
Americans was structurally ill-prepared and ill-equipped to institute broad-based 
change, because of their limited “footprint” among the Germans, and limited 
experience with occupation, understanding of Germany and limited information 
gathering and dissemination capacity. I will return to the issue of institutional strength 




























The denazification of Germany was maybe the biggest single policy initiative 
instituted by the American Military Government during the occupation. It was also 
among the prime objectives. To make sure that Germany never again would be a 
threat to their neighbours and to world peace, the Allies had agreed on a program of 
demilitarisation and denazification. 
The denazification programme, outlined in JCS 1067, aimed at clearing “from 
public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises 
… active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to Allied 
purposes.” (FRUS 1945 III:488) 
Instead it would turn into what Steininger (1988:123-134) would term a 
“Revolution auf dem Papier.” Impressive in scope and aims, and with massive efforts 
on both the American and German side, it would not lead to the kind of societal 
change the US planners had hoped. As Steininger put it, “In den westlichen Zonen, 
insbesondere in der amerikanischen, degenerierte die Entnazifierung zu einem 
undifferenzierten Prozeß personaler Säuberung [firings], dem sich jeder Deutsche 
unterziehen sollte [had to undergo].” (Steininger 1988:128) Attempts to reeducate the 
Germans on top of this process failed, and then the advent of the Cold War turned the 
American focus from fighting the ghosts of Nazism to attacking the Red Menace. 
 
6.a Demilitarisation 
The demilitarisation part, on the other hand, can probably by any objective norm be 
considered a success. The German Wehrmacht was completely disarmed and 
dismantled. All weapons were removed from German hands, including police 
weapons, and in some reported cases, antique hunting guns and swords from the 
Franco-Prussian war. Any overt sign of militarism was banned, including marching, 
use of uniforms, military songs or national anthems, military toys, veterans’ 
organisations or benefits, and the glorifying of war in the arts. (Peterson 1978:138) 
For a nation devastated by war these regulations seems to have been pretty 
easy to swallow. So successful was the “demilitarisation” of Germany, that when the 
Americans were pressuring the Bundesrepublik to rearm in the early 1950s, a majority 
of the population opposed rebuilding the armed forces. As late as 1959 an Augsburg 
veteran was quoted laconically asking “… and where are the Americans who 
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promised us in 1945 that none [of] us would ever soldier again?” (Peterson 
1978:139) The denazification program would prove to be a lot more difficult and 
frustrating to the American MG. 
 
6.b Dismantling the Nazi apparatus 
JCS 1067, which instructed the American Military Commander on demilitarisation, 
also had clear directives on how to dismantle the Nazi power structure. All leading 
members of Nazi organisations were to be detained. This included judges of the 
special courts, police officers over the rank of lieutenant, military high command, 
members of the Nazi bureaucracy with the rank of Burgermeister or higher, and 
identified Nazi sympathisers in positions of power in businesses and other 
organisations. The German Courts were to be closed down, as were the School system 
and the Press, to be rebuilt only after a purge of Nazi influence, and under Allied 
supervision. (FRUS 1945 III:383-385) 
The denazification programme was already ambitious in scope at the end of 
hostilities. But the increased emphasis on denazification after the zonal administration 
got up and running, and frantic attempts at closing loopholes in the regulations, meant 
it was expanding rapidly and was increasingly difficult to administer. While the first 
directives in December 1944 stipulated that only members of the Nazi party that 
joined before 1933 was to be automatically removed from positions of power, in July 
1945 this had widened to include 136 mandatory categories of Nazi affiliation. In 
September 1945 the denazification process was extended to include all parts of the 
German economy except agriculture. 
Not only was the programme broad in scope, it was also hastily planned, its 
different revisions the response to a series of crisis and incidents. One example was 
the August 15 1945 directive, known as “The Butcher of Augsburg Directive”. It was 
ordered by General Clay after a visit to Augsburg, where he heard that a local butcher 
gave local Nazis preferential treatment.  
Another example was the outcry in the United States when General Patton, 
Military Governor of Bavaria, was quoted as comparing membership in the Nazi party 
in Germany to being a member of the Democratic and Republican parties. When 
additional stories were reported of him “hob-nobbing” with former leading members 
of the Nazi party and Wehrmacht, he was promptly dismissed and sent back to the 
States. Shortly thereafter Lucius Clay introduced the controversial Law No. 8, 
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specifying that: “It shall be unlawful for any business enterprise to employ any 
member of the Nazi Party or its affiliate organizations in any supervisory or 
managerial capacity, or otherwise than ordinary labor.” (Gimbel 1968:102; Horvay 
1993:169) 
The MG denazification boards were suddenly swamped with work, as the new 
law, hastily drawn up, listed the national union, which most German workers were 
forced to join, and even the German Red Cross, as Nazi affiliate organisations, 
meaning that a large part of the German work force were suddenly illegally employed. 
At the same time MG officers were threatened with court martials unless they sped up 
the denazification effort. (Peterson 1978:143) 
 
6.c Problems develop 
But even without the problem of the wide inclusion of affiliate organisations, the MG 
had a formidable effort ahead of it. Roughly one tenth of the adult German population 
in the American zone had been a member of the Nazi party (Peterson 1978:151). 
Removing all but manual labourers and farmers from their positions posed serious 
practical as well as ethical problems.  
How could automatic guilt categories based on party (or affiliate organisation) 
membership deal with the ardent Nazi supporters or war profiteers that had never 
joined with the Nazi Party or any of its organisations? A formulaic scheme built on 
“guilt categories” based on positions held in Nazi organisations could hardly be fair in 
judging those who were members either. Some members of the Nazi Party had been 
forced to join to keep their jobs, or did so as a way to further their career without ever 
being active supporters of Nazi policies. On the other hand, other marginal members 
or even non-members might still have been ardent Nazis after the end of the war. 
During the occupation, the Opinion Survey Section (OSS) calculated that between 10 
and 20 percent of the population still held views close to the Nazi ideology after the 
war.  (Merritt and Meritt 1970:36) 
The enforcement of the denazification laws and policies on the local level 
were often crude and arbitrary. As a general rule it also met determined resistance 
from the reinstituted German local bureaucracy, who resented the disruptiveness and 
insecurity that followed the often random firings of “Nazi sympathisers” and former 
Nazi Party members. 
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There were also few objective ways for the OMGUS Command to know how 
denazification at the lower levels was proceeding. There were lists of prominent 
members of the Nazi party and bureaucracy, but the number of low-level Nazi 
sympathisers in the German administration was more difficult to gauge.  
One reason was that the local German administrations had to be reinstituted 
after the war. The number of Nazis that popped up in the new administrations 
depended on how zealous MG officers or local German appointees had been at 
filtering out the Nazis while rebuilding local administration.  
One problem was that OMGUS under General Clay measured the 
effectiveness of their officers in charge of denazification based on the number of 
firings done. The labelling as a Nazi or a sympathiser was more or less up to the 
discretion of the MG officer in charge, leaving the denazification programme open to 
abuse, both by overdoing firings, or by ignoring Nazis in administrative positions. In 
the end OMGUS statistics showed that 28 percent of the population over 18 years had 
been dismissed from their professional jobs during the denazification. (Peterson 
1978:150-151, 272-277)  
However, this monolithic denazification effort was mostly aimed at the 
smaller fish in the Nazi apparatus, as the Americans had already imprisoned 100.000 
“leading Nazis” (The Americans were clearly being more thorough here than their 
allies. The British interned 64.000, the Soviets 67.000 and the French 19.000) 
(Peterson 1978:145) 
 
6.d Liberation from National Socialism 
The MG was under strong pressure from the American public to clear out the vestiges 
of the Old Nazi system. In an attempt to deal with an ever expanding program 
spiralling out of control, and with decreased funding and fewer troops to reach the 
goal, OMGUS was forced to reassess its program towards the end of 1945. 
A high-level OMGUS Denazification Policy Board was convened in the HQ 
in Berlin, and outlined what would be known as the “Law for Liberation from 
National Socialism and Militarism.” The Board linked the denazification process to 
the broader objectives of the occupation of Germany, the principal one being to 
remove Germany as a threat to world peace and to its neighbours. To accomplish this, 
the Board suggested letting the Germans themselves handle the denazification, under 
American supervision and rules. This would also conveniently solve many of the 
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problems the Americans had with finding enough officers and funds to keep the 
programme going. (Gimbel 1968:103) 
The law, going into effect March 5, 1946, stipulated that all Germans over 18 
years of age had to fill out questionnaires (Meldebogen), and that German-led 
Spruchkammern (tribunals) were to try Nazi members and decide the punishment of 
minor offenders. 
Twelve million questionnaires with over 100 questions were sent out to 
German adults in the American zone. All had to be answered truthfully and returned, 
at the threat of imprisonment in the Allied Internment camps for non-compliance. The 
entire population was sifted for Nazi Party members and sympathisers, who were then 
placed into four “guilt categories” based on their answers: Class I, Hauptschuldige; 
Class II, Belastede; Class III, Minderbelastede; Class IV, Mitläufer. (Steininger 
1988:130-131) 
People guilty of having links to the Nazi apparatus numbered in the millions, and as 
with the OMGUS Special Branch, responsible for denazification before the institution 
of the new law, the Spruchkammern were quickly swamped with cases. 
  
6.e Denazification relaxed 
Under pressure from the Americans to show strict adherence to the rules, and because 
of the rule banning Nazi suspects from most jobs, the early work of the 
Spruchkammern was concentrated on the lower guilt categories. As the scope of the 
work became apparent, and under pressure from German elites and administrators to 
be lenient, the courts proved less and less willing to take a hard stance against their 
suspects. German businessmen and administrators were understandably apprehensive 
about losing skilled workers, subordinates and friends because of strict denazification 
rules. 
OMGUS estimated that at least 3 million people would have to be tried 
through the Spruchkammer system for the denazification process to be complete. This 
quickly proved to be virtually impossible with the resources available, leading the 
German Ministerpresidents of the Länder to ask for, and receive, a pardon for all 
suspected Class III and IVs born after January 1 1919. Later, an amnesty was given to 
suspected Class III and IV with a yearly income of under 3,600 marks. Even after this, 
there was still over 900.000 Nazi Party members or sympathisers that needed to be 
processed. (Peterson 1978:150-151; Steininger 1988:130-131) 
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An easy and popular solution to the workload and the German pressure to be 
lenient seems to have been for the to classify as many as they could get away with as 
either Class IV Nazis, or to exonerate them totally. In November 1946 Clay severely 
criticised the work of the Spruchkammern in a speech to the Länderrat (the highest 
German administrative organ in the American zone) Ministerpresidents, where he told 
them that he had “personally examined” 575 cases put by the Denazification Law into 
Class I. Of these 355 were reclassified into Class IV, while 49 were exonerated. 
(Peterson, 1978:150) 
This severe critique made the Spruchkammern tighten the classification 
process for a while, but soon the numbers were back to where they had been before 
the verbal scolding by the OMGUS chief. It would be the last great push for 
denazification in the American zone.  
Visiting Congress members in the American zone joined in the growing 
chorus of critics of the denazification process towards the end of 1947. The Case 
Committee (the Congressional subcommittee on Austria and Germany) called for an 
end to the denazification programme, except for major offenders, by May 8, 1948. 
This left 60 days for OMGUS to wrap up the denazification effort. The result was a 
crash programme to get rid of the backlog of denazification cases.  
From being told that successful denazification was necessary before the focus 
could move to economic recovery, exasperated German denazification officials were 
told that the denazification effort was now to be wound down, as it was hindering 
economic recovery. (Gimbel 1968:170-172)  
For the German officials this was problematic, as many of the high ranking 
Nazis were still being processed, and a rapid closing of the denazification effort 
would presumably lead to many of them escaping justice. Also, they were worried 
about the whole denazification process losing its legitimacy among the German 
population if the rapid cancellation of the programme led to high ranking Nazis 
escaping punishment, while the rank and file had been punished earlier in the 
“simpler” trials. 
In the last week before the supposed shutdown of the denazification 
programme there were still 28,065 cases dealing with hard-core Nazi party members, 
according to an OMGUS report. 100,000 cases were waiting for the paper work to be 
completed, and there were still about 50,000 new cases being received each month, 
forcing the MG to order a phase-out programme, which barely managed to get 
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through its case-load in time for the first West German general election in the spring 
of 1949. (Gimbel 1968:174) 
 In total 3.660.648 cases were initiated in the Western zones up until February 
1950. 1667 were found to belong to Class I, 23.060 to Class II; 150.425 to Class III 
and 1.005.854 people to Class IV. The rest were amnestied, judged innocent or had 
their case dismissed for other reasons (Steiniger 1988:131) 
 
6.f Failure of reeducation 
The next step was to re-educate the Germans so as to make them “good democratic 
citizens”. By most criteria this was a failure. Maybe not surprisingly, the US 
occupation army was not the perfect tool for changing the German “national 
character”. Also, the Army’s interaction with local Germans, outlined earlier, seems 
to have been counterproductive. Some ham-fisted attempts were made at education 
reform and at spreading American culture through youth sports clubs and other 
cultural activities for younger Germans, as they were deemed to be the ones most 
malleable to change.  
The only programmes that were considered successes was an exchange 
programme for German students that let them study at American universities, and 
American information centres, popularly called Amerika Häuser by the Germans. 
An impressive bureaucracy was built up by the Military Government to deal 
with reorienting Germans, but it was mainly staffed by Military bureaucrats more 
interested in turf wars and empire building than German culture or language, 
according to Edward N. Peterson (1978:159-163). 
A policy of re-educating the young can hardly be said to be aimed very 
aggressively towards changing the values of older people. And OSS surveys clearly 
showed that American reorientation efforts had minimal to no effect on German 
attitudes towards Nazism and Democracy. 
 
In eleven surveys between November 1945 and December 1946, an average of 
47 per cent expressed their feeling that National Socialism was a good idea 
badly carried out; by August 1947 this figure had risen to 55 per cent 
remaining fairly constant throughout the remainder of the occupation. […] 
They also tended to be more critical of than others of the postwar news media, 
to be more likely to find fault with democracy, and to prefer a government 
offering security rather than one stressing liberty. (Merritt and Merritt, 
1970:32-33) 
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 The same opinion polls showed that people were generally in favour of denazification 
efforts, as long as they were not personally targeted. The resistance encountered by 
the Military Government against denazification seems to have been a result of 
growing discontent over the way the process was handled. (Meritt and Merritt 
1970:37) 
Konrad Adenauer of the CDU/CSU in many ways mirrored these attitudes. At 
first a proponent of punishing all former Nazi Party members, he soon started to speak 
out against the denazification effort, as the massive scope was getting apparent. 
Although he called for strict punishment of the guilty, he criticised the process for not 
including non-Nazi party members that supported the party, like wealthy donors, in 
the guilt classes. He also favoured the release of the “little” party members, for as he 
laconically put it “Heroismus ist nicht alltäglich.” (“Heroism is not an everyday 
occurrence,” Schwarz 1986:441) 
 
6.e “Die Revolution auf dem Papier” 
As Rolf Steininger (1988:123-134) put it, the denazification process in the American 
zone was very much a revolution on paper. It was a massive effort, where all adults in 
the zone were questioned and almost a million eventually were judged on their level 
of guilt within the Nazi system. 
It was also highly bureaucratic and formulaic in its repercussions. Low level 
functionaries were often punished disproportionately hard compared to higher-ups, 
simply because they were sentenced early in the process, had no defenders among the 
new German elite or were simply unlucky. “Big fish” within and outside the Nazi 
party often got away without punishment, or with a mere slap on the wrist. 
Also, it seems not to have made much difference in the people’s attitudes 
towards Nazism or the previous regime. Not until the end of the 60’s would a 
counterculture movement start asking painful questions about the War and the Nazi 
era, one of the slogans of which was “What did you do during the War, father?” 
 OMGUS planned to transform German society by a process of several steps: 
First to disarm and demilitarise society, then to punish and exclude the prior 
authoritarian elite from civil society, before reeducating the Germans into good, 
democratic citizens, preferably in the American mould. This process proved to be 
progressively more difficult to accomplish. 
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The successful monopolisation of violence by the occupation forces (in the 
American zone accomplished through an aggressive and effective disarming of 
military and civilians, as well as general passivity among the German population.) is 
vital in nation-building exercises. Significantly thought, the two most notable 
successes in achieving a monopoly on violence was Germany and Japan, two states 
where the previous regime also had the strongest entrenched monopoly on violence.  
 When it came to denazification, the success was not of the same magnitude. 
Albeit the denazification agencies managed to process all adult Germans in the US 
zone, the process was fraught with difficulty, and critiqued both for being arbitrarily 
harsh and for letting upper echelons of the Nazi party and its sympathisers get off 
without or with very little punishment. The reeducation of the German people into an 
American ideal was the most ambitious goal in the policy of change in the US zone. 























7. The Allies 
 
In the waning days of the Second World War, the US Administration was set upon 
turning the war time alliance that defeated Nazi Germany and Japan into a worldwide 
system of collective security. But the rosy plans for the post-war era would soon fail. 
The break-up of consensus and cooperation was undoubtedly one of the main causes 
of the Cold War, but the rapidly chilling relationship between the United States and 
the USSR would also have a profound effect on the American treatment of and 
attitude towards Germans. 
 In this chapter I will briefly outline the goals and policies of the other Allied 
occupiers in Germany, and how this affected American policy. Specifically I will 
address the need for the Americans to abandon their punitive policies in the face of 
British economic problems, French intransigence and growing communist power in 
the Soviet zone. 
 
7.a French Resistance 
Like after the First World War, the French were insistent on a harsh peace for 
Germany. The fear of another destructive war permeated their thinking. The French 
were not invited to the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945, and were shocked 
at the agreement hammered out there. 
 The agreement called for the restoration of a central administration of 
Germany in Berlin. This was out of the question for French politicians and the press, 
who saw the break-up of Germany into smaller parts as the only way to secure itself 
against another destructive war. 
 Ideally the French wanted control over Saar, and internationalisation of Ruhr 
and the Rhineland, and ideally the division of the rest of Germany into smaller states. 
Along with reparations, mainly coal and raw materials from the French zone, the 
division of Germany was the main objective of the French in Germany. The French 
were so much against a unified Germany that they refused to let political parties in the 
French zone use the word Deutschland in their name. Up until the merger with 
Bizonia in 1949, the SPD was called SP in the French zone. The Ministerpresidents of 
the French Länder were called Staatspresidents, signifying the French resistance to 
building up German administrative institutions higher than the Land level. (Steininger 
1988:67-70) 
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 Although they had not been invited to Potsdam, the French had to be invited to 
the Allied Control Commission (ACC). The ACC was responsible for administering 
Germany above the zonal level, and in this forum the four occupying powers all had 
vetoes. In line with the French policy the French representative in the ACC spent the 
next few years vetoing all initiatives aimed at building up country-wide institutions in 
Berlin. (Kiersch 1977:62) 
 But French resistance was not built only around the fear of a resurgent 
Germany. The French were also pumping raw materials, especially coal and wood, 
out of their zone for the rebuilding of France after the war. A resurgent Germany 
might push the French out of their coal- and raw materials-rich zone. 
 The Americans used a combination of carrots and sticks to try to force France 
into accepting a less punitive policy towards Germany. The Americans and the British 
viewed interzonal cooperation as the only way to make Germany even moderately 
self-sufficient economically. France, on the other hand, managed to run its zone with 
a net trade surplus, mainly through massive exports of coal and wood.  
 
7.b Monnet Plan 
This extraction of raw materials was codified in the Monnet plan, penned by French 
head of planning Jean Monnet in March 1946. It was an ambitious plan to rebuild and 
modernise French industry and economy, built on German resources and American 
machinery and credits. (Willis 1965:246-247) 
 The dilemma for the French was that to get maximum American help, they 
would have to assent to centralised institutions in Germany. The French held out for a 
while, but got tempted by the Americans with the Saar as consolidation, as well as 
monetary payments.  
 
The crucial foreign-policy decision came in mid-1947, when, after two years 
of unproductive tussles over loans and the future of Germany, the Socialist 
Ramadier government finally decided that the USA was more likely than 
Russia to support French interests. (Killick 1997:110) 
 
When Marshall Plan aid started arriving the year after, the French would, together 
with Britain, receive the largest share. But the French economy was considerably 
smaller than the British, meaning that the funds probably had a bigger effect. The 
French used the Marshall aid, as well as so-called American Counterpart funds, for 
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investment in infrastructure and industry. Monnet himself calculated that American 
aid had paid for around one third of the modernisation programme. (Killick 1997:114) 
 After disrupting the plans for creating central German institutions, the French 
were eventually ”bought off.” This turn in French policy came for several reasons: 
The need for American capital and material assistance and American agreement to 
some of the French demands in Germany, most importantly the Saar question. Saar 
would be administrated by the French up until the province decided to join the 
Bundesrepublik in a plebiscite in 1957. Without a doubt, one of the most important 
factors was the growing animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which on one side forced the French to choose a side, but on the other, offered the 
possibility that Germany might stay divided, and thereby weak after all. Also, the 
French were not able to run their zone with a surplus from 1948 on, making it less 
valuable as a source of resources for the reconstruction of France. (Kiersch 1977:76) 
After an agreement was hammered out in mid 1948, the French merged their zone of 
occupation into Bizonia in the spring of 1949, thereby removing the last big hurdle for 
West German central institutions and the founding of the Bundesrepublik. 
 The natural question about French intransigence towards the attempts at 
creating centralised German institutions is why did the Americans not put more 
pressure on the French to change their positions? During the whole period while the 
French were refusing to yield to pressure in the ACC, they were receiving American 
aid and loans. Clay and the leaders of OMGUS obviously were very interested in 
restoring central government in Germany to make the German economy more self-
sufficient and thus to free up American troops.  
One might conclude that the inability of the Administration in Washington to 
use the means they had at their disposal to pressure the French into compliance 
suggests that the breakdown of the Potsdam accord was not of supreme importance to 
the White House. On the other hand, France was politically and economically weak, 
with a strong communist party. Forcing the French hand might therefore have 
catastrophic consequences, as where France to fall to communism, West Germany 
would also be dangerously exposed and the European continent all but lost. 
 
7.c British Reserve 
The British, with their vast colonial experience, tended to see the occupation of 
Germany as a more traditional operation than the United States. The British wanted to 
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limit the deindustrialisation of Germany to the armaments industry, and war 
reparations as low as possible. As we recall, Churchill had been forced to concede to 
the separation and “pastoralisation” of Germany at the Quebec conference in 1944. 
After Roosevelt’s death however, British views moved back towards supporting a 
unified and strong German state.  
The British had managed to acquire the responsibility for administrating the 
North-western part of Germany after much arguing with the Americans, who also 
wanted to control it. (Sharp, 1975) This zone was the most populous part of Western 
Germany, but most importantly it also included the Ruhr and Rhineland areas, the 
heart of German industrial might. 
The fight over the control of the Ruhrgebiet and the Rhineland would turn into 
the biggest political and economic issue at stake for the British, as well, as well as for 
the Allies in general. Because of the concentration of industry in these two areas, the 
treatment of them would be of vital importance not only to the German future, but it 
would also have continent-wide and global ramifications. 
 
… The future of the Ruhr constituted the greatest challenge, not least because 
of the intense interest shown by the Soviet Union and France. Economic 
security, the level of industry debates, reparations: all these questions centred 
on the Ruhr. British diplomacy made the most of it by keeping all the other 
powers in the game without giving away anything. Various plans were put 
forward: a separate state, completely severed from Germany (the French 
proposal), international ownership and control of the whole of the industrial 
complex (20 per cent for each of the four powers), and finally a newly 
founded state consisting of the Ruhr as a trustee of the German people. British 
Military Government, notably the Deputy Governor Sir Brian Robertson, 
favoured the formation of a new state based on the Prussian provinces of 
North Rhine and Westphalia. On 23 August 1946 these two provinces were 
dissolved and ‘Operation Marriage’, the creation of a new federal state, took 
place. The raison d’être of this development, the transfer of coal and steel into 
public ownership, though never renounced by the Labour government was 
postponed indefinitely. (Kettenacker 1997:24) 
 
The zone received the bulk of the millions of refugees flooding in from the East. 
Unless the sector was to be a bottomless pit of expenses for the British government, 
Northern Germany needed to start producing and exporting goods to pay for food. For 
this reason, the British resisted pressure from the other occupation powers, primarily 
France and USSR, to start aggressive deindustrialisation policies or reparations 
payments from their zone. They were also consistently calling for the restarting of 
industrial production and export, so as to get Germany back on its feet economically. 
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The British were from the beginning interested in a more lenient treatment of 
Germany than the other allies. An early example was the British refusal to sign on to 
the JCS 1067 framework for the occupation, which the Americans hoped the British 
would adopt too. Instead, the British military stuck to the older Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS) 551 document, up until the merger of the American and the British zone, 
as I outlined in chapter 2c. 
Despite this, and in contradiction with the agreement at Potsdam, the British 
gradually started to moved against a central German administration, as they feared 
that it might fall into the Communist sphere of influence, according to some British 
historians, (Deighton 1989:15-34)  
As there was no sign that the economic restrictions on German production 
would be softened over the near term, and with the dual crisis of the British economy 
and the feeding of Germans and refugees in the British zone in Germany, the Attlee 
government agreed to Clay’s offer to merge the American and British zone in 1946.  
The continued economic problems of Britain, and their effect on British policy 
should not be understated. British inability to counteract communist and Soviet 
pressure in Greece and Turkey helped drag the United States deeper into European 
security concerns. In Germany the British economic problems led to reduced 
influence, but this was mitigated by the United States gradually moving towards the 
British views on German reconstruction.  
 
7.d Soviet Pressure 
Superficially the Soviet positions on Germany had some similarities with the US 
positions. The Soviet Union wanted a central German government, albeit much more 
centralised than the federal system favoured by the Americans. The Germans were to 
pay for their war of aggression. But unlike the American emphasis on destruction of 
war making potential and throttling of the economy, the Russians pursued a much 
more direct policy of deindustrialisation.  
They scoured the Soviet zone, dismantling about 26 percent of the industrial 
capacity of their zone and sending it to the Soviet Union. (In comparison to about 12 
percent of the Industrial capacity of the Western zones.) (Fulbrook 2002:126-127) A 
large part of the rest of the industry of the zone was put under Soviet control, and the 
profit and much of the production was sent to Russia and its satellites.  
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Like the Americans, the Russians pledged societal change and the uprooting of 
National Socialism and militarism. Both saw German authoritarianism as part of the 
reason for the war. The Americans tried to deal with it by half-hearted attempts at 
building grass-roots democracy and decentralisation of the political and 
administrative apparatus. The Soviets chose a more hands-on approach. They attacked 
the economic and political power of the old elites. The Junker class lost their large 
eastern estates. Control of industry was moved out of the hands of the old industrial 
elites.  In politics and in the bureaucracy, the Soviet Union used German communist 
émigrés to gain control of the East German governing apparatus on all levels. 
The Soviets also worked to strengthen the Communist party as much as 
possible in their zone, with the goal of making it into a potent political force in post-
war Germany. As the speed and scope of the Communist penetration of East German 
(and Eastern European) society became apparent, western opposition hardened. The 
British were the first to speak out, for instance in connection with the Soviet support 
for the Polish Lublin government, but the Americans quickly caught up with British 
anti-communism, as the Allied post-war consensus fell apart. 
One might ask if the rise of the Cold War was not as much caused by Western 
fears at the speed and ease of the Soviet subversion and subjugation of the countries 
that fell under its control after the Second World War as by the actual military power 
of the Soviet Union. Especially for the United States, with its moralistic, 
deterministic, almost messianic belief in the supremacy of its system, this rapid 
development must have been deeply troubling and decidedly unnatural.  
Another question raised by this interpretation is whether the US Occupation 
would have been more successful if the Americans had been able to utilise German 
emigrant elites instead of just handing over power to “the natives” after the war. 
Whether this is a sign of lack of US planning, or a belief that friendly, democratic 
forces will naturally converge from within the target country is discussable, although 
the answer is probably a mix. The apparent use by the United States of Chalabi and 
his compatriots as instruments for change and control in the latest Iraqi war might be 
seen as an attempt by the United States to recreate this dynamics. Albeit a rather 
unsuccessful one.  
On the other hand, the dynamics after the Second World War, with growing 
anticommunism in both Western Germany and in the United States can not be 
separated from the extremely harsh policies instituted by the Russians in their 
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occupation zone. German refugees flooding into the Western parts of Germany had 
horrible stories to tell about abuse, looting and rape in the Eastern zone and in the 
areas being ethnically cleansed in Eastern Europe. 
 
7.e Threat of a Communist Germany 
Some have seen the rapid and massive Soviet infiltration of East German society as a 
determined Soviet attempt at creating a unified Communist Germany under Soviet 
influence, a policy followed continuously from the end of the War to the death of 
Stalin. 
 
The more we learn about [Stalin’s] policy toward Germany during the last four 
years of his life, the more it makes sense to see it as an increasingly desperate 
series of maneuvers, aimed at […] salvaging his own scheme for a reunified 
Germany under Soviet control. (Gaddis 1998:125) 
 
Others agree that the Soviet Union wanted a unified Germany. But the speed and 
scope of the reparation regime have led to questions about the Soviet determination to 
turn Germany into a satellite state. 
 
The scale of dismantling was one indication that that the Soviets had no initial 
firm intention to remain on German soil in the long term; they at this time 
appeared to want to get in, take what they could, and get out… (Fulbrook 
2002:126) 
 
No doubt the Soviet Union would have wanted a communist Germany, and according 
to Marxist ideology, they expected it to eventually turn into one. And like the 
Americans the Soviets were not adverse to a bit of pushing of the Germans so as to 
speed up the Germans on their trek towards Utopia. 
 But it might be that Stalin would have been content with a demilitarised, 
neutral Germany, a la post-war Austria as a buffer between Eastern Europe and the 
West, while waiting for the inevitable fall of Capitalism. The virulent anticommunist 
attitudes prevalent in the Western zones, from the SPD on the left and all the way to 
the extreme right, would have made it very difficult for Soviet-aligned Communists to 
gain power in a unified Germany, at least as long as the Western Powers had military 
forces in the country. Even in the Eastern zone, the Communists did not get more than 
30 percent of the vote in the only free elections held there. 
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 No matter what Stalin’s plans were, he was viewed with increasing suspicion 
in the West. And sources uncovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union seems to 
show that the Russians did not intend to leave East Germany even if the West agreed 
to the plan for a neutral, unified Germany. (Gaddis 1998) 
 
7.f The growing divide 
In the immediate postwar days, the Soviet Union was able to more or less set the 
agenda. On the April 30, 1945, the same day that Hitler committed suicide, Walter 
Ulbricht and his group of German Communist exiles left Moscow for Germany.  
June 10 the same year the Soviet Union allowed political parties in their zone. 
The day after, the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KDP) was founded. In the 
founding document, the communists called for the unification of Germany, the 
restoration of democracy and a vigorous campaign of denazification (Steininger 
1988:159) KDP was followed by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
on June 15 and the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) June 26.  
The Western allies were taken by surprise. At the subsequent Potsdam 
conference, the United States and Britain agreed to a process of democratisation and 
to the creation of a central German administration in Berlin. Implementation of the 
Potsdam agreement was put in the hands of the Allied Control Council. The French, 
invited to the ACC but not to Potsdam, vetoed all subsequent attempts at 
implementing central agencies. 
Political activity was allowed in the Western zones in the autumn of 1945. The 
Berlin parties immediately started to work towards putting their western sibling 
parties in under “central control.” After considerable Soviet and Communist pressure, 
the Berlin leadership of SPD under Otto Grotewohl agreed to a merger with the KPD 
in April 1946. The new party, Sosialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) would 
run the Eastern zone and later the Deutsche Demokratische Republik, up until 
reunification. According to Gaddis (1998:116) Stalin met with KPD leaders in the 
summer of 1945, and discussed a plan for gaining control of Germany, in which the 
Soviet forces would secure SED control of the Soviet zone, while the merged SED 
would draw socialist and communist groupings in the West under its umbrella, 
thereby laying the groundwork for a communist takeover of the whole of Germany 
through democratic means.  
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The SPD in the Western zones, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, was, 
however, wary of such a turn of events. It condemned the creation of SED and racked 
up its anti-communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric throughout 1946 and beyond. (Edinger 
1965:70-190)  
The CDU and CSU of the Western zones also refused to subjugate themselves 
to the Berlin “headquarters”. Konrad Adenauer rose to the leadership of the CDU in 
the British zone, and slowly turned the party away from flirtation with “socialist” 
ideas like nationalisation, and subduing calls for restoration of central rule. (Schwarz 
1986:425-617) As a result, the German political elites were already at this early stage 
starting to separate themselves into distinct East and West German spheres. 
Cut off from the agricultural areas of Eastern Europe and with no central 
distributing agencies, along with the influx of millions of refugees, the economies of 
the British and American zones deteriorated during 1945 and 1946, and needed 
infusions of food and capital to avoid disease and unrest. The Soviet and French 
zones, on the other hand, were turned into net exporters, used for the rebuilding of 
their respective occupying countries. 
Irritated by French and Soviet insistence on reparations in the face of a 
growing economic crisis, Clay stopped reparations payments from the American zone 
in May 1946, just two months after Allied agreement on the Level of Industry Plan, 
which was aimed at reducing the German standard of living to the level of 1932, and 
industrial capacity to about 50 percent of the 1938 level. 
Stalin’s so-called election speech of February 1946, in which he called for 
massive rearmament, is sometimes cited as the starting point of the Cold War. And 
the “explanation” of the speech, written by American Charge d’Affaires in Moscow 
George F. Kennan, (Known as “The Long Telegram”, posted under the pseudonym 
“X” in Foreign Affairs, 1947) would create far more consternation in Washington 
than the speech in itself. Calling for a tougher stand against the Russians, it would 
embolden the critics of the “appeasement policy” towards the Soviet Union in the 
Administration. But Clay and Byrnes continued advocating for cooperation with the 
Russians through the spring and summer of 1946. Both only gradually shifted their 
positions during 1946, in the face of Soviet intransigence and shifting public opinion 
at home.   
Due to the widening economic crises in the American zone and the lack of 
common policies, the Americans invited the other allies to merge the zones in July 
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1946. The British accepted, thereby formally initiating the road towards the division 
of Germany. American policy against the German population was still punitive in 
nature, but fear of the “growing communist threat” led to a colder relationship with 
the Soviet Union, as well as interference with the newly elected Land governments to 
stop nationalisation, corporatist organisations and other examples of “creeping 
Marxism”. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes, one of the Americans most intent on keeping 
the cooperation with the Soviet Union going, finally conceded to the growing pressure 
from Washington and from Britain and Germany in September 1946. In his speech at 
Stuttgart on the September 6, the Germans for the first time learnt that they were to 
receive more lenient treatment, that the United States would keep troops in Germany 
for the length of the occupation, and that the United States was committed to the 
introduction of democracy in Germany and to the rebuilding of the German economy 
so as to make it self-sufficient. 
The new American attitude towards the Soviet Union and Germany also 
manifested itself in US voting booths. In the midterm elections of November 1946, 
the Republicans swept to majorities in both chambers. The new Republican majority 
was advocating Federal spending cuts, but was also fiercely anti-communist. To get 
funding for its foreign commitments, the Truman administration (which shed Byrnes 
and pro-Russian Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace in the winter of 1946/47) had 
to play on the fears of spreading communism to persuade the Republican majority, 
and the conservative southern Democratic congressmen and senators. 
Cooperation between the Truman administration and the powerful Republican 
senator Arthur Vandenberg, first initiated to replace British military aid to Turkey and 
Greece in the spring of 1947 (against communist guerrillas in Greece and Soviet 
pressure in Turkey), pushed American policy on Germany decidedly away from 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
The new Secretary of State George Marshall and President Truman got 
bipartisan support for the military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, by 
promising senator Vandenberg to publicly voice the same kind of rationale about the 
creeping danger of Communism they had used in private meetings in Congress. The 
result was the famous speech by Truman on March 12 1947, where he laid out what 
would later be known as the Truman Doctrine. (Hammond 1969:16-23) 
 85
The final abandonment of the effort to get an agreement on a unified Germany 
is said by some historians to have happened at the meeting of the Allied foreign 
ministers in Moscow, from early March to late April 1947. With Soviet foreign 
minister Molotov refusing to back down on Soviet demands during a long series of 
fruitless sessions, the Western allies resorted to discussing the German problem on 
their own.  
 
These [informal conversations] produced the first consensus among all the 
Western allies, including the French, in support of Bevin’s view that a 
truncated and rehabilitated Germany would be less dangerous than a unified 
state that might come under Soviet control. (Gaddis 1998:117) 
 
They did not reach total agreement. The most important issue to the French, their 
request for the internationalisation of Ruhr and the Rhineland, would not be solved for 
some time yet. But the new course was more or less set: An abandonment of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and the goal of a unified German state, for the 
division of Germany into two distinct parts. On the American side, this was an 
important break away from anti-nazism and towards anti-communism as the principal 
driver of policy on Germany.   
In June 1947 the punitive JCS 1067 guideline for the occupation was 
superseded by the much more accommodative JCS 1776. This document, restorative 
in nature, was publicised in the same month as Secretary of State Marshall’s famous 
Harvard speech, laying out the case for the economic aid that would later be known as 
the Marshall aid. In his speech, Marshall was careful not to leave the impression that 
the aid programme was designed to bolster Europe against Soviet pressure, 
mentioning only vague threats against unspecified countries that might work against 
the US policies: 
 
- Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries 
cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or 
groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom 
politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. 
(“The Harvard Speech” Pharo and Nordahl 1972:79) 
 
The Soviet Union was invited to join in the request for aid from the United States 
along with its new satellites. They refused however, to the relief of the Western allies. 
(Hammond 1969:25)  
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 The focus in Germany had now definitively moved from a policy of anti-
fascist reform to anti-communist containment. While Britain and the United States 
were still committed on paper to the restoration of a unified Germany, they were busy 
integrating Bizonia and trying to settle their differences with France so as to create a 































8. The Economy 
 
The economic policies pursued in Germany went through two distinct phases, as with 
American policy towards Germany in general. During the first phase, lasting from the 
end of the war and roughly until the institution of the currency reform in 1948, the 
German economy was artificially deflated due to American policy decisions, Allied 
disagreement and bureaucratic control and incompetence. The second period, from 
1948 and onwards, was characterised by a rapid turning over of control from the 
Allied MGs into German hands, along with an end to the most punitive American 
economic policies in Germany and the beginning of a program of American economic 




8.a Stunde Null 
It was the stated goal of JCS 1067 to keep the basic living standard of Germans below 
the level of any of Germany’s neighbours, and that the MG were to take no steps to 
strengthen or maintain the German economy, unless needed to fulfil American 
objectives. (FRUS 1945 III:494) At this the Americans succeeded. The controls on the 
economy in the American zone, and the other occupation zones for that matter, were 
sufficient to keep the German economy almost stagnant during the first couple of 
years of the occupation. 
Economic controls were hotly debated, however, both between the allies and 
among the American administrators. Clay claimed that upon coming to Germany in 
the spring of 1945 he was shocked at how unsuitable the JCS 1067 provisions were to 
the situation “on the ground”. According to him and his advisors, the document 
clearly foresaw an economically functioning Germany, able to handle restrictive 
Allied economic policies. (Morgan 2002:76) 
 What they found on arrival were what the Germans later termed Stunde Null, 
the complete breakdown of the economy, massive damage to the infrastructure and 
massive shortages of food, shelter and basic goods. Clay, tasked by JCS 1067 to keep 
the German population free from “disease and unrest”, and also with instructions to 
make the occupation self-financing, sent his economic advisor Lewis Douglas to 
Washington in the autumn of 1945 to ask for a revision of the JCS document to allow 
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the restarting of limited industry exports, so as to make it possible for the Germans to 
pay for what imports were needed, primarily food. The mission was a failure. Douglas 
only managed to get a concession for the MG to exercise further controls to fight 
inflation. Douglas resigned in protest, while Clay kept to his post, hoping that Allied 
cooperation would make it possible for the different occupation zones to eventually 
return to something resembling an economic unit, as envisaged in the Potsdam 
accords. 
The first years were dominated by the work of feeding the hungry German 
masses, both residents and refugees from the East. The closing and destruction of the 
armaments industry was also important, along with dealing with bottlenecks in the 
economy, especially when it came to transportation and agricultural products, and 
administrating reparations payments from Germany to countries that had suffered 
from Nazi aggression. 
In the Western zones reparations mainly consisted of the export, free of charge 
or under extremely favourable credit arrangements, of large amounts of coal and other 
non-manufactured goods. The US and the British claimed no reparations themselves, 
but did in fact pursue a vigorous program of information gathering on German 
industrial processes and practices, both military and commercial. The monetary worth 
of these extractions of German technology and research has never been adequately 
quantified by either the US Government or researchers. John Gimbel, in an article on 
the American research extraction program, suggests that a Russian claim at the time 
of a monetary value of the extractions at around 10 billion dollars was not wildly off 
the mark. The extraction programs ended with the change of American occupation 
policy in mid 1947, due to fear that they would undercut the rebuilding of German 
industry. (Gimbel 1993:193) 
The punitive policies of the occupation in the economic field were many and 
varied, ranging from keeping the rations of Germans barely at sustenance level, to the 
discouragement of German industrial exports and disruption of trade. This affected 
trade between Germany and the rest of Europe, between the Occupation zones and 
even commerce between different parts of the American zone. The monetary policies 
of the Allies led to runaway inflation of the struggling Reichsmark and the growth of 
a sustenance economy that was heavily dependent on black market dealing, instead of 




Despite growing opposition, the concept of deindustrialisation of sectors of the 
German economy, first seen in the Morgenthau plan, continued to set the agenda for 
the allies well into 1946. The Level of Industry Plan of March 1946 can in this context 
be seen as the final “judgement” on the German economy, before anti-communism 
overtook anti-Nazism as the principal goal of the American Occupation.  
 This plan, hammered out by the allies in the Allied Control Council, decreed 
that Germany’s standard  of living was to be reduced to the 1932 level, and that it was 
not to exceed that of its European neighbours. Industrial capacity was to be reduced to 
about 50-55 percent of the 1938 level, and over 1500 factories were to be dismantled 
in the Western zones. Limits were imposed on the production of virtually all goods, 
except for armaments and war-related products, which were banned completely. Only 
coal production was increased, an important reason being the use of coal as restitution 
payments to Germany’s neighbours, primarily France and Belgium. (Fulbright 
2002:127-128; Hardach 1980) 
 The Plan included provisions for the exchange of food and raw materials from 
the Soviet zone with products from the Western zones. But this agreement was 
cancelled only a couple of months later. Along with a general worsening of the 
economic situation, the fear of famine, a further breakdown of relations with the 
Soviet Union, and continued British pressure to use German industrial capacity to 
feed the German population, the Americans slowly started to move towards a more 
lenient policy.  
 
8.c Decartellisation 
According to Peterson (1978:126-131), breaking so-called cartels was the most 
important part of the “defanging” of the German economy. The American planners 
viewed the German industrial arrangements as a series of cartels or trusts that had 
been vital in the build-up and execution of the German war effort. A breakup of the 
cartels was viewed by the Americans as an important tool to hinder the Germans from 
again waging aggressive war. 
 The retreat from the policy of decartelisation is in many ways indicative of 
American economic policy in Germany in general. It happened not as much from 
German resistance, as because of disagreements within the MG and its Economics 
Division, as well as opposition from the British.  
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 The breakdown of decartelisation would lead to a minor scandal because of 
the vocal protests of the “losing faction” within the MG, led by James Martin and 
Bernhard Bernstein (a close ally of former Treasury Secretary Morgenthau). Martin 
later wrote a book on this topic, All Honorable Men (1950), which passionately laid 
out how the plans to reform German industry were systematically being undermined 
by “reactionary” elements within the Economic Division, from its leader, General 
Draper (a former Wall Street Investment Banker), and on down. 
 The distaste for destroying functioning economic structures and punishing the 
big wartime companies led to clashes with the ideologues of the Decartelisation 
group, who wanted a thorough reform of the German economy. After a long drawn 
out-fight, where the decartelisation groups’ only big accomplishments were the 
seizure and partial break-up of I.G. Farben and the appointment of a trustee to 
administrate coal wholesale firms, Martin eventually left. Criticising the gradual 
removal of administrative power for the decartelisation branch, Clay’s “inability” to 
sign Martin’s proposal for a decartelisation law and the lack of progress and support 
for decartelisation in general, he left March 22, 1947. 
 Draper appointed his son-in-law Phillip Hawkins to Martin’s position, and the 
Decartelisation Branch turned more and more into a paper mill, where small and 
medium companies had problems getting export or production licenses, while bigger 
firms, especially the ones with pre-war relationships with Western European and 
American companies, were able to use their contacts to get not only licenses, but 
preferential treatment in the form of allocation of coal and electrical power to 
transportation assets and prisoners of war as forced labour. (Gulgowski 1983:288) 
 Martin saw Clay’s unwillingness to take a firm stance on decartelisation as the 
reason for the floundering of the policy. Despite the fact that Clay had originally 
argued for an effective decartellisation law (as he saw it as a deterrent to any attempts 
at nationalisation of industry), he admitted later that he was unwilling to stand behind 
a strong and disruptive decartelisation process in the face of mounting economic 
problems in Western Germany and mounting pressure from Washington to cut costs. 
(Gulgowski 1983:286-287; Gimbel 1968:117) 
 Others blamed Martin and his compatriots, in essence arguing that the young 
lawyers staffing the Decartelisation Branch were overzealous and tone deaf to 
German administrative traditions. MG officer Bert Schloss would later characterise 
the fight against cartels as a quixotic endeavour: 
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 The Americans in charge of the anti-trust action in Germany seemed to have 
acted under the illusion that the Germans themselves had never recognised the 
problem [of cartels,] or done anything about it. In fact, the Germans had a 
well-developed system of legal supervision of cartels, the administration of 
which was entrusted to the highly competent special courts…. The new law 
(which read like the Sherman Act) omitted any reference to established 
German legal ideas, institutions or procedures. (Schloss, 1955:256) 
 
The failure of decartelisation can, however, not be blamed solely on American 
cluelessness towards local customs or Wall Street resistance. As the occupation 
authorities dealt with the mounting economic crisis, it gradually became obvious to 
Clay and others at the top that the British were right in their view that some German 
industrial export was needed to feed the country’s citizens. 
 
8.d Food crisis 
The lack of food, brought about by the loss of German farmland to Poland and the 
Soviet Union and the end of imports as well as the depletion of fields as a result of 
wartime overproduction, was the most pressing problem. It was increased by the MG 
overestimating the amount of food that could be grown in the American zone, and the 
attitude that the Germans should pay for feeding themselves, at the same time as 
Allied restrictions kept German exports at a minimum. 
With little to no fertilizer, lack of manpower and machinery, agriculture in the 
American zone improved only gradually. At the same time a massive influx of 
refugees from the East threatened to push the entire American zone into famine.  
The only solution available was to start importing an increasing amount of 
food, if people were not to starve to death. Despite the imports, the death rate among 
the children and the old rose quickly. During the first year of the American 
occupation 30 percent of children less than one year old died. By 1948, food rations in 
Bizonia were still around half the recommended level, despite the United States and 
Britain spending an estimated 1.5 billion dollars importing food. One reason was the 
continued problems in agriculture.  
The farms of the western zones were still only producing at 60 percent of the 
level before the War. Some of the blame undoubtedly lay with the severe weather 
conditions of 1946 to 1947, but the failure to supply the agricultural sector with vital 
supplies to increase production was clearly also part of the explanation. (Peterson 
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1978:118-120) The situation improved only after the currency reform of June 1948 
and the removal of Allied economic controls that followed it. 
There was also a massive problem delivering enough coal, partly because of a 
shortage of experienced workers. To increase productivity, coal miners were given 
better housing and more generous rations than the rest of the civilian population, at 
around 3000 calories a day. (Latour and Vogelsang 1973:153-154) For the general 
population the goal was 1600 calories a day, but it periodically fell under 1000 
calories a day. During the winter of 1946-47 the calorie distribution averaged 1040 
calories a day, with a bottom at 650 calories a day. (Peterson 1978:118) 
In comparison, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
recommends an average calorie consumption of about 3200 calories per day for men 
and 2300 for women. (Passmore, 1964) Clearly the population in the US zone needed 
additional sources for sustenance, outside of the official, rationed food economy. This 
was usually done through foraging, black marketeering or small-scale farming. 
 
8.e Constraints on exports and inter-zonal trade 
One of the bigger problems of the American economic policy in Germany was how 
the punitive aspects of US policies tended to undermine the efforts to achieve self-
sufficiency, as we just saw when it came to food production. JCS 1067 instructed the 
MG commanders to keep control over exports and imports. 
 
4.9 All foreign exchange transactions, including those arising out of exports 
and imports, shall be controlled with the aim of preventing Germany from 
developing a war potential and of achieving the other directives set forth in 
this directive. (FRUS 1945 III, 502) 
 
These constraints on foreign exports and finance were an example of self-defeating 
American policies. The Reichsmark was not legal tender outside of Germany after the 
war, and the Foreign Trade Section of American MG would only approve of foreign 
trade between Germany and other countries either by barter or in dollars. The dollar 
requirement was a big problem for European countries, which were all running large 
current account deficits with the United States because of the rebuilding after the war. 
They simply did not have dollars to send to Germany, when the few dollar credits 
they had needed to be spent buying more vital supplies directly from the United 
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States. Potential trading partners complained it was easier to trade with the Russian 
zone than with the American.  
 
The Dutch, short on dollars as were they all, were driven to the expedient in 
1947 of destroying the vegetables they were long accustomed to sell to the 
Ruhr and Rhineland although the people there were desperate for food. 
(Peterson 1978:125) 
 
The failure to create the common economic administration for Germany envisaged at 
Potsdam was also contributing to the difficult situation. The four occupying powers 
were pursuing different economic policies, and the level of cooperation between the 
zones was low, with the exception of Bizonia after the merger. 
 In the American zone the effect was magnified by MG policies encouraging 
the Länder to act as autonomous units. This led to border controls being set up to stop 
badly needed industrial output from disappearing out of individual States. (Peterson 
1978:120-132) 
 
8.f Fight against Nationalisation 
It was the stated policy of the United States to leave the handling of the economy in 
German hands as soon as possible, but under American supervision and following 
overall American policies. The MG Commander was instructed: “To the maximum 
extent possible […] you will use German authorities and agencies” in the running of 
the German economy. (FRUS 1945 III:493) This was not so much an outreached hand 
to the German bureaucracy as it was an additional punishment. The Germans were 
tasked with a policy of keeping the German economy in stasis, awaiting successful 
denazificiation, decartellisation and partial deindustrialisation. As a punitive measure, 
the use of the German local and zonal administration to police a hard economic peace 
was a failure. But then the focus of the occupation, both for the MG and the Germans 
moved quickly to keeping the faltering economy running at all in the difficult 
conditions resulting from the zonal divisions and overall economic policies. 
 The American MG was quick to reinstate German administrative 
apparatus on the local and Land level, and from the autumn of 1945, on the zonal 
level through the Länderrat. These German institutions, eventually elected, gave 
legitimacy to American rule at the same time as they reduced the size and 
commitment of the American administration.  
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 The problem for the MG was the irritating habit of the German 
administrators of turning to corporatist solutions or even to nationalisation of industry 
in their effort to rebuild the shattered economy. Draper, Wall Street banker turned 
General and leader of the Economics Division of OMGUS, was less than happy with 
this.  
 Throughout the occupation, calls for nationalisation were ignored or 
disrupted. Clay personally intervened to squash nationalisation laws in Hesse and 
North-Rhine-Westphalia, and to pressure the British into doing the same. Pressure 
was also exerted to split communist and socialist trade unions, isolating the more 
extreme ones, and moderating the rest. (Fulbrook 2002:129-131)  
 Corporatist solutions to the administration of industry were supported by 
both labour unions and trade associations. Laws were proposed in all Western zones 
for the creation of labour councils, formal institutions to regulate industry and the 
economy. In the French zone these councils would work throughout the French 
occupation, and some fragments of this policy would survive for decades after the 
founding of the Bundesrepublik. The British were in principle not hostile to the idea, 
but the implementation was put on hold with the merging with the American zone. 
Only in the American zone was there a fundamental opposition to corporatist 
solutions. The most famous case was the blocking of the Hessian 
Landeswirtschaftsrat (economic council), an agreement between all the major 
employer and labour organisations, and supported by the German Land Government 
and factions of the American MG. It was promptly vetoed by Clay when signed into 
law. (Prowe 1993:313-320) 
Despite the fact that a majority of Germans were in favour of expropriating 
and nationalising industry after the war, this was the area where American 
administrators acted the most forcefully and would leave the most enduring marks. 
The Economics division, under General Draper, in many ways shaped important parts 
of the economic policy in the Bundesrepublik by the foundation they laid by fighting 
tooth and nail against all German attempts at nationalising industry, and against 






8.g Dividing the loot 
As noted earlier, the British might be said to have been following the most 
accommodative policy towards the Germans. The political winds were changing, and 
the policymakers in Washington as well as London had started the move towards anti-
communism which would lead to the gradual abandonment of the restrictive military 
occupation and the division of Germany along ideological lines. 
 With the merger of the British and the American zone on the first day of 1947, 
the American Länderrat was extended to include the British Länder, and the tasks 
assigned to this German-run administration were increased. With the later addition of 
the French zone, this would be the nucleus for the emerging Bundesrepublik. 
 There were some attempts at creating a unified Germany, but they were all 
unsuccessful. The June 1947 all-German conference of Ministerpresidents was the 
final straw for West German politicians (most notably Adenauer and Schumacher). 
The West German Ministerpresidents were neither allowed nor prepared to accept the 
calls for cooperation from their colleagues in the Soviet zone. (Kettenacher 1997:35-
36) 
 The Soviet Union did not give up the policy of reunification until Stalin’s last 
breath in 1953. “It is now clear that Stalin never wanted a separate East German 
state.” (Gaddis 1998:125-127) The last attempt by Stalin to wrestle West Germany 
out of the American sphere of influence was in the spring of 1952. The Americans 
were initially interested, but the British, French and Chancellor Adenauer were 
against it. (Steininger 1985) 
 
8.h Currency reform 
As the attitude of the British and Americans towards the Soviet Union chilled, the 
policies towards the Germans in the Bizone softened. More and more authority was 
put into the hands of the German-run administrative apparatus, and the MG gradually 
withdrew. The German Land administrations were already well established by 1947, 
but with the building up of the Bizone, the scene was set for the emergence of 
German national leaders, and for the emerging West German state. For the 
Americans, who had worked towards grassroots democratisation and decentralisation 
of politics, it must have been disheartening to see how much influence the leaders of 
the two biggest parties, Konrad Adenauer of the CDU/CSU and Kurt Schumacher of 
the SPD, were able to wield.  
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The only real checks on their powers were the Ministerpresidents of the 
Länder. Especially the Ministerpresidents of the former American zone were acting 
independently, as they had been voted into power, as opposed to having been 
appointed in the British zone. (Bavaria, the biggest Land in the south, was by far the 
most independent-minded, calling itself a “Freistaat”, as well as being ruled by its 
own Christian-Social Union party.) (Kettenacher 1997:43) 
The two main political figures of the postwar period, Adenauer and 
Schumacher, had several things in common. They were both prominent politicians of 
the Weimar era. Schumacher had been an SPD member of the Reichstag, Adenauer 
had been Oberbürgermeister of Cologne during the whole Weimar republic. They had 
both been removed from office and prosecuted by the Nazis, although Adenauer’s 
brief capture at the end of the war paled in comparison to Schumacher’s ten harsh 
years in a concentration camp. 
For Schumacher, his and his SPD compatriots fight against the Nazis and their 
survival was proof that only they were morally in a position to rule the new German 
state. Schumacher had come out of the concentration camp a man broken in body (he 
lost one arm and was partially crippled) but hardened in spirit. By far the best known 
and most popular German politician in the first post-war years, he in many ways 
epitomised Germany to ordinary people.  
For Schumacher and many of his followers the Communists were tainted by 
their subservience to the Soviet Union, and by their attacks on the SPD during the 
Weimar era, laying the ground for the ascendance of the National Socialists. The 
bourgeois parties were weakened by their lack of resistance against Hitler during the 
Nazi era, and by their subservience to the Western Allies. They were weak, 
collaborators. Only the SPD had been fighting, and dying. By right of their sacrifice, 
the SPD were destined to rule. (Edinger 1965:144-190) 
Adenauer was the chairman of the CDU in the British zone, and “the most 
cunning of foxes”. (Kettenacher 1997:28) While Schumacher’s SPD had learnt to be 
wary of their ideological cousins in the Communist party after the turmoil of the 
Weimar years and the rise of the Nazis, Adenauer and his CDU tried to build bridges 
with other right-of-centre groupings to maximise their power base.  
Adenauer had belonged to the Catholic Centre party during the Weimar era. 
Many of his ideological allies shared his conviction that the division of Christian 
voters into protestant and catholic parties, and the constant strife between them, 
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helped open the way for the National Socialists. The old Centre party was also guilty 
of signing the Enabling Act of March 23 1933, the virtual death sentence of the 
Weimar republic. (Schwarz 1986:478-484) 
The CDU worked towards gaining as broad a voting base as possible. For 
most of the occupation period this involved calling for collectivist approaches like 
corporatist control of the economy and nationalisation of selected industries. The most 
concrete evidence of the relatively left-wing policies of the early CDU can be found 
in the January 1947 Ahlen programme for German economic recovery. (Schwarz 
1986:539-541) 
Strong forces within the new party wanted to call it the Christian Social 
Union, a proposal voted down partially for tactical reasons. The fact that the Bavarian 
part of the Christian Union is still called that, probably says more about the 
Bavarians’ independent spirit than their socialist leanings, then as now. 
Despite this, Schumacher’s SPD seemed to be ascendant in the Western zones. 
Schumacher himself was clearly the best known and most respected German 
politician in the years after the war. His determined stance against Nazism, and the 
suffering he had endured because of it, made him into a symbol of German pride. Not 
all Germans were collaborators in the war.  
But in the summer of 1948 a wind of change was blowing, in which 
Schumacher’s unbending will lost out to Adenauer’s more pragmatic power politics. 
In the American financial division of the MG, and in the German administrative 
apparatus, the need for a currency reform had been discussed for years. The first 
American plan was on the table in the summer of 1945, and the Germans submitted 
over 250 different proposals for a reform. They were all postponed or shelved, for 
different reasons.  
The most important reason was that the Americans were still working towards 
the goal of a unified Germany. And instituting a new currency in only parts of 
Germany would lead to a de facto partition of the country into different economic 
zones. But with the relationship with the Soviet Union rapidly cooling, and with 
Bizonia a reality and France willing to compromise, the decision to cut the Soviet 
zone off was taken. In Frankfurt, the administrative centre of Bizonia, Ludwig Erhard 
had been chosen as the head of the Economics Council. The American and British 
MG had by this time presented dozens of plans for currency reform, which was 
considered vital for reviving the German economy. Erhard built on these proposals, 
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and got a new currency reform approved by the Allies. The Currency reform, 
instituted in June 1948 also included, to the apparent surprise of the Western allies, 
the removal of most price controls and other state controls on the economy.  
Ludwig Erhard more or less built his reputation on the response he gave when 
MG economic advisors told him that deregulation was beyond his authority. When 
asked by him what law prohibited him from doing so, the MG officers read him the 
law saying that he could not change MG regulations.  To which Erhards famous reply 
purportedly was “Ich habe sie nicht verändert, ich habe sie abgeschafft!“ (Peterson 
1978:191)  
It is a measure of the increasingly important and independent position of the 
German administrative apparatus that Clay did not fire Erhard on the spot, like 
Erhards predecessor had been, for much less of an offence. Instead Clay backed 
Erhard, and most price controls were lifted on June 25 1948. 
The currency reform, which substituted the nearly worthless Reichsmark with 
a new West-German Deutschmark, was on the one hand the largest move towards a 
division of Germany up to that date. On the other hand it was a vital step in 
revitalising an economy that had since the end of the war been mainly barter- and 
black market-based.  
Whether the following economic boom was the result of the currency reform 
and lifting of economic controls (as Erhard saw it) or the Marshall Aid (which I will 
return to shortly), or as some historians see it, already in process by the time of these 
events (Abelshauser 1991:367-409), there was no doubt by the time of the federal 
elections in the spring of 1949 that conditions were improving. Adenauer, who wisely 
had persuaded Erhard to switch party from the Liberal Democrats (later Freie 
Democratische Partei, FDP) to his own CDU was able to take full advantage of this in 
the election campaign. While there were undoubtedly other factors involved in the 
surprise CDU win in the first German elections, such as strong anticommunism and, 
according to some, Schumachers divisiveness (Edinger 1965), the state of the 
economy clearly helped propel Adenauer into the chancellorship. With Erhard 
onboard as a strong counterweight, Adenauer was able to neutralise the left wing of 
the CDU/CSU coalition, to ditch the Ahlen plan once and for all and to opt for a 
laissez-faire economy with a social security net, somewhat misleadingly labelled 
“social market economy”. 
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8.i Marshall Aid 
On June 5 1947 General Marshall held his famous speech announcing what would 
later be known as the Marshall Plan. Due to a series of interlocked crises, primarily 
the British financial crisis, the continued economic troubles in Germany as well as 
weakening economies and strong communist challenges in France, Austria and Italy, 
the US promised to offer what was at the time an enormous sum of money as loans 
and grants to aid European recovery. (Pharo and Nordahl 1972:79) Or as the orthodox 
narrative goes: 
 
In France and Italy powerful communist fifth columns were thriving upon the 
protraction of the post-war paralysis and the inability of governments to deal 
with it. An unusually harsh winter, followed by devastating drought in most of 
Europe, made starvation in the coming winter a real possibility since none of 
the European countries possessed the means for purchasing food overseas. 
(Warburg 1953:46-47)  
 
Newer literature has asked questions about whether the crisis was really as severe as 
contemporary American rhetoric would have it. Along with this, economic historians 
have also over the last decades started to ask whether the Marshall Aid really was 
responsible for turning Europe around economically. They point out that the aid, in 
relation to gross domestic product in the target countries, was relatively low, and that 
a recovery from the harsh winter of 1946/1947 was already well under way when the 
Marshall Aid finally got under way in early 1948. (Killick 1997:94-102)  
Critics are also right to point out that despite the publicity the amount of US 
aid given through the Marshall Plan almost exactly equalled the aid given in the three 
first post-war years. Despite German recovery being one of the main goals of the 
Marshall Aid, West Germany would get less per head than any other major nation 
receiving Marshall Aid. And in principle all of it was given as loans. (Although two 
thirds of the debt incurred by Germany during the US occupation would be cancelled 
in the beginning of the 1950’s.) 
In one area, thought, the Marshall Aid served a very important function. As a 
symbol of US political commitment to Western Europe in general and West Germany 
in particular, it had an immense effect. 
  
There is another reason for the Plan's continued vitality. It has transcended 
reality and become a myth. To this day, a truly astonishing number of 
Germans (and almost all advanced high school students) have an idea what the 
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Marshall Plan was, although their idea is very often very inaccurate. They 
think the Marshall Plan was aid given exclusively to West Germany; that it 
was given in the form of a vast amount of dollars (cash); that it was an outright 
gift from the U.S. Many Germans believe that the Marshall Plan was alone 
responsible for the economic miracle of the Fifties. And when scholars come 
along and explain that reality was far more complex, they are sceptical and 
disappointed. (Stern 2001) 
 
As a symbol of support and cooperation, the Marshall Plan has outlived and outshone 
all other US policies in West Germany. Whenever I discussed the topic of this thesis 
during my visits to Germany, the response from young Germans would immediately 
be “Ah, the Marshall Plan, right?” Well-publicised largesse goes a long way towards 

























9. Germany: A comparative look 
 
The United States has been involved in military occupations with the intent of 
creating stable, friendly regimes since the Maine went up in a cloud of gunpowder 
and dubious intelligence in Havana harbour in 1898. This chapter outlines this 
brokered history of interventions, and compares the occupation Germany with them. 
Further, I compare the occupation of Germany to my definition of nation-building, 
especially when it comes to the issue of strength of state institutions, and put forth the 
theory that the German occupation, along with Japan, differs from other US 
occupations in that there was a concerted and successful (albeit limited in scope) 
effort to reduce state strength in these countries. 
 
9.a American occupations 
It is difficult to find a common thread in what one might call American nation-
building. At different times the United States has chosen to occupy and administrate 
foreign countries for different reasons, with different goals and using different 
methods. The most consistent theme might be said to be how these military 
interventions have been legitimised to the American public. From the bloody guerrilla 
war in the Philippines a hundred years ago to the bloody guerrilla war in Iraq, 
American civilian and military leaders have used the prospect of civilising and 
democratising the territories held as a reason for their presence. (Boot 2002) 
 While there is some connection between these occupations and what was 
attempted in them, the differences are also striking. And the strategic considerations 
as well as the rationale for these military interventions have changed according to the 
larger waves of American foreign policy.  
In short, the history of American interventions can be divided into seven 
different phases. The first, imperialist period, saw the United States “rediscovering” 
the Monroe doctrine, using it as a pretext to extend its influence in the Western 
hemisphere. The Spanish-American war of 1898, where the United States threw the 
old colonial power Spain out of the Caribbean and the Pacific, was the prime example 
of this period. The result was the annexation of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and 
Guam, and the conditional independence of Cuba. 
The new independent Cuba was somewhat of an American puppet state. The 
first president was Tomás Estrada Palma, an American citizen who initially favoured 
 102
the American annexation of the island. The so-called Platt amendment, which detailed 
strict conditions for the withdrawal of American troops, was enshrined in the Cuban 
constitution. Among these conditions were the right of the US to intervene military in 
Cuba, as well as indefinite leases of military bases on Cuban territory, including 
Guantanamo Bay. (Bevans 1971:1116-17) Likewise the creation and propping up of 
the new Panamanian state is most easily explained as an American imperialist project, 
with the goal of creating an American-controlled channel through the Isthmus. 
Less blatantly imperialistic was the period from the beginning of the First 
World War and through the 1920’s. Inspired to a degree by Wilsonian idealism the 
United States used its newly won hegemony of the Western hemisphere to try to turn 
struggling Central American and Caribbean states into more stable democratic 
nations. These efforts included the 1915-1934 military occupation of Haiti, the 1916-
1924 occupation of the Dominican Republic and the 1926-1933 occupation of 
Nicaragua. Several incursions to prop up the struggling regimes of Panama and Cuba 
can be considered continuations of earlier US commitments to these countries. The 
nasty guerrilla war in the American protectorate of the Philippines was finally 
quenched in this period, after nearly two decades of atrocities by both sides of the 
conflict, and the death of between 200.000 and 1 million Filipinos as well as about 
4000 American soldiers. (Smallman-Raynor 1998; Boot 2002)
 These interventions could hardly be called smashing successes. And there was 
strong opposition within the United States against what was considered colonial 
adventures. One can question how heartfelt the attempts at democratisation and 
reform really were. A cynic might call the relatively modest reform programs of these 
occupations a mix of “white man’s burden” and an attempt at stilling the considerable 
domestic opposition to these foreign adventures. 
The Franklin Roosevelt administration, under financial strain and bent on 
solving problems at home rather than financing foreign adventures, stopped the policy 
of interventions, and tried to influence the US ”back yard” through diplomacy. (The 
“Good Neighbourhood” initiative.)  
 The next period of American military occupation was the immediate post-
World War Two era. If the establishment of stable democracies can be considered the 
criterion for success of American military occupations, this was the period in which 
the American Army could do almost nothing wrong. Most famous are the occupations 
of Germany and Japan. Less often mentioned are the occupations of Italy and Austria, 
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also part of the fascist forces fighting against the Allies, as well as the limited 
occupation of South Korea. Austria has been a generally stable country since the end 
of the war, while Italy has had a rougher ride. The austere economic policies followed 
by the Christian Democrats after the war led to social and political turmoil and a 
lacklustre economy.  But despite runaway inflation and governments and the only 
slowly diminishing communist threat, post-war Italian developments are generally 
considered a success. (Geppert 2003) 
 The Cold War was surprisingly low on American nation-building exercises, 
considering the vastly increased strategic reach and interests of the United States. 
After “successfully” stalemating the Chinese forces in Korea, US troops in South 
Korea were content with letting dictators rule, as long as they kept the territory out of 
the hands of the North Koreans. In South Vietnam the Americans had to drop their 
support for the resident dictator and made a few half-hearted attempts at 
democratising under increasing pressure from the Vietcong guerrillas. The 
democratisation efforts petered out with the stepping up of the “Vietnamization” (i.e. 
withdrawal) efforts.  
In Cambodia, the American surrogate regime was replaced with the Khmer 
Rouge after the US withdrawal. Hardly a victory for democratisation. The 
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in 1983 ended with a couple of hundred dead US 
Marines and a withdrawal a few months later. The only success stories as the Cold 
War neared its end were the lightning strikes on, and withdrawal from, the communist 
powerhouse of Grenada (in 1983) and the deposing and incarceration of the 
supposedly drug-smuggling president Noriega of Panama (in 1989). These two 
Caribbean nations are the only examples, except for the immediate post-World War 
Two occupations, of countries that have stayed democratic since the end of American 
or allied Military Government. (Collier 1993) 
 The end of the Cold War led to a renaissance for ambitious projects of nation-
building. The start was not very promising. In Somalia in 1993, US and UN forces got 
embroiled in warlord power-struggles, took some casualties, and fled. This was the 
first big foreign policy debacle of the Clinton presidency. As post-communist regimes 
and third world countries imploded all over the world, the Clinton administration used 
humanitarian missions in failed states to realign the American system of military 
alliances from containment of the Soviet Union to spreading peace, democracy and 
market liberalism in Haiti (1994-96) Bosnia Herzegovina (1995-present) and (after a 
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short offensive air war) Kosovo (1999-present.) Or in the words of the “Big Dog” 
himself: 
 
DIMBLEBY:  The role of the President is to define during his watch, 
America’s place in the world and you have talked about crises coming at you 
all the time.  Would you agree that America’s response to crises was very 
uneven, sent out an uncertain signal. For instance you were prepared to use 
bombing raids to save Kosovo, you weren’t prepared to lift a finger for 
Rwanda, where eight hundred thousand people were massacred in a genocide.  
 
CLINTON:  Well, I would agree to some extent that the response was uneven, 
but I would not agree with the characterisation of it.  Let me try to give a 
serious answer to that.  It was predictably uneven because at the end of the 
Cold War, we no longer had a bi-polar world.  We had to figure out how we 
were going to do what I thought we should do. What I wanted America to do 
was to be the world’s leading force for peace and freedom and security 
and prosperity.  Helping to integrate this interdependent world in to a 
more effective global community.  
 
At the same time, we had obligations that we had inherited from before and 
we had limits on what we could do.  We didn’t go in to Bosnia as quickly as I 
wanted to, but that was mostly because of initial European reluctance, so I was 
trying to do two things;  I was trying to end the slaughter of the Bosnian War, 
but to do it in a way that would increase European integration, and 
increase the trans-Atlantic partnership… 
 (Transcript from Panorama, BBC One June 22, 2004, emphasis mine) 
 
The results in the targets of this democratisation effort are rather mixed. The Haitian 
government was felled in a later coup supported by the United States. Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Kosovo were both ethnically cleansed by the local majorities before 
the end of hostilities, and NATO troops are still present in both territories to ensure 
the peace. Despite economic aid to Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina at a level that 
dwarfed the assistance to Germany and Japan on a per capita basis, economic growth 











(Source: Dobbins et al. 2003:xviii) 
 
 Despite this, the new wave of nation-building was a very welcome tool for 
integration and realignment of transatlantic ties with the European powers. American 
willingness to commit itself to Europe’s “back yard” and the (relatively) clear 
humanitarian nature of these missions made them popular among the Europeans. 
 The last epoch of American nation-building exercises, during Bush the second, 
was not as “idyllic.” Despite NATO’s invoking the self defence clause of the NATO 
charter, thereby affirming the new post-war alliance system, the Bush Administration 
initially refused to involve the whole of NATO, and instead cherry-picked allies to 
take part in the war and the later occupation of Afghanistan. This would prove to be 
only a prelude to the clash between the Allies in the runup to the Iraqi war, however. 
After trouncing the Iraqi army, the United States and its “coalition of the willing” 
were quickly engulfed in an urban guerrilla war beyond their control. 
 With the widening failure of the “neo-colonial” adventure in Iraq, the United 
States has in a way come full circle from its first colonial exploits. As I have outlined, 
American military occupations started with the capture of Spain’s American and 
Pacific colonies, sparking off an intense wave of internal dissent. Then followed a 
string of interventions in unstable Caribbean nations, driven by a mix of Wilsonian 
liberalism and the desire to strengthen the American strategic hold over Central 
America. After withdrawing most overseas troops during the recession era, the United 
States suddenly found itself with millions of troops in the middle of Europe and all 
over the Pacific at the end of the Second World War. The Cold War interregnum was 
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followed by Clinton’s neoliberalism, which was mixed with the US attempt at 
realigning its network of alliances to keep its place as the number one superpower. 
And finally, the Bush administration decided to return to unilateral policies and to 
sidestep its formal alliance network. Sparking off a wave of external dissent.   
 
9.b Measures of nation-building success 
 
American military occupations can in general be divided into three distinct categories: 
Occupations during war, occupations with the goal of annexing territory, and 
occupations with the goal of creating a client state/friendly regime.  
This has, at least after the end of the Cold War, meant a policy of nation-
building that can be seen as having five main goals: The absence of war, the 
reestablishment of a successful monopolisation of violence, positive economic 
development, (re)introduction of democracy and the increase of institutional 
capacities. (Zuercher 2006:10-12) 
For any foreign occupation, or for that matter any kind of effective rule of a 
people, some degree of consent from those to be ruled is needed. Max Weber 
famously said "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". (Weber in Gerth 
1946:77-126) In a nation-building exercise, the monopolisation of violence is a 
pivotal part of the success of the occupying power, following only the cessation of 
open warfare itself in importance. If the occupying army is not able to quickly and 
legitimately end open warfare and then monopolise the use of violence, it will be very 
difficult to use the same army as a tool to reshape the political, social and economic 
structure of the society it is attempting to control. 
 The relatively successful monopolising of the “legitimate” use of force in 
Germany and Japan does separate these occupations from many, but not all, American 
nation-building exercises. But no American democratisation effort has succeeded 
where American forces have not been able to reach this basic level of control. 
The difference in economic development of Germany and Japan versus other 
examples of nation-building is frequently put forward as a primary reason for the 
differences in success. (Bellin 2004:597-598)  Germany and Japan were advanced 
industrialised nations at the time of their occupation. They were, as the economist 
Luigi Zingales put it, like a business whose factory burnt down. To restart production, 
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what was needed was only the capital and time to rebuild. He compares this to the 
situation in Iraq, which has never achieved a comparably advanced level of economic 
development, and where the social and human capital to get to that level is lacking. 
(Zingales 2003) 
As I have been trying to show, the economic situation in Germany after the 
war was slightly more complicated. If we are to play along with Zingales comparison, 
the German factory did not really burn down. It was damaged, but could not get spare 
parts to repair its machinery, nor raw materials to produce finished goods, due to 
bureaucratic red tape and hostile officials. Dower (1999) paints the same picture of 
punitive and inefficient policies in the occupation of Japan. When the economies were 
finally freed, the phenomenal growth that followed helped to cement the legitimacy of 
the new ruling parties.  
 
9.c Democratic stability 
As has been pointed out in several comparative studies on American nation-building, 
Germany and Japan had, unlike many of the failed states where the United States has 
intervened, a history of at least partial democratic rule. (Pey and Kasper 2003; Bellin 
599-600)  
 
Nation building in target countries that have had periods of constitutional rule 
– characterized by the effective rule of law and binding limits on the 
governments’ power – is more likely to succeed. The importance of such an 
experience of constitutionalism, however brief, is that political behaviour in 
these societies is more likely to be subject to the most fundamental rules of 
governing. Political conflicts get settled through established institutional 
procedures. (Pei and Kasper 2003) 
 
Despite widely held contemporary views in the West that both Germany and Japan 
were “authoritarian by nature,” there is no doubt that both countries could draw upon 
pre-dictatorship democratic political elites to help smooth the transition back into 
more democratic forms of government. I have discussed the return to power of the 
Weimar party elites earlier in this thesis, outlining the process as it unfolded in 
Western Germany.  
In the other societies with traces of democratic traditions, the post-conflict 
political situation was either defined along ethnic or sectarian lines (Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Iraq, Afghanistan) and/or US military power was willingly or unwillingly turned into 
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an asset among competing domestic power structures in the occupied country. (Pei 
and Kasper 2003; Hartlyn 1991)  
States that are so weak that an intervention force is required to prevent them 
from descending into civil war, or where the political elites are so uncommitted to the 
democratic process that they are prepared to use violence to deal with their 
opposition, have little in common with the situation in Germany and Japan after the 
Second World War.  
Eva Bellin, among others, have pointed out how the ethnic homogeneity in the 
two countries made the post-war reconstruction easier. “Conventional wisdom in the 
field suggests that some consensus about national identity, that is, some degree of 
social solidarity, is necessary to prevent the inherently conflictual nature of the 
democratic process from tearing a country apart.” (Bellin 2004:598) Germany and 
Japan (along with Austria and Italy) are unique in that it was not a lack of national 
identity, but an overabundance of nationalism that led to their defeat and occupation. 
The goal in Germany and Japan was to weaken nationalism as a force, not to 
strengthen it, to change the national identity instead of building it up. 
An important caveat is that, albeit there was little ethnic strife in Germany and 
Japan, there was considerable friction between different social and economic classes. 
(As well as the fault-line between Protestants and Catholics in Germany.) Both in 
Japan and Germany, the fascist governments preceding the American occupation, 
have been seen as resulting from an increasingly bitter struggle between working class 
and middle class and capitalist ideologies. Had there not been an occupation force in 
place, it is far from unthinkable that a period of severe social unrest or even revolution 
or civil war could have followed the defeat.  
 
9.d “Institutions matter” 
 
As case after case of failed democratization in the postcolonial world has 
shown, order is prior to liberty. Before democracy, you must have a state of 
law, with effective state institutions that can deliver fair, predictable order to 
citizens. (Bellin 2004:599) 
 
While Hitler’s rule can hardly be called the fairest regime to ever grace the Earth, its 
bureaucracy was remarkably good at following laws and orders. To a large degree, its 
bureaucracy was a continuation of the Weimar and Wilhelmian meritocratic rule-
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bound administrations. Large parts of this bureaucracy would continue to work under 
and after the American occupation. The situation was likewise in Japan, where the 
situation was made even worse for the American occupiers because of a lack of 
proficient Japanese speakers and experts. While there was significant disruption in the 
German bureaucracy, especially on the national and state level, the Japanese 
bureaucracy survived nearly intact. (Pembel 1987; Dower 1999) 
 Why are state institutions important for (re)building a country? The obvious 
answer is that they are needed to administer the efficient running of a state. The 
problem is that it turns out to be very difficult to create effective state institutions. The 
idea that “institutions matter” has come to the fore within the development policy 
community after the spectacular collapse of Argentina in 1997. (World Bank 1997; 
World Bank 2000) This is not a new idea in itself, but it went out of vogue in the post-
Cold war neoliberal wave of the 1990’s. International development aid policy was 
dominated by economists, calling for financial liberalisation and the decrease of the 
scope of institutions in recipient countries. Argentina was not alone in experiencing a 
rapid deflation of both the economy and of state control because of this. Large parts of 
the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia also experienced spectacular busts. The 
conclusion seems to be that a nation is only as strong as its state institutions. 
(Fukuyama 2004:29) Let us look at how to quantify the strength of state institutions. 
 
 
9.e Institutional scope and strength 
The reach of a state’s institutions is decided by two aspects, the scope of the 
institutions and the strength of institutional capacities. The scope of state institutions 
refers to the number of different public functions a government seeks to accomplish. 
An example of state functions is given in The World Bank’s 1997 World 
















 Functions of the state: 
 
Minimal functions:   Providing pure public goods: 
     - Defense 
- Law and order 
     - Property rights 
     - Macroeconomic management 
     - Public health 
     Improving equity: 
     - Protecting the poor 
     - Antipoverty programs 
     - Disaster relief 
 
Intermediate functions:  Addressing externalities: 
- Education 
- Environmental protection 
     Regulating monopoly: 
- Utility regulation 
- Anti-trust    
  
Overcoming imperfect information: 
- Insurance 
- Financial regulation 
- Consumer protection 
     Providing social insurance: 
     - Redistributive pensions 
     - Family allowances 
     - Unemployment insurance 
 
Activist functions:   Coordinating private activity: 
     - Fostering markets 
     - Cluster initiatives 
     Redistribution: 
- Asset redistribution 
 
(Source: World Bank 1997) 
 
This is just an attempt at categorising different state functions. What is important is 
that different functions of the state have different levels of ambition. On this list, the 
further down you go on the list, the more difficult it is for a state to accomplish the 
task. 
 But the scope of state institutions is one thing. How effective the institutions 
are at accomplishing their tasks is another. Francis Fukuyama  defines the strength of 
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institutional capacities as “the ability to formulate and carry out policies and enact 
laws; to administrate efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy; to control graft, 
corruption, and bribery; to maintain a high level of transparency and accountability 
in government institutions; and, most important, to enforce laws.” (Fukuyama 
2004:12) Again, this is just an attempt at a definition.  
A state can choose to have a large scope of state functions, without being very 
efficient at the tasks. Or it can choose to limit the scope of state functions, despite 
being strong at what it does. It can be efficient at doing one set of functions while 
being very weak at doing others. 
The problem for an ambitious state wanting to become stronger is that while it 
is easy to expand the scope of state functions, it is much more difficult to increase the 
strength of institutional capacities. Pumping resources into weak institutions only 
leads to inefficiency and graft. Not adequately funding them leads to corruption and 
bribery. 
But how do you build up the strength of state institutions? The short answer is: 
No one really knows. (Fransisco 2000:45; Woolcock and Pritchett 2002) Fukuyama 
proposes that strength of state institutions are decided by a mix of four “nested aspects 
of stateness.” The first aspect consists of the design of the individual organisations 
and how they are managed. Due to the complex nature of bureaucracy this is 
specialist knowledge that can not be directly transferred from organisation to 
organisation or state to state.  
Another aspect is how the institutions relate to the state as a whole: What kind 
of government a nation has, whether it is centralised, federal, the level of politication 
and so forth helps shape the institutions within it.  
The legitimacy of the institution and the regime also help decide institutional 
strength. (As examples, a weak school system or police will be bypassed by the 
population. A government without legitimacy might weaken its own enforcing arms 
and therefore threaten its own existence.)  
Lastly, cultural and structural factors specific to the specific society in 
question, shape institutions distinct to the society they grow out of. One simple 
example would be different cultures acceptance of bribery, or the status of different 
parts of the bureaucracy within society.  
These four aspects are studied in different academic disciplines, and have 




Components of institutional capacity       
Component   Discipline   Transferability 
 
Organisational design  Management, Public  High 
and management  Administration, Economics 
 
 Institutional design  Political science, Law  Medium 
     Economics 
 
 Basis of legitimisation Political Science  Medium to low 
 
 Social and cultural factors Sociology, Anthropology Low 
 
       (Source: Fukuyama 2004:42) 
 
 
As we can see, increasing institutional strength, the core factor in building up a 
nation, is a complex set of components of different transferability between countries. 
The strength of a state’s institutions is the result of a complex weave of the 
bureaucratic and political apparatus, constitutional framework and laws, and social 
and cultural conditions in society in general. But the institutions also need to have 
legitimacy from the population, both the state apparatus as a whole and the individual 
parts of it.  
 
9.f Weakening the state 
The occupation of Germany, Japan and Austria had one thing in common. The United 
States was there, not in attempt to turn around and strengthen a weak state, but as a 
result of winning a war against aggressors.  
 In this context, it is my view that Germany and Japan are unique. They are the 
only countries the United States has occupied with a stated policy of weakening the 
power of the state. Italy was not considered a serious threat in itself and was freed 
from allied occupation in 1947, after the victory of Christian democrats in the election 
the year before. (Urwin 1997:12-13; Bevans, 1969) Austria was an insignificant 
European power, which insisted on being treated as a country that had been occupied 
by the Nazi’s, instead of joining them. Apart from a denazification programme, 
interference in the occupation zones of the Western Allies in Austria was limited. 
(Bischof, 1999) The (rather sketchy) plans for the occupation of Iraq seems to be 
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inspired by the German and Japanese experiences. While US plans in Iraq were 
generally not as punitive as in Germany and Japan, there was still a wish to  
“transform” the Iraqi state: To reduce its extensive scope of functions, to free the 
market and to reduce the security apparatus. Unfortunately the US administrators 
chose to start with the firing of the Iraqi army and the purging of the Baath members, 
who were more or less the bureaucratic elite. State power collapsed and the jobless 
former Army personnel and Baath party members turned into the nucleus in an armed 
resistance against US troops. 
 The view that German and Japanese authoritarianism was a generic trait of 
these cultures was widespread among American policy-makers at the end of the 
Second World War. To limit the future threat from these two countries it was 
therefore decided to reduce their industrial capacity and to weaken of their state 
apparatus through decentralisation and constitutional controls. (Japan still has, at the 
time of writing, a constitution technically forbidding the country from having a 
military capacity.) 
 Like in Japan, the German occupation had the goal of limiting the capabilities 
of the new German state. The economy and the government were to be decentralised 
and “democratised”; the military capabilities destroyed. The goal was to limit the 
economic and foreign policy power of Germany. As the conflict between the US and 
USSR intensified (and with the help of the stalemate with the French) this was 
eventually to be accomplished by binding the West German parts into an Atlantic 
economic and military cooperative sphere.  
 The Americans hoped to decrease the power of the German state apparatus 
through two main paths. By decentralising the power structure and encouraging 
grassroots democracy, they hoped to decrease the institutional power of a future 
central administration. At the same time, they wished to decrease the scope of state 
responsibilities. Most notably this included the abolition of military forces. The 
corporative control over German industry was seen as one of the reasons for the initial 
success of Germany in the war, and was to be built down too, being replaced with the 
more “peaceful” free market. There was also to be a clear diminishing of the scope of 
the state by the fact that the territory to be administered by the new German state was 
decreased dramatically.  
Considering the relative strength and scope of German administrative 
capabilities, the punitive policies that survived the softening of American attitudes 
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towards Germany were rather minor. The effect of these policies was also weakened 
by the fact that the American Military Government was itself a state institution, 
subject to the same limitations of its powers as other types, as I have outlined above. 
And as I have tried to outline in this thesis it was in many of its areas quite weak. 
Compared to the typical case of American nation-building, the situation in 
Germany and Japan was completely atypical. Apart from the post-war years and to a 
certain degree Iraq, the United States has only attempted what I define as nation-
building in failed or weak states. Instead of a weakening of the strength of the state, 
the goal in these countries has been to enormously increase the strength of state 
institutions, as competent and strong state institutions seems to be essential for viable 
democracy and economic growth.  
If we go back to table 9.3 and look at the model of institutional strength, a 
military occupation apparatus has to strengthen the indigenous administration on 
many different levels. The Military Government is itself both an institution of the 
occupier and the occupied. It needs to straddle the void between two often widely 
different cultures, while attempting to impose positive change. While it is possible to 
decrease state capacity (or keeping aloof of it, in the style of British colonial rule) by 
enforcing it through nothing more than a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, 
increasing state capacity is not as simple. “Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous 
experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western 
models of social, political, and economical organization into war-shattered states in 
order to control civil conflict.” (Paris 1997:56) 
 
9.g MG Outcompeted 
The problem of developing institutions is exasperated by the danger external 
organisations may pose to weak state institutions. When outside organisation set up 
parallel public services (like health care, schools or security) to bypass weak state 
institutions, they might starve the already weak institutions, ending up weakening 
them even more. After all, why would a state finance a state institution that has been 
rendered irrelevant by outside or private institutions. A well known example of this 
was Mozambique in the 1980’s, when non-governmental organisations (ngos) ended 




In Afghanistan right now there is considerable tension between the central 
government (which has little capacity to deliver humanitarian relief and 
services but feels that it should coordinate the effort) and international ngos 
(which has greater capacity and experience). For the time being, ngos are the 
most effective channel for delivering aid, but if government institutions are not 
allowed to take more long-term responsibility, nation building will fail. 
(Ottaway 2002) 
 
The American Military Government in Germany also had to deal with institutional 
atrophy. But in the US zone it was mainly the Americans themselves who were being 
weakened and supplanted by the re-emerging German administrations. As the 
American war-time army stood down, the specially educated MG officers with 
German expertise were sent back to the United States. The officers left were often 
mediocre personnel with no hope of a better paid job back in the United States. The 
result was that local MG officers often ended up just shuffling on reports from 
German subordinates with real administrative expertise. According to Peterson (1978: 
347-9) OMGUS became captive to German internal political developments because of 
the lack of institutional strength. Because leaving the decisions to the Germans turned 
out to be the easiest solution to administrative problems, the American MG was 
slowly being controlled by the German bureaucrats under its rule. 
 The military occupation of Japan relied even more heavily on the local 
administrative apparatus, due to both a lack of administrative personnel and expertise. 
To the Japanese, the American military governor MacArthur seemed to rule more by 
charismatic power than through bureaucratic channels. (Dower 1999) Reforms were 
instituted, and mediated, by the Japanese bureaucracy, after being ordered by the few 
American MG officers at the top. In Austria as well as in Italy, the indigenous 
administrative apparatus was strong enough to influence the military governments that 












This work is aimed at establishing whether the US occupation of Germany after the 
Second World War was a representative case of nation-building.  
 Other studies have pointed out a series of differences between Germany and 
Japan on one side and other US military interventions on the other, mainly along the 
lines of differences in political, economic and social developments in the target 
country. (Pei and Kasper 2003; Bellin 2004; Fukuyama 2004) But, as I outlined in the 
introduction, one of the central elements of nation-building is the strengthening of the 
state apparatus as a tool, so it can handle economic, political and cultural 
developments.  
 I have endeavoured to go further in this thesis, asking to what degree the basic 
aims and policies pursued by the United States in Germany and Japan might be 
considered nation-building. What I found was that Germany and Japan are different 
from other American-led nation-building exercises in a crucial area, namely the 
punitive aspect of the occupation.  
 Concentrating on Germany, I discussed in chapter two and three how US 
planning and policy had a strong element of punishment and collective judgement at 
its core. The stated goals of the US occupation were anti-fascist; to rid Germany of its 
authoritarian tendencies, to punish the Nazi party membership and their supporters, to 
stop Germany from ever again threatening world peace. I then outlined how this 
antifascist policy was gradually hollowed out by a wide range of factors involving US 
politics, German conditions and allied pressure, and eventually converged on a 
Western consensus of anti-communism.  
 This study is the first one within the field of nation-building research to point 
out that US policy in Germany was to weaken state power, not to strengthen it. What 
emerged after the occupation was hardly the Carthagian peace envisioned in the 
Morgenthau plan. But neither was it the result of a targeted set of reforms to 
strengthen a nation. And although the goals changed as the occupation progressed, the 
end product, the West German state, was weakened in certain core areas. (Most 
importantly in central power, military power and geographical reach.)  
 As I discussed in the introduction, the weakening of the German state, whether 
by design or by evolution, does not in itself mean that the American occupation of 
Germany can not be called a nation-building exercise. That judgement depends on 
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which definition of the term nation-building one chooses to apply. But a definition 
suited to accurately encompass the German and Japanese cases would in my opinion 
be very close to also defining imperial or hegemonial client-statism (such as the 
Soviet control of Eastern Europe) as nation-building. 
 In this thesis I therefore chose a definition of nation-building as a military 
intervention where “the intent was to use military force to underpin a process of 
democratization.” (Dobbins et al., 2003:1), and where “[s]uccess is defined as the 
ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions.” (Dobbins, et al. 
2003:2) The US occupation of Germany can, by this definition, hardly be called a 
nation-building exercise, at least not until the introduction of JCS 1779 on July 11 
1947. (Department of State 1950:33-41) And the definition of success is also 
arguable, as doubts can be raised about whether the democratic institutions of the 
Bundesrepublik were mainly indigenous or “transferred.” Any lengthy discussion of 
the occupation of Germany in comparison to these absolute terms is a bit tendentious, 
however, as by doing so I can be accused of choosing definitions that are deliberately 
meant to fail. This would, if it were true, ironically be the opposite of what I consider 
is the case with the work I have quoted the definitions from. As I argue in the 
introduction the RAND study from whence it came has in my opinion deliberately 
chosen data and interpretations that strengthen Germany as a case of what they define 
as nation-building, above and beyond the literature they are referring to. 
 But even if we move from the abstract definition chosen and to actual cases of 
American military interventions, we see that none has gone as far in its punitive 
aspects as the German and Japanese occupations. When the United States has 
intervened to remove an unwanted ruler, the usual strategy has been to punish the 
upper leadership, while trying to strengthen the rest of society, usually along 
democratic lines. The most punitive US interventions outside of Japan and Germany 
are probably the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, where Baath party and Taliban 
members have been purged from most administrative positions, and where the upper 
leadership is getting prosecuted. But in no US occupation outside of Germany and 
Japan has the whole population been a target for judgement. In no other occupations 
were the economies deliberately kept under check “to instil a sense of defeat,” and 




 10.a Degrees of success 
Unfortunately this fundamental difference between the US occupation of Germany 
and Japan and other American military occupations, does not really tell us anything 
substantive about how to successfully remould a country along democratic lines. All it 
does is to raise serious questions about their status as representative cases of US 
nation-building.  
 This is important enough, since without the German and Japanese cases, the 
success-stories of foreign-led nation-building (using the above definition) in general 
would have been very few and far between. While the reasons for going in might not 
have been perfectly consistent with a strict definition of nation-building, the end result 
was nevertheless a stable democratic, market-liberal country. Whether there are 
elements of the occupation that might be translatable to later nation-building attempts 
should also be examined. 
 In the introduction I suggested dividing a nation-building attempt (or a 
supposed one) into five categories of success, here paraphrased from Zuercher 
(2006:2); the end of open warfare, successful monopolisation of violence, economic 
rebuilding, democratic reforms and (re)building state institutions.  
 
10.b End of fighting 
The first two points were undoubtedly unconditional successes in the US occupation 
of Germany. And they are important points, as no nation-building exercise has had 
measurable success when it comes to the other factors, where a monopoly of violence 
and an end to open warfare has not been accomplished. But since these points are 
usually equally important in any occupation, the German experience falls into a wide 
category of likewise examples throughout military history.  
 One specific point that might be raised, though, is the issue of force level. The 
failure to pacify Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 has often been blamed on 
insufficient force levels to disarm Iraqis and to keep the peace. The US occupation of 
Germany seems to be a perfect example in so regard. The peacetime occupation 
started off with 1,6 million troops, a level which was decreased as peace took hold. 
Unfortunately the other great post-war success, Japan, had a much lower level of 
occupation troops. While the United States started off with roughly 100 troops per 
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1000 inhabitants in its German zone of occupation, in Japan there were only 5. And in 




  (Source: Dobbins et al. 2003:xvii) 
 
The above numbers are total (not only US) troop numbers in these nation-building 
exercises. Germany is not included, due to the large number of troops early in the 
occupation. Later the number of troops would settle between 10 and 20 per thousand 
inhabitants. 
 What is interesting is comparing these numbers to the Iraqi occupation. Iraq 
has an estimated population of 26.8 million (CIA World Factbook 2006) and the 
number of US and Coalition troops in Iraq is at the moment around 150.000, (a 
number that has been roughly stable during the occupation, and certainly not much 
lower) according to an August 3 2006 speech by Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld. (globalsecurity.org 2006) This gives roughly 5.6 troops per inhabitant, 
comfortably ahead of Japan (as well as Somalia and Haiti) on the chart above. Not 
surprisingly, troop levels are therefore not alone indicative of success. But on the 
other hand, increasing the initial troop level in Iraq could hardly have made the 




The economic aspects of the occupation of Germany can hardly be called a smashing 
success, if viewed as part of a nation-building exercise. The original plans were a mix 
of collective punishment and wishful thinking.  Further problems were created by the 
fact that Germany was never united economically after the war, as was stipulated in 
the Potsdam agreement, mainly due to the vehement opposition of France, but also 
due to disagreements between the other allies.  
 At the same time the United States had as a policy in the first years of the 
occupation not to take any steps to rebuild the German economy. Active plans were 
laid to decrease German industrial capacity, as presented in the Level of Industry 
Plan. The US and British zone did receive economic aid, but this went almost 
exclusively to feed the starving population, and was structured as loans. A raging 
inflation and a thriving black market made US cigarettes the preferred currency, until 
the break with the Soviet Union and agreement with France finally made turning West 
Germany into a single economic unit possible.  
 The Marshall Aid has become the symbol of US-sponsored economic 
assistance, but the consensus among economic historians nowadays seems to be that it 
had less impact on the European recovery at the time than was previously thought. Its 
main benefit was helping to ease the dollar-shortage among US trading partners in 
Europe. Also, West Germany got relatively little Marshall Aid money compared to 
other European nations. (Killick 1997:114-117) Ludwig Erhard’s currency reform of 
early 1948 has, along with the Marshall Plan, been put forward as an explanatory 
factor for the subsequent economic boom. My view is that both of these had an effect, 
although mostly symbolically and psychologically. The most important factor was 
probably the removal of the de facto throttling of the West German economy through 
zonal division and allied punitive policies. 
 
10.d Democracy 
Democratisation is the fourth success criterion of nation-building. German political 
parties were allowed to form only months after the end of the war. (I will get back to 
why later.) In the spring of 1946 local elections were held, and later the same year 
Land level elections were held. Country-level elections took a while longer, and only 
materialised after the break with the Soviet Union and its East German zone, but 
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when they were held in 1949 they signalled the start of a stable democratic system 
that survives to this very day. 
 On the surface this seems like work well done. But as I outlined in the chapter 
on democratisation, there were considerable misgivings within the US MG about how 
the democratisation process was progressing. In their opinion, it was happening too 
fast, and was too anchored in the past. According to US plans, democratisation was 
supposed to come at the tail end of a thorough denazification and re-education of the 
Germans, where the goal was to create an American-style loose party structure 
democratic system with a strong grassroots element. 
 What did emerge, after the genuine grassroots Antifa-movement was 
suppressed, were the moderate Weimar parties. But as shown in chapter five, 
OMGUS had only limited options available after banning this leftist movement. The 
West German political scene can hardly be called a US creation either. It was created 
in many ways in opposition to the “national” parties in Berlin, which many Germans 
in the west considered to be controlled by the Soviet Union, and coalesced in the 
British zone.  
 The British zone became the focal point for West German political growth 
because the British were the only Western ally to allow party structures above the 
Land level. The result was that the leaders and much of the leadership of the by far 
two biggest parties in West Germany, SPD and CDU, came from the British zone. 
 Further, the direction of the new Bundesrepublik was not set until Adenauer of 
the CDU/CSU won a surprise victory against the most famous German politician of 
the occupation era, Kurt Schumacher of the SPD. While Adenauer was happy to tie 
the new West German state to Western Europe and the United States, Schumacher 
was advocating a united, neutral Germany built on democratic and socialist principles: 
A third way between the Soviet and the American systems.  
The United States, as well as the other Western allies, had two important 
weapons in shaping the political future of the Bundesrepublik. They could set the 
limits of the burgeoning federal political system, and they had veto power. These 
weapons were used actively to keep communists and nationalist forces out of the 
political system. But these weapons had, by their nature, to be used sparingly, 
especially towards the end of the process towards statehood. Otherwise the allies 
might have ended up threatening the legitimacy of the German political institutions. 
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 The extent of the grip over German party developments held by the US MG is 
a topic too voluminous and detailed for this thesis. What is clear in a comparative 
perspective is that the democratisation of the Bundesrepublik benefited from its 
democratic past. The biggest parties were reconstituted Weimar parties, complete with 
Weimar party leadership. 
 Unfortunately this inheritance from the Weimar era also included some of the 
autocratic traditions of that era. Adenauer would rule West Germany until 1963 with a 
firm hand. Not until after his departure from power were many of the issues the 
United States planners were aiming to deal with, actually confronted head on. During 
the late 1960’s West Germany finally started in earnest the process of dealing with its 
painful Nazi past. Youths confrontationally asked “What did you do during the war, 
father?” and rebelled against post-war authoritarianism and demands for conformity. 
 In Japan, which held its first national elections early into the occupation, the 
progress towards a fully democratic system might be said still not to be complete. The 
country has been ruled largely by the same party since the end of the war, and there is 
continued friction with neighbouring countries over Japan’s perceived refusal to deal 
with its wartime history.  
 
10.e State institutions  
I have returned several times to the issue of the limits of US power in its dealings with 
the Germans and its allies. In many ways this relative powerlessness is the one overall 
theme of the US occupation of Germany. Only after an almost complete breakdown in 
the relationship with the Soviet Union, were the Americans able to move forward with 
the creation of a state in the Western zones. 
 While US powerlessness was most glaring in the allied wrangling over the 
future of Germany, it was also quite visible in the MG’s dealings with the Germans 
under its control. OMGUS’s logistics operation was able (barely) to keep the 
Germans under US control alive, but other areas of US administration were more 
problematic. And the weak institutional strength of the MG only got weaker as 
experienced specially-trained personnel was decommissioned and sent back home, 
being replaced with often untrained, second-rate officers and troops. The simplest 
answer to failing MG administration was to “outsource” responsibilities to German 
subordinates. 
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 Every time OMGUS decided that a new area was to be put into German hands, 
be it the local administrative apparatus, the economy, denazification and so forth, the 
Military Government found not only willing, but able German hands to do the job. In 
the perspective of German history, this willingness is not in itself extraordinary, as the 
administrative apparatus had a long history of adjusting to change. If we move our 
perspective from Germany to a world perspective, and compare what was done in 
Germany with what was attempted in other nation-building exercises, we see how rare 
this cooperation was. 
 In Japan, where there was no aggressive purge of members of the old ruling 
elite like the denazification effort in Germany, the US reliance on indigenous state 
institutions was even more glaring. The vast majority of the Japanese bureaucracy 
continued in their job, only switching bosses, after the surrender. (Dower 1999) 
 In the previous chapter I discussed at length the importance of strong state 
institutions and the difficulty in building them up, so I will not spend much time 
recapitulating the issues here. Suffice to say that building and strengthening state 
institutions is a very complex endeavour that if it is to be successful has to be tailored 
specifically to the needs, cultural attitudes and conditions of the society in which they 
are created. One size does not fit all when it comes to state institutions. Luckily for 
the United States in Germany and Japan, the US was not aiming to strengthen state 
institutions for the most part. If nation-building history is any guide, such efforts 
would probably have been doomed to failure. 
 In absolute terms the Americans were actually interested in weakening these 
state systems, as they saw the exceptionally strong state systems of Germany and 
Japan as one of the reasons for the war. Mostly this process involved cutting down on 
the scope of the state, like banning the military and curbing state “meddling” in the 
economy. But central administrative power was also attempted curbed, with the goal 
being a more decentralised, federal system. 
 One of the problems for OMGUS was that it was both an organisation 
responsible for German developments, and therefore having to conform to German 
social and cultural norms and expectations, while at the same time being an American 
organisation, staffed by and controlled by US interests. It was therefore beholden also 
to US social and cultural values, and reflected American attitudes towards Germans 
and the occupation. On top of that, OMGUS had to get agreement from three allies 
with veto powers and their own widely differing opinions about Germany. 
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 Clearly this put the MG under tremendous pressure, and made the choice of 
turning over responsibility in more and more areas to the rather servile German 
administration an obvious choice, since it at least removed one of the problems, the 
clash of cultures at the lower levels of administration. 
 During the early occupation, there were clearly problems with leaving 
administrative tasks to a civil administration that the US intended to purge of Nazi 
sympathisers and transform into more healthy, American ways. And indeed, the MG 
preferred to hand over tasks mostly of a punitive nature, so as not to undermine their 
overall policies. The Germans were tasked with implementing the punitive aspects of 
the early economic policies, and as the denazification effort turned out to be too 
massive an undertaking for the MG, this area too was handed over to Germans. 
Likewise, rebuilding of infrastructure and housing was left in German hands.  
 As the focus moved from anti-fascism to anti-communism, however, the 
problems associated with turning over areas of control to the Germans turned into 
opportunities, simply because the highly efficient German bureaucracy could now be 
used to its full potential to create a bulwark against the communist threat. 
 In comparative perspective, what was remarkable about state institutions in 
Germany and Japan was their exceptional strength. Both countries had highly 
professionalized bureaucracies with a reach and legitimacy that had few equals in the 
world at the time. Most US state institutions at the time were feeble in comparison. (A 
weak state being somewhat of an ideal for large parts of the US electorate.)  
 If we look at most other nation-building exercises, be they US- or UN-led, 
they have tended to be held in states with a weak or failing administrative apparatus. 
In stark contrast to Japan and Germany, there was a massive need to strengthen state 
institutions in these cases, if they were to handle a move towards stable democracy 
and economic growth. 
 Iraq might be said to be somewhat of an exception in this regard. Saddam 
Hussein’s baathist dictatorship had relatively strong state institutions, although they 
were weakened by the Gulf war and its aftermath, as well as being hampered by 
corruption, inefficiency and sectarian differences. As I discussed in chapter nine, state 
institution strength is a complex issue when it comes to Iraq. But whether or not these 
institutions could have been a tool for change has been rendered moot by the security 
situation. Without an end to warfare and a monopolisation of violence there is no 
foundation on which to build democratic institutions. And the relatively weaker Iraqi 
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state institutions could not handle the policies of the US occupiers, which in certain 
areas mirrored Germany and Japan. While the German bureaucracy could handle a 
relatively strict denazification-policy, Iraqi bureaucracy fell apart when the upper 
echelon Baath party members were purged. (Otterman 2005) 
 As I stated in the introduction, there is as far as I know no in-depth analysis at 
the level of this work on the US occupation of Germany as a nation-building exercise. 
The closest study in that regard is the RAND case study on Germany and other post-
World War Two nation-building exercises. (Dobbins et al. 2003) discussed in the 
introduction. Shorter and less detailed than mine, and in my view with problematic 
aspects both in its approach and its conclusions, it offers a relatively rosy view of the 
applicability of lessons from Germany to future nation-building exercises. 
 I do not share this optimism. Even calling the American occupation of 
Germany a nation-building exercise seems a gross simplification. The main 
accomplishment of the occupation seems to have been the restoration of law and 
order, and the subsequent blocking of anti-democratic forces on the left as well as the 
right from a say in the Western zones. Subsequent developments were in many ways 
based on already existing German traditions and institutions, not on imposed external 
ones. To what degree the monopolisation of the means of violence is really 
transferable to all other cases is, however, not clear.  
 
10.f Historical perspective 
If viewed purely as a historical work, this thesis does not really scour the hidden 
depths of the US occupation of Germany nor bring a lot of new information to the 
table. My main original contributions in my historical overview of the American 
occupation of Germany (as opposed to the nation-building aspects listed above), is in 
my opinion to explain the early occupation not as a concerted effort at running away 
from the Morgenthauian policies enforced on the MG by Washington in the last days 
of the war, but as a rear end of a distinct period of time, where anti-fascism had won 
precedence over anti-communism as the chief ideological foe of the United States. As 
I have described, there is a connection between the anti-fascism of the war and the 
anticommunism of the period after World War One and the Cold War, and the United 
States used this fear of fascism to legitimise its presence in Germany. 
 The relatively early start of political activity and elections on the local level 
are often seen as examples of a softening of relations with the Germans. A point 
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rarely given its proper weight is, in my view, that the Soviets started democratisation 
by a surprise legalisation of political parties in their zone right before the Potsdam 
conference, leaving the Western allies scrambling to respond. Since both OMGUS 
and German administrators in the US zone considered it too soon to restart parties and 
hold elections at this time, it seems fair to assume that this would have happened later 
if it had not been for the Soviet initiative. How much later is impossible to say. 
Because of US policies of disallowing parties above the Land level, most of the 
political organisations in the Western zones coalesced in the British Länder. It 
therefore seems safe to conclude that the US hardly took a lead in democratisation in 
this first period of the occupation. The Level of Industry plan of 1946 is also an 
indication that the antifascist, punitive policies of what I have called The Moral 
Occupation was not yet over. 
 The second period of occupation, roughly from mid-1947 and onward I 
interpret mainly in line with the literature I list in the introduction, seeing it as a 
relatively rapid change of focus to anti-communism, a general turn of US policy 
towards British views, working out an agreement with France and handing power 
back to the Germans. Some might argue that this period is the one where a discussion 
of nation-building should be concentrated. This seems rather tendentious, however, as 
the process was one of Germans being freed from foreign occupiers. Nation-building 
reforms were basically limited to telling the German administrative apparatus and 
political forces when they were to take over their own affairs. (With the stick of veto 
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